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8 Georgia opinions name it 1 courts 1980–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jonathan Lamar Perkins v. Stategreen2 sentences2023See Perkins v. State, 360 Ga. App. 782 (1) ( 861 SE2d 621 (2021) (“Because the trial court [ruled on] the motion to suppress in a summary order without explicit findings, ‘we presume that the trial court implicitly made all the findings in support of its ruling that the record would allow.’”), quoting State v. Walden, 311 Ga. 389 ( 858 SE2d 42 ) (2021). 21 seizure; and (4) the government’s legitimate interest in holding the property as evidence.29 Here, “the State had a legitimate interest in holding the electronic devices as evidence,”30 but Black’s possessory interest in his phone was signif 2023See Perkins v. State, 360 Ga. App. 782 (1) ( 861 SE2d 621 (2021) (“Because the trial court [ruled on] the motion to suppress in a summary order without explicit findings, ‘we presume that the trial court implicitly made all the findings in support of its ruling that the record would allow.’”), quoting State v. Walden, 311 Ga. 389 ( 858 SE2d 42 ) (2021). 21 seizure; and (4) the government’s legitimate interest in holding the property as evidence.29 Here, “the State had a legitimate interest in holding the electronic devices as evidence,”30 but Black’s possessory interest in his phone was signif | 1 | 1 |
State v. Waldengreen2 sentences2023See Perkins v. State, 360 Ga. App. 782 (1) ( 861 SE2d 621 (2021) (“Because the trial court [ruled on] the motion to suppress in a summary order without explicit findings, ‘we presume that the trial court implicitly made all the findings in support of its ruling that the record would allow.’”), quoting State v. Walden, 311 Ga. 389 ( 858 SE2d 42 ) (2021). 21 seizure; and (4) the government’s legitimate interest in holding the property as evidence.29 Here, “the State had a legitimate interest in holding the electronic devices as evidence,”30 but Black’s possessory interest in his phone was signif 2023See Perkins v. State, 360 Ga. App. 782 (1) ( 861 SE2d 621 (2021) (“Because the trial court [ruled on] the motion to suppress in a summary order without explicit findings, ‘we presume that the trial court implicitly made all the findings in support of its ruling that the record would allow.’”), quoting State v. Walden, 311 Ga. 389 ( 858 SE2d 42 ) (2021). 21 seizure; and (4) the government’s legitimate interest in holding the property as evidence.29 Here, “the State had a legitimate interest in holding the electronic devices as evidence,”30 but Black’s possessory interest in his phone was signif | 1 | 1 |
Ungar v. Sarafitegreen2 sentences2019Yet, here, as acknowledged in the order denying Black’s motion for new trial, “[t]o date, retained counsel has still not been officially ordered withdrawn from the case.” Nevertheless, Black was forced to go to trial—on criminal charges that potentially (and actually) carried a life sentence—with alternative counsel after receiving legally insufficient notice and none of the requisite inquiry into whether retained counsel should have been permitted to withdraw. (b) The assigned judge also failed to exercise her discretion regarding the possible need for a continuance by instructing appointed c 2019Yet, here, as acknowledged in the order denying Black’s motion for new trial, “[t]o date, retained counsel has still not been officially ordered withdrawn from the case.” Nevertheless, Black was forced to go to trial—on criminal charges that potentially (and actually) carried a life sentence—with alternative counsel after receiving legally insufficient notice and none of the requisite inquiry into whether retained counsel should have been permitted to withdraw. (b) The assigned judge also failed to exercise her discretion regarding the possible need for a continuance by instructing appointed c | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Greekgreen2 sentences2019Yet, here, as acknowledged in the order denying Black’s motion for new trial, “[t]o date, retained counsel has still not been officially ordered withdrawn from the case.” Nevertheless, Black was forced to go to trial—on criminal charges that potentially (and actually) carried a life sentence—with alternative counsel after receiving legally insufficient notice and none of the requisite inquiry into whether retained counsel should have been permitted to withdraw. (b) The assigned judge also failed to exercise her discretion regarding the possible need for a continuance by instructing appointed c 2019Yet, here, as acknowledged in the order denying Black’s motion for new trial, “[t]o date, retained counsel has still not been officially ordered withdrawn from the case.” Nevertheless, Black was forced to go to trial—on criminal charges that potentially (and actually) carried a life sentence—with alternative counsel after receiving legally insufficient notice and none of the requisite inquiry into whether retained counsel should have been permitted to withdraw. (b) The assigned judge also failed to exercise her discretion regarding the possible need for a continuance by instructing appointed c | 1 | 1 |
Roberts v. Stategreen2 sentences2018Moreover, to the extent that Black’s motion could be construed as seeking to vacate or modify his convictions, “a petition to vacate or modify a judgment of conviction is not an appropriate remedy in a criminal case,” id. at 218 (1), and any appeal from an order denying or dismissing such a motion must be dismissed, see id. at 218 (2); see also Roberts v. State, 286 Ga. 532, 532 ( 690 SE2d 150 ) (2010). 1 Black was subject to the 2005 versions of these statutes at the time he committed the offenses. 2018Moreover, to the extent that Black’s motion could be construed as seeking to vacate or modify his convictions, “a petition to vacate or modify a judgment of conviction is not an appropriate remedy in a criminal case,” id. at 218 (1), and any appeal from an order denying or dismissing such a motion must be dismissed, see id. at 218 (2); see also Roberts v. State, 286 Ga. 532, 532 ( 690 SE2d 150 ) (2010). 1 Black was subject to the 2005 versions of these statutes at the time he committed the offenses. | 1 | 1 |
Harper v. Stategreen2 sentences2018Moreover, to the extent that Black’s motion could be construed as seeking to vacate or modify his convictions, “a petition to vacate or modify a judgment of conviction is not an appropriate remedy in a criminal case,” id. at 218 (1), and any appeal from an order denying or dismissing such a motion must be dismissed, see id. at 218 (2); see also Roberts v. State, 286 Ga. 532, 532 ( 690 SE2d 150 ) (2010). 1 Black was subject to the 2005 versions of these statutes at the time he committed the offenses. 2018Moreover, to the extent that Black’s motion could be construed as seeking to vacate or modify his convictions, “a petition to vacate or modify a judgment of conviction is not an appropriate remedy in a criminal case,” id. at 218 (1), and any appeal from an order denying or dismissing such a motion must be dismissed, see id. at 218 (2); see also Roberts v. State, 286 Ga. 532, 532 ( 690 SE2d 150 ) (2010). 1 Black was subject to the 2005 versions of these statutes at the time he committed the offenses. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Finch v. Weaver
green
1 sentence1998Brooks, supra; Finch, supra. The trial court erred in denying appellant Black’s motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Benton
green
2 sentences1994See OCGA § 5-7-1; State v. Benton, 246 Ga. 132 ( 269 SE2d 470 ) (1980). 1994See OCGA § 5-7-1; State v. Benton, 246 Ga. 132 ( 269 SE2d 470 ) (1980). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Black v. Prince
green
2 sentences1986On the first appearance of these cases ( 176 Ga. App. 465 ( 336 SE2d 318 (1985)), we reversed the judgment in Case No. 70558, ruling that the trial court erred in denying Black’s motion for a directed verdict; and affirmed the judgment in Case No. 70559, denying Prince’s motion for directed verdict. 1986On the first appearance of these cases ( 176 Ga. App. 465 ( 336 SE2d 318 (1985)), we reversed the judgment in Case No. 70558, ruling that the trial court erred in denying Black’s motion for a directed verdict; and affirmed the judgment in Case No. 70559, denying Prince’s motion for directed verdict. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Prince v. Black
green
2 sentences1986On certiorari, our judgment in Case No. 70558 was reversed by the Supreme Court ( 256 Ga. 79 ( 344 SE2d 411 ) (1986)), with direction that we take such action as may be necessary to give effect to the Supreme Court’s judgment. 1986On certiorari, our judgment in Case No. 70558 was reversed by the Supreme Court ( 256 Ga. 79 ( 344 SE2d 411 ) (1986)), with direction that we take such action as may be necessary to give effect to the Supreme Court’s judgment. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Goldberg v. Black
green
2 sentences1983On the prior appearance of this case ( Goldberg v. Black, 156 Ga. App. 872 ( 275 SE2d 810 ) (1981)), the question at issue was whether Goldberg’s complaint for return of $3,000 earnest money toward the purchase price of a house being erected by Black and his partner stated a cause of action as against Black’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 1983On the prior appearance of this case ( Goldberg v. Black, 156 Ga. App. 872 ( 275 SE2d 810 ) (1981)), the question at issue was whether Goldberg’s complaint for return of $3,000 earnest money toward the purchase price of a house being erected by Black and his partner stated a cause of action as against Black’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
State v. Meredith Chevrolet, Inc.
green
1 sentence1980Cf. State of Ga. v. Meredith Chevrolet, 145 Ga. App. 8 , supra. It was not error to grant Black’s motion. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.