Movant bar in Georgia

2020See Shields v. Gish, 280 Ga. 556, 558 (2) ( 629 SE2d 244 ) (2006); Hiner Transp., 293 Ga. App. at 706 .

2007As an initial matter, we must point out that, in Shields v. Gish, 280 Ga. 556, 558 (2) ( 629 SE2d 224 ) (2006), this Court clarified that, in considering a motion to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) (3), as opposed to (d) (2), negligence or fault on the part of the movant is not a bar to the movant’s claims.

2025See Hall v. Cohner, 134 Ga. App. 586, 586 (1) ( 215 SE2d 340 ) (1975) (“Where the evidence is silent as to some fact, although it be necessary to be proved to authorize a recovery, the question will remain for trial where such fact is not negated by the movant on a hearing of the summary judgment motion.”); see also Cleveland v. Team RTR2, LLC, 359 Ga. App. 104 , 110 (3) ( 854 SE2d 756 ) (2021).

2025See Hall v. Cohner, 134 Ga. App. 586, 586 (1) ( 215 SE2d 340 ) (1975) (“Where the evidence is silent as to some fact, although it be necessary to be proved to authorize a recovery, the question will remain for trial where such fact is not negated by the movant on a hearing of the summary judgment motion.”); see also Cleveland v. Team RTR2, LLC, 359 Ga. App. 104 , 110 (3) ( 854 SE2d 756 ) (2021).

2020See Voyles, 301 Ga. at 45, n. 2 (motion to set aside the judgment for lack of sufficient notice of a hearing, where trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to set aside, construed as a motion to set aside the judgment to correct a clerical mistake under OCGA § 9-11-60 (g) rather than a motion to set aside based on a nonamendable defect on the face of the record under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) (3)). 13 have been a contributing cause to the mother’s failure to appear at the October 2 hearing, when a court considers “a motion to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) (3), as opposed to (d) (2), neglig

2020See Voyles, 301 Ga. at 45, n. 2 (motion to set aside the judgment for lack of sufficient notice of a hearing, where trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to set aside, construed as a motion to set aside the judgment to correct a clerical mistake under OCGA § 9-11-60 (g) rather than a motion to set aside based on a nonamendable defect on the face of the record under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) (3)). 13 have been a contributing cause to the mother’s failure to appear at the October 2 hearing, when a court considers “a motion to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) (3), as opposed to (d) (2), neglig

2020See Voyles, 301 Ga. at 45, n. 2 (motion to set aside the judgment for lack of sufficient notice of a hearing, where trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to set aside, construed as a motion to set aside the judgment to correct a clerical mistake under OCGA § 9-11-60 (g) rather than a motion to set aside based on a nonamendable defect on the face of the record under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) (3)). 13 have been a contributing cause to the mother’s failure to appear at the October 2 hearing, when a court considers “a motion to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) (3), as opposed to (d) (2), neglig

1967State v. Arrington, 147 W.

1963However, where “. . . the petition for mandamus shows on its face . . . no . . . probable cause . . ., then the movant could not claim the benefit of the time during which the mandamus action was pending in the appellate court. *262 This does not mean that he must state facts which result in the writ’s issuance, but merely that it must not appear from the petition that he was totally without probable cause to believe himself to be entitled thereto.” Henry v. Crabtree, 100 Ga. App. 91, 96-97 ( 110 SE2d 88 ).

1963However, where “. . . the petition for mandamus shows on its face . . . no . . . probable cause . . ., then the movant could not claim the benefit of the time during which the mandamus action was pending in the appellate court. *262 This does not mean that he must state facts which result in the writ’s issuance, but merely that it must not appear from the petition that he was totally without probable cause to believe himself to be entitled thereto.” Henry v. Crabtree, 100 Ga. App. 91, 96-97 ( 110 SE2d 88 ).

1958Grounds 4 and 5 of the amended motion for new trial are controlled adversely to the movant by the rule pronounced in numerous opinions among which is Maner v. Dykes, 55 Ga. App. 436, 443 ( 190 S. E. 189 ), “ ‘If the plaintiff by ordinary care could have avoided the consequences to himself caused by the defendant’s negligence, he is not entitled to recover.’ Code § 105-603.

1958Grounds 4 and 5 of the amended motion for new trial are controlled adversely to the movant by the rule pronounced in numerous opinions among which is Maner v. Dykes, 55 Ga. App. 436, 443 ( 190 S. E. 189 ), “ ‘If the plaintiff by ordinary care could have avoided the consequences to himself caused by the defendant’s negligence, he is not entitled to recover.’ Code § 105-603.