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6 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1984–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rakas v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences1984(Katz v United States, supra, at p 353; see Rakas v Illinois, 439 US 128, 143, n 12 .) The Court of Appeals has held that “[w]hen a party to the conversation consents to its recording * * * the constitutional privacy rights of other participants are not implicated” and no eavesdropping warrant is required. 1984(See Rakas v Illinois, 439 US 128 ; United States v Salvucci, 448 US 83 .) Thus in Jones the Supreme Court said (at p 261): “To establish ‘standing,’ Courts of Appeals have generally required that the movant claim either to have owned or possessed the seized property or to have had a substantial possessory interest in the premises searched.” Underlining the dilemma that had confronted defendants in cases in which possession of the seized items in question was an essential element of the crime, the Supreme Court in Jones (supra, at p 262 ) quoted the following from an opinion by Judge Learned H | 1 | 2 |
Borst v. International Paper Co.green1 sentence2024Movant's claim to intervene as a right is premised on the second of these tests, which requires that the intervenor show an interest in the case that is "direct and substantial" ( see Borst v International Paper Co. , 121 AD3d 1343, 1346 [3d Dept 2014] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). | 1 | 1 |
Katz v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1984(Katz v United States, supra, at p 353; see Rakas v Illinois, 439 US 128, 143, n 12 .) The Court of Appeals has held that “[w]hen a party to the conversation consents to its recording * * * the constitutional privacy rights of other participants are not implicated” and no eavesdropping warrant is required. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Teichergreen1 sentence1984The court left open the question whether, under appropriate circumstances, video surveillance may be conducted without a warrant consistently with Fourth Amendment principles. ( 52 NY2d, at p 650, n 1 .) Under the standards of Katz and its progeny, the beginning of any analysis of an alleged Fourth Amendment violation is whether the movant can claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in the invaded area. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sunset Cafe, Inc. v. Mett's Surf & Sports Corp.
green
1 sentence2025A motion to dismiss on this basis "may be granted only where the documentary evidence utterly refutes . . . factual allegations, conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law" ( Sunset Café, Inc. v Mett's Surf & Sports Corp. , 103 AD3d 707 , 709 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Cord Meyer Dev. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Zecca v. Riccardelli
green
1 sentence2024"Even where there is no opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the court is not relieved of its obligation to ensure that the movant has demonstrated his or her entitlement to the relief requested" ( Zecca v Riccardelli , 293 AD2d 31 [2d Dept 2002]). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Cron v. Hargro Fabrics, Inc.
green
1 sentence2000However, motions to dismiss are ill-suited to inquiring into factual and legal questions such as whether the movant has a defense (Unadilla Silo Co. v Ernst & Young, 234 AD2d 754 ) because the court’s sole inquiry on such motions is whether the facts as alleged in the complaint fit within a cognizable legal theory (Cron v Hargro Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362, 366 ). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Unadilla Silo Co. v. Ernst & Young
green
1 sentence2000However, motions to dismiss are ill-suited to inquiring into factual and legal questions such as whether the movant has a defense (Unadilla Silo Co. v Ernst & Young, 234 AD2d 754 ) because the court’s sole inquiry on such motions is whether the facts as alleged in the complaint fit within a cognizable legal theory (Cron v Hargro Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362, 366 ). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
United States v. Salvucci
green
1 sentence1984(See Rakas v Illinois, 439 US 128 ; United States v Salvucci, 448 US 83 .) Thus in Jones the Supreme Court said (at p 261): “To establish ‘standing,’ Courts of Appeals have generally required that the movant claim either to have owned or possessed the seized property or to have had a substantial possessory interest in the premises searched.” Underlining the dilemma that had confronted defendants in cases in which possession of the seized items in question was an essential element of the crime, the Supreme Court in Jones (supra, at p 262 ) quoted the following from an opinion by Judge Learned H | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Jones v. United States
red
1 sentence1984(See Rakas v Illinois, 439 US 128 ; United States v Salvucci, 448 US 83 .) Thus in Jones the Supreme Court said (at p 261): “To establish ‘standing,’ Courts of Appeals have generally required that the movant claim either to have owned or possessed the seized property or to have had a substantial possessory interest in the premises searched.” Underlining the dilemma that had confronted defendants in cases in which possession of the seized items in question was an essential element of the crime, the Supreme Court in Jones (supra, at p 262 ) quoted the following from an opinion by Judge Learned H | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.