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8 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1966–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barnes v. City of Atlantagreen2 sentences2020“Where, as here, exhaustion of administrative remedies is a precondition for suit, the satisfaction of this requirement by the class plaintiff normally will avoid the necessity for each class member to satisfy this requirement individually.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Barnes v. City of Atlanta, 281 Ga. 256, 258 (1) ( 637 SE2d 4 ) (2006). 2020“Where, as here, exhaustion of administrative remedies is a precondition for suit, the satisfaction of this requirement by the class plaintiff normally will avoid the necessity for each class member to satisfy this requirement individually.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Barnes v. City of Atlanta, 281 Ga. 256, 258 (1) ( 637 SE2d 4 ) (2006). | 2 | 2 |
Knight v. Lowerygreen2 sentences1974The doctrine of single satisfaction, as pointed out in Knight v. Lowery, 228 Ga. 452, 455 ( 185 SE2d 915 ) exists for the reasons "first, that joint tortfeasors contribute to a single injury *882 for which there is but one cause of action, and, second, that once the damage has been paid in full by one joint tortfeasor, the injured party has no right to seek an additional or double recovery from another.” Where the negligent acts do not occur to cause a single injury, and where full satisfaction has not been obtained, the Knight case establishes that another suit may lie. 1974The doctrine of single satisfaction, as pointed out in Knight v. Lowery, 228 Ga. 452, 455 ( 185 SE2d 915 ) exists for the reasons "first, that joint tortfeasors contribute to a single injury *882 for which there is but one cause of action, and, second, that once the damage has been paid in full by one joint tortfeasor, the injured party has no right to seek an additional or double recovery from another.” Where the negligent acts do not occur to cause a single injury, and where full satisfaction has not been obtained, the Knight case establishes that another suit may lie. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
US Xpress v. Taxation and Revenue Dept.
green
2 sentences2015Decisions to the contrary, such as U. S. Xpress v. State of New Mexico, 136 P3d 999 (N.M. 2006), are “based on genuinely unique statutory requirements.” 2 Newberg, supra at 440. 2010Decisions to the contrary, such as U.S. Xpress v. State of New Mexico, 139 N.M. 589 , 136 P.3d 999 (N.M.2006), are "based on genuinely unique statutory requirements." 2 Newberg, supra at 440. | 3 | 2006–2015 |
Glaser v. Meck
green
2 sentences1990We also agree with Cheeley that its third defense *545 adequately raised the defense of insufficiency of the expert's affidavit for purposes of OCGA § 9-11-12 (b), compare Glaser v. Meck, 258 Ga. 468 ( 369 SE2d 912 ) (1988), and note furthermore that had any confusion existed as to the grounds for that defense, an interrogatory addressing the matter could have been presented to Cheeley earlier than the ten month delay seen in the case at bar. 1990We also agree with Cheeley that its third defense *545 adequately raised the defense of insufficiency of the expert's affidavit for purposes of OCGA § 9-11-12 (b), compare Glaser v. Meck, 258 Ga. 468 ( 369 SE2d 912 ) (1988), and note furthermore that had any confusion existed as to the grounds for that defense, an interrogatory addressing the matter could have been presented to Cheeley earlier than the ten month delay seen in the case at bar. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Schoenly v. Nashville Speedways, Inc.
green
2 sentences1966“It seems clear that since the State’s employee Graham was a joint tort-feasor with defendants and that the State, but for its immunity from suit as a sovereign, would have also been jointly and severally liable with the others upon the doctrine of respondeat superior; and that since the Board of Claims allowed plaintiff compensation for his injuries, which was paid, that this was a satisfaction of his claim and a discharge of the other joint tort-feasors.” Schoenly v. Nashville Speedways, Inc., 208 Tenn. 107 ( 344 SW2d 349 ). 1966“It seems clear that since the State’s employee Graham was a joint tort-feasor with defendants and that the State, but for its immunity from suit as a sovereign, would have also been jointly and severally liable with the others upon the doctrine of respondeat superior; and that since the Board of Claims allowed plaintiff compensation for his injuries, which was paid, that this was a satisfaction of his claim and a discharge of the other joint tort-feasors.” Schoenly v. Nashville Speedways, Inc., 208 Tenn. 107 ( 344 SW2d 349 ). | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.