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28 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1886–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ryan v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.green2 sentences2014See Ryan, 2012 IL App (1st) 120005, ¶¶ 20-21 (articulating the Sandholm test and equating the satisfaction of this test with “affirmatively demonstrat[ing] that the nonmovant’s claim is a SLAPP within the meaning of the Act, that is, that the claim is meritless and was filed in retaliation against the movant’s protected activities”); Hammons, 2012 IL App (1st) 102644, ¶ 18 (describing the Sandholm test as having the effect that, “[i]n other words, the Act only applies to meritless, retaliatory SLAPP lawsuits, as those suits have traditionally been defined”). ¶ 41 E. 2014See Ryan, 2012 IL App (1st) 120005, ¶¶ 20-21 (articulating the Sandholm test and equating the satisfaction of this test with “affirmatively demonstrat[ing] that the nonmovant’s claim is a SLAPP within the meaning of the Act, that is, that the claim is meritless and was filed in retaliation against the movant’s protected activities”); Hammons, 2012 IL App (1st) 102644 , ¶ 18 17 No. 1-12-1545 (describing the Sandholm test as having the effect that, “[i]n other words, the Act only applies to meritless, retaliatory SLAPP lawsuits, as those suits have traditionally been defined”). ¶ 41 E. | 2 | 2 |
Hammons v. Society of Permanent Cosmetic Professionalsgreen2 sentences2014See Ryan, 2012 IL App (1st) 120005, ¶¶ 20-21 (articulating the Sandholm test and equating the satisfaction of this test with “affirmatively demonstrat[ing] that the nonmovant’s claim is a SLAPP within the meaning of the Act, that is, that the claim is meritless and was filed in retaliation against the movant’s protected activities”); Hammons, 2012 IL App (1st) 102644, ¶ 18 (describing the Sandholm test as having the effect that, “[i]n other words, the Act only applies to meritless, retaliatory SLAPP lawsuits, as those suits have traditionally been defined”). ¶ 41 E. 2014See Ryan, 2012 IL App (1st) 120005, ¶¶ 20-21 (articulating the Sandholm test and equating the satisfaction of this test with “affirmatively demonstrat[ing] that the nonmovant’s claim is a SLAPP within the meaning of the Act, that is, that the claim is meritless and was filed in retaliation against the movant’s protected activities”); Hammons, 2012 IL App (1st) 102644 , ¶ 18 17 No. 1-12-1545 (describing the Sandholm test as having the effect that, “[i]n other words, the Act only applies to meritless, retaliatory SLAPP lawsuits, as those suits have traditionally been defined”). ¶ 41 E. | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fleming v. Dillon
green
2 sentences1981There the case of Fleming v. Dillon (1938), 370 Ill. 325, 331 , 18 N.E.2d 910 , was quoted approvingly: “If coexistent remedies are consistent with each other, a party may adopt all or select any one which he thinks best suited to the end sought, and only the satisfaction of the claim in one case constitutes a bar of the other.” The Elmore court determined that the remedies of money damages and specific performance were not inconsistent remedies. 1981There the case of Fleming v. Dillon (1938), 370 Ill. 325, 331 , 18 N.E.2d 910 , was quoted approvingly: “If coexistent remedies are consistent with each other, a party may adopt all or select any one which he thinks best suited to the end sought, and only the satisfaction of the claim in one case constitutes a bar of the other.” The Elmore court determined that the remedies of money damages and specific performance were not inconsistent remedies. | 5 | 1947–1981 |
Ostrander v. Scott
green
2 sentences1924The payment of a part of a fixed and certain demand which is due and not in dispute is no satisfaction of the whole debt even where the creditor agrees to receive a part for the whole and gives a receipt for the whole demand, (Ostrander v. Scott, 161 Ill. 339 ,) but if there'is a bona fide dispute as to how much is due, a payment of the amount claimed by the debtor to be due in full settlement, if accepted by the creditor, is a satisfaction of the claim. 1905He could not accept the benefit and reject the condition, for if he accepted at all, it was cum onereP In Ostrander v. Scott, supra, it is held that a creditor to whom a check is sent, reciting that it is in full payment of a claim, the amount of which is in dispute, cannot receive it, without the assent of the debtor, in part payment only, but his receipt thereof and the use of the check will constitute a full satisfaction of the claim. | 5 | 1905–1924 |
Snow v. Griesheimer
neutral
2 sentences1912On the part of the plaintiff in error the rule is invoked that where the amount of a claim is unliquidated, or there is a bona fide dispute as to how much is due, the payment of the amount claimed by the debtor to be due, in full settlement, if accepted by the creditor, is a satisfaction of the claim; or as stated in Snow v. Griesheimer, 220 Ill. 106, 110 , “If a check is offered under such circumstances as amount to a condition that it is to be received in full payment of the demand, an acceptance will satisfy the demand, although the creditor protests at the time that it is not all that is d 1910In Snow v. Griesheimer, 220 Ill. 106 -109, it is said: “Where the amount due a creditor is ascertained and not in dispute, the payment by the debtor and acceptance by the creditor of a less sum will not operate as a satisfaction of the demand; but if the amount due is unliquidated and there is a bona fide dispute as to how much is due, a payment of the amount claimed by the debtor to be due, in full settlement, if accepted by the creditor is a satisfaction of the claim. | 4 | 1910–1925 |
Hanson v. Denckla
green
2 sentences2013In the other the plaintiff seeks to apply what he [or she] concedes to be the property of the defendant to the satisfaction of a claim against him [or her]." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 , 246 n.12 (1958). 9 1-12-1964 Thus, while in rem differs from quasi in rem, both are alternatives to in personam jurisdiction. 2013In the other the plaintiff seeks to apply what he [or she] concedes to be the property of the defendant to the satisfaction of a claim against him [or her].” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 , 246 n.12 (1958). | 3 | 2013–2013 |
Bagdonas v. Liberty Land & Investment Co.
green
2 sentences1988The requirements for appointment of a receiver were noted in Bagdonas v. Liberty Land & Investment Co. (1923), 309 Ill. 103, 110 , as follows: “The general rule is that the applicant must show, first, that he has a clear right to the property itself or has some lien upon it, or that the property constitutes a special fund to which he has a right to resort for the satisfaction of his claim; and second, that the possession of the property by the defendant was obtained by fraud, or that the property itself, or the income arising from it, is in danger of loss from neglect, waste, misconduct or ins 1985(Bagdonas v. Liberty Land & Investment Co. (1923), 309 Ill. 103 .) “The general rule is that the applicant must show, first, that he has a clear right to the property itself or has some lien upon it, or that the property constitutes a special fund to which he has a right to resort for the satisfaction of his claim; and second, that the possession of the property by the defendant was obtained by fraud, or that the property itself, or the income arising from it, is in danger of loss from neglect, waste, misconduct or insolvency.” ( 309 Ill. 103,110 .) In the context of a proceeding to foreclose | 2 | 1985–1988 |
Canton Union Coal Co. v. Parlin & Orendorff Co.
green
2 sentences1925(Canton Union Coal Co. v. Parlin & Orendorff Co. 215 Ill. 244 ; In re Estate of Cunningham, supra.) The undisputed evidence in the case shows that there was a bona fide dispute between the parties as to how much there was due from plaintiff in error to defendant in error for wages for “labor to date.” Whatever amount plaintiff in error owed defendant in error, it was a balance due him for “labor to date.” The only claim that defendant in error had against plaintiff in error was for “labor to date.” When he accepted the check for $10.80, containing the words “Labor to date in full” and cashed t 1912An acceptance in such a case is an acceptance of the condition notwithstanding any protest he may make to the contrary (Ostrander v. Scott, 161 Ill. 339 ; Lapp v. Smith, 183 Ill. 179 ; Canton Union Coal Co. v. Parlin & Orendorff Co., 215 Ill. 244 ; 1 Cyc. 229; 1 Am. & Eng. | 2 | 1912–1925 |
Citicorp Savings v. Occhipinti
green
1 sentence1988(See Citicorp Savings, 136 Ill. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
First National Bank v. Fraker
neutral
1 sentence1985(First National Bank v. Fraker (1982), 111 Ill. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Poulakidas v. Charalidis
green
1 sentence1980(See, for example, Poulakidas v. Charalidis (1979), 68 Ill. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
The PEOPLE v. Richardson
green
1 sentence1969The satisfaction of this requirement was discussed in People v. Richardson, 32 Ill2d 497, 207 NE2d 453 which upheld the jury waiver on the facts of the case. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
United States v. Temple
green
1 sentence1963The remedy by action in tort for fraud and deceit in the purchase of goods is not inconsistent with the remedy by action on the contract for the purchase price or value of the goods bought, for both actions proceed upon the theory of an affirmance of the contract by the plaintiff.” United States v. Temple, 147 F Supp 118 (DC Ill), was an action by the Federal government to recover damages for several transactions in which it was allegedly defrauded. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Marcus v. National Council of Knights & Ladies of Security
neutral
1 sentence1947In Fleming v. Dillon, 370 Ill. 325 , at page 331, the court said : “If coexistent remedies are consistent with each other, a party may adopt all or select any one which he thinks best suited for the ends sought, and only the satisfaction of the claim in one case constitutes a bar to the other. ’ ’ To the same effect is Marcus v. National Council of Knights & Ladies of Security, 127 Minn. 196 . | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Heine v. Degen
neutral
1 sentence1940They then argue the payments of the stockholders should be applied pro rata to discharge unsatisfied liabilities due all creditors, citing Heine v. Degen, 362 Ill. 357 . | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Braude v. Wardy
neutral
1 sentence1938(Braude v. Wardy, 340 Ill. 180 ; Jackson v. Industrial Board, 280 id. 526; Ridgely Nat. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Janci v. Cerny
green
1 sentence1925(Janci v. Cerny, 287 Ill. 359 .) Under the rule laid down in the authorities, from the undisputed facts in this case it is clear that the receipt and cashing of the check in question by defendant in error operated as a discharge of plaintiff in error from further liability to defendant in error on account of “labor to date,” and the circuit court erred in refusing to instruct the jury to find the issues for plaintiff in error and rendering judgment for defendant in error and the Appellate Court erred in affirming the same. | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Bradner Smith & Co. v. Williams
neutral
1 sentence1924(Bradner Smith & Co. v. Williams, supra, p. 427 .) We think, therefore, that the record does not disclose a case where plaintiff was driven to an election of remedies, nor was. estopped from prosecuting the present action to judgment. | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Turnbull v. Prentiss Lumber Co.
green
1 sentence1923Baker v. Backus, 32 Ill. 79 ; Turnbull v. Prentiss Lumber Co. 55 Mich. 387 ; Conro v. Gray, 4 How. | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Baker v. Administrator of Backus
green
1 sentence1923Baker v. Backus, 32 Ill. 79 ; Turnbull v. Prentiss Lumber Co. 55 Mich. 387 ; Conro v. Gray, 4 How. | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Conro v. Gray
neutral
1 sentence1923Baker v. Backus, 32 Ill. 79 ; Turnbull v. Prentiss Lumber Co. 55 Mich. 387 ; Conro v. Gray, 4 How. | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Eckman v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad
neutral
2 sentences1914This was decided in Eckman v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. 169 Ill. 312 , following the general current of authorities in other States on the same subject. 1914(Eckman v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. 169 Ill. 312 .) The State law in this regard has been modified, however, by the Federal Employers’ Liability act as to cases where injuries are received by certain employees of an employer engaged in inter-State commerce. | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Lapp v. Smith
neutral
1 sentence1912An acceptance in such a case is an acceptance of the condition notwithstanding any protest he may make to the contrary (Ostrander v. Scott, 161 Ill. 339 ; Lapp v. Smith, 183 Ill. 179 ; Canton Union Coal Co. v. Parlin & Orendorff Co., 215 Ill. 244 ; 1 Cyc. 229; 1 Am. & Eng. | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Rumsey & Co. v. Colman
neutral
1 sentence1905In Rumsey v. Barber, supra, which was a controversy over the amount due from the defendants to plaintiffs for merchandise, the plaintiffs wrote to the defendant as follows: “We shall refuse draft, as we do not owe you $200. | 1 | 1905–1905 |
Andrews v. W. R. Stubbs Contracting Co.
neutral
1 sentence1905In Andrews v. Stubbs, 100 Mo. App. 599 , a difference existed between plaintiff and defendant as to the amount due plaintiff for grain purchased of him by defendant. | 1 | 1905–1905 |
Carter v. . Worrell
neutral
1 sentence1905The legacy was a direct charge upon that particular estate; and if they take under her will the whole estate upon which their legacy is a charge, that must be deemed a satisfaction of their claim for the $1,000, in the absence of anything in the will indicating a different intention on the part of the testatrix.” In Carter v. Worrell, 96 N. C. 358 (60 Am. | 1 | 1905–1905 |
Union Trust Co. v. Rigdon
neutral
1 sentence1886Union Trust Co. v. Rigdon, 93 Ill. 458 ; Zimpleman v. Veeder, 98 Ill. 613 . | 1 | 1886–1886 |
Zimpleman v. Veeder
neutral
1 sentence1886Union Trust Co. v. Rigdon, 93 Ill. 458 ; Zimpleman v. Veeder, 98 Ill. 613 . | 1 | 1886–1886 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.