Wright rule in Iowa

2021This is a substantially different argument than asking us to disregard Greenwood because it is no longer the controlling Supreme Court precedent on this issue. “[W]e do not create issues or unnecessarily overturn existing law sua sponte when the parties have not advocated for such a change.” Feld v. Borkowski, 790 N.W.2d 72 , 78 n.4 (Iowa 2010). 60 Nor do we address arguments raised for the first time on appeal, see State v. Derby, 800 N.W.2d 52, 60 (Iowa 2011), but that is what the majority does in declaring, “an officer acts unreasonably when, without a warrant, the officer . . . uses means

2021This is a substantially different argument than asking us to disregard Greenwood because it is no longer the controlling Supreme Court precedent on this issue. “[W]e do not create issues or unnecessarily overturn existing law sua sponte when the parties have not advocated for such a change.” Feld v. Borkowski, 790 N.W.2d 72 , 78 n.4 (Iowa 2010). 60 Nor do we address arguments raised for the first time on appeal, see State v. Derby, 800 N.W.2d 52, 60 (Iowa 2011), but that is what the majority does in declaring, “an officer acts unreasonably when, without a warrant, the officer . . . uses means

2021Wright’s brief never so much as cited Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. ___ , 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), despite the majority’s reliance upon it, let alone argued that it formed a basis for rejecting Greenwood.

2021Wright’s brief never so much as cited Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. ___ , 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), despite the majority’s reliance upon it, let alone argued that it formed a basis for rejecting Greenwood.

2017Thus, at the time Heemstra was decided, those cases on direct appeal in which the defendant had objected to the instruction had a potentially meritorious claim whereas those cases in which the defendant had failed to object to the instruction had no claim or no meritorious claim. 6 The district court relied on Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), to conclude principles of equal protection required Wright be allowed a new trial despite him not having any legal claim or any meritorious legal claim.

2014We refer to the minutes to establish the crime was properly charged, the charge matched Wright’s conduct, and the State provided adequate notice to Wright of both the law and the facts. 7 Gunderson, who was present during the July robbery, would testify “that she was in fear of immediate serious injury to herself or her colleagues.” Taken together, the two charges included in the trial information and the minutes of testimony properly “apprise the accused of the crime charged.” Id.

1984State v. Wright, 234 N.W.2d 99, 103 (Iowa 1975) (Sixty instead of ninety days allowed at that time, jury failed to agree in first trial: “We thus hold as a rule of this court that criminal cases must be retried within 60 days after mistrial, if the case is to be retried.” Emphasis added.); State v. Butler, 243 N.W.2d 232 (Iowa 1976) (same; good cause shown for exceeding sixty days after mistrial); State v. Lybarger, 263 N.W.2d 545 (Iowa 1978) (mistrial for prosecutorial misconduct, Wright rule applied); State v. Hamilton, 309 N.W.2d 471 (Iowa 1981) (withdrawal of speedy trial waiver, ninety da

1984State v. Wright, 234 N.W.2d 99, 103 (Iowa 1975) (Sixty instead of ninety days allowed at that time, jury failed to agree in first trial: “We thus hold as a rule of this court that criminal cases must be retried within 60 days after mistrial, if the case is to be retried.” Emphasis added.); State v. Butler, 243 N.W.2d 232 (Iowa 1976) (same; good cause shown for exceeding sixty days after mistrial); State v. Lybarger, 263 N.W.2d 545 (Iowa 1978) (mistrial for prosecutorial misconduct, Wright rule applied); State v. Hamilton, 309 N.W.2d 471 (Iowa 1981) (withdrawal of speedy trial waiver, ninety da

1984State v. Wright, 234 N.W.2d 99, 103 (Iowa 1975) (Sixty instead of ninety days allowed at that time, jury failed to agree in first trial: “We thus hold as a rule of this court that criminal cases must be retried within 60 days after mistrial, if the case is to be retried.” Emphasis added.); State v. Butler, 243 N.W.2d 232 (Iowa 1976) (same; good cause shown for exceeding sixty days after mistrial); State v. Lybarger, 263 N.W.2d 545 (Iowa 1978) (mistrial for prosecutorial misconduct, Wright rule applied); State v. Hamilton, 309 N.W.2d 471 (Iowa 1981) (withdrawal of speedy trial waiver, ninety da

1984State v. Wright, 234 N.W.2d 99, 103 (Iowa 1975) (Sixty instead of ninety days allowed at that time, jury failed to agree in first trial: “We thus hold as a rule of this court that criminal cases must be retried within 60 days after mistrial, if the case is to be retried.” Emphasis added.); State v. Butler, 243 N.W.2d 232 (Iowa 1976) (same; good cause shown for exceeding sixty days after mistrial); State v. Lybarger, 263 N.W.2d 545 (Iowa 1978) (mistrial for prosecutorial misconduct, Wright rule applied); State v. Hamilton, 309 N.W.2d 471 (Iowa 1981) (withdrawal of speedy trial waiver, ninety da

1973See also Wright v. Standard Oil Co., 234 Iowa 1241, 1245 , 15 N.W.2d 275, 277 (“an indispensable party is one having an interest in the controversy of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting that interest”); Provident Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 , 88 S.Ct. 733 , 19 L.Ed.2d 936 (federal rule on the subject); 59 Am.Jur.2d Parties § 13 at 360 (same as Wright rule, supra); 67 C.J.S.

1973See also Wright v. Standard Oil Co., 234 Iowa 1241, 1245 , 15 N.W.2d 275, 277 (“an indispensable party is one having an interest in the controversy of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting that interest”); Provident Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 , 88 S.Ct. 733 , 19 L.Ed.2d 936 (federal rule on the subject); 59 Am.Jur.2d Parties § 13 at 360 (same as Wright rule, supra); 67 C.J.S.