Certainly defendant in Illinois

1989(See Board of Education of Community Unit School District No. 101 v. Parlor (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 397 , 424 N.E.2d 1152 ; Streamwood Home Builders, Inc. v. Brolin (1960), 25 Ill.

1989(See Board of Education of Community Unit School District No. 101 v. Parlor (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 397 , 424 N.E.2d 1152 ; Streamwood Home Builders, Inc. v. Brolin (1960), 25 Ill.

1989(See Board of Education of Community Unit School District No. 101 v. Parlor (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 397 , 424 N.E.2d 1152 ; Streamwood Home Builders, Inc. v. Brolin (1960), 25 Ill.

1979Certainly error will be demonstrated if it is clear from the trial court's statements and findings that the wrong standard was applied or that inappropriate circumstances were considered in either aggravation or mitigation. ( Cf. People v. Gant (1974), 18 Ill.

1979(Cf. People v. Gant (1974), 18 Ill.

1979(See People v. Parks (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 132 , 357 N.E.2d 487 .) Certainly defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to give his instruction exactly as it was tendered.

1979(See People v. Parks (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 132 , 357 N.E.2d 487 .) Certainly defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to give his instruction exactly as it was tendered.

1977Moreover, the court stated: “We further note that defendant here affirmatively sought the benefits and protection of Illinois law within the meaning of Hansen [sic] v. Denckla, supra. Certainly defendant knew plaintiff was an Illinois resident, knew that the contract was to be executed and performed in Illinois, and knew that he was signing an Illinois security agreement.” ( 23 Ill.

1974We believe that these contacts satisfy due process requirements and an assertion of jurisdiction here would not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” In 50 holding we take into consideration the language of our supreme court in Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 389 , that our long arm statute “reflects a conscious purpose to assert jurisd!ction over non-resident defendants to the extent permitted by the due-process clause.” (Emphasis added.) We further note that defendant here affirmatively sought the benefits and protection of Illinois law within the meaning of Han

1974We believe that these contacts satisfy due process requirements and an assertion of jurisdiction here would not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." In so holding we take into consideration the language of our supreme court in Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 389 , that our long arm statute "reflects a conscious purpose to assert jurisdiction over non-resident defendants to the extent permitted by the due-process clause." (Emphasis added.) We further note that defendant here affirmatively sought the benefits and protection of Illinois law within the meaning of Han

1974We believe that these contacts satisfy due process requirements and an assertion of jurisdiction here would not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” In 50 holding we take into consideration the language of our supreme court in Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 389 , that our long arm statute “reflects a conscious purpose to assert jurisd!ction over non-resident defendants to the extent permitted by the due-process clause.” (Emphasis added.) We further note that defendant here affirmatively sought the benefits and protection of Illinois law within the meaning of Han

1974We believe that these contacts satisfy due process requirements and an assertion of jurisdiction here would not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." In so holding we take into consideration the language of our supreme court in Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 389 , that our long arm statute "reflects a conscious purpose to assert jurisdiction over non-resident defendants to the extent permitted by the due-process clause." (Emphasis added.) We further note that defendant here affirmatively sought the benefits and protection of Illinois law within the meaning of Han

1923Attention is also called to the language used in Mack v. Latta, supra: “Whether there is a sufficient common bond among the body of similarly situated persons on the one side,” etc. In the case at bar the “body of similarly situated persons,” consists of the numerous complainants, their claims all growing out of contracts for the purchase of stock and the payment of their separate funds into the hands of the corporation and the defendants.