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8 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 1990–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
LaFever v. Kemlite Co.green2 sentences2019See, e.g., Simmons v. American Drug Stores, Inc., 329 Ill. App. 3d 38, 40-41 (2002) (plaintiff had to encounter the danger to leave the store area 2 See also LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d at 394 ; Morrissey, 404 Ill. App. 3d at 725-26 (the deliberate encounter exception “has most often been applied in cases involving economic compulsion, as where workers are compelled to encounter dangerous conditions as part of their employment obligations”); Lucasey v. Plattner, 2015 IL App (4th) 140512, ¶ 42 (“The cases in which courts have applied the deliberate-encounter exception almost always involve a plaintiff 2010See LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d at 394 , 706 N.E.2d at 449 ; Buerkett, 384 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Kleiber v. Freeport Farm and Fleet, Inc.green2 sentences2019The “deliberate encounter” exception usually applies “where the plaintiff has an economic reason for choosing to encounter the danger, such as a job requirement.” Kleiber v. Freeport Farm & Fleet, Inc., 406 Ill. App. 3d 249, 259-60 (2010). 2 At a minimum, to avail himself of the “deliberate encounter” exception, the plaintiff must demonstrate some compelling reason that forced him to confront the danger and the lack of a viable alternative. 2010I also disagree with the majority's determination that the deliberate encounter exception is not applicable in the instant matter because the plaintiff did not have an economic reason for choosing to encounter the danger, such as a job requirement. 347 Ill.Dec. at 446-47 , 942 N.E.2d at 649-50 . | 1 | 2 |
Buerkett v. Illinois Power Companygreen2 sentences2019See, e.g., Simmons v. American Drug Stores, Inc., 329 Ill. App. 3d 38, 40-41 (2002) (plaintiff had to encounter the danger to leave the store area 2 See also LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d at 394 ; Morrissey, 404 Ill. App. 3d at 725-26 (the deliberate encounter exception “has most often been applied in cases involving economic compulsion, as where workers are compelled to encounter dangerous conditions as part of their employment obligations”); Lucasey v. Plattner, 2015 IL App (4th) 140512, ¶ 42 (“The cases in which courts have applied the deliberate-encounter exception almost always involve a plaintiff 2010See LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d at 394 , 706 N.E.2d at 449 ; Buerkett, 384 Ill. | 1 | 2 |
Simmons v. American Drug Stores, Inc.green1 sentence2019See, e.g., Simmons v. American Drug Stores, Inc., 329 Ill. App. 3d 38, 40-41 (2002) (plaintiff had to encounter the danger to leave the store area 2 See also LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d at 394 ; Morrissey, 404 Ill. App. 3d at 725-26 (the deliberate encounter exception “has most often been applied in cases involving economic compulsion, as where workers are compelled to encounter dangerous conditions as part of their employment obligations”); Lucasey v. Plattner, 2015 IL App (4th) 140512, ¶ 42 (“The cases in which courts have applied the deliberate-encounter exception almost always involve a plaintiff | 1 | 1 |
Morrissey v. Arlington Park Racecourse, LLCgreen1 sentence2019See, e.g., Simmons v. American Drug Stores, Inc., 329 Ill. App. 3d 38, 40-41 (2002) (plaintiff had to encounter the danger to leave the store area 2 See also LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d at 394 ; Morrissey, 404 Ill. App. 3d at 725-26 (the deliberate encounter exception “has most often been applied in cases involving economic compulsion, as where workers are compelled to encounter dangerous conditions as part of their employment obligations”); Lucasey v. Plattner, 2015 IL App (4th) 140512, ¶ 42 (“The cases in which courts have applied the deliberate-encounter exception almost always involve a plaintiff | 1 | 1 |
Lucasey v. Plattnergreen1 sentence2019See, e.g., Simmons v. American Drug Stores, Inc., 329 Ill. App. 3d 38, 40-41 (2002) (plaintiff had to encounter the danger to leave the store area 2 See also LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d at 394 ; Morrissey, 404 Ill. App. 3d at 725-26 (the deliberate encounter exception “has most often been applied in cases involving economic compulsion, as where workers are compelled to encounter dangerous conditions as part of their employment obligations”); Lucasey v. Plattner, 2015 IL App (4th) 140512, ¶ 42 (“The cases in which courts have applied the deliberate-encounter exception almost always involve a plaintiff | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Stokes
green
2 sentences2025That case involved a jury trial, and the court’s comments included a statement that “maybe he [the trial judge] could do a better job than defense counsel.” Id. at 648 . 2017App. 3d at 648 , 228 Ill.Dec. 566 , 689 N.E.2d 625 , distinguishable where in that case, the trial judge interrupted defense counsel's cross-examination of a witness and stated that the cross-examination was driving him " 'crazy.' " The judge also suggested that maybe he could do a better job than defense counsel and told the jury that they could ignore defense counsel's cross-examination of another witness: " 'I don't know where we are going. | 3 | 2017–2025 |
Slager v. Commonwealth Edison Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences2005Nor do we find Slager v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 230 Ill. 2005Nor do we find Slager v. Commonwealth Edison Co. , 230 Ill. | 2 | 2005–2005 |
D. Houston, Inc. v. Love
green
2 sentences2005Houston, Inc. v. Love, 92 S.W.3d 450 (Tex. 2002) (nightclub held liable to independent contractor who worked at the nightclub as a dancer and who became intoxicated as a result of a job requirement that she consume alcohol; dancer was injured in car accident proximately caused by intoxication). 2005Houston, Inc. v. Love , 92 S.W.3d 450 (Tex. 2002) (nightclub held liable to independent contractor who worked at the nightclub as a dancer and who became intoxicated as a result of a job requirement that she consume alcohol; dancer was injured in car accident proximately caused by intoxication). | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Ludwig v. Evergreen Overlook, Inc.
green
1 sentence1990Ed. 2d 585 , 109 S. Ct. 1316 .) The trial court concluded Constant was aware of the job requirement of work in the mine as early as 1982 and he worked underground during that year. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.