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8 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1974–1998 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. St. Pierregreen1 sentence1998Pierre, 146 Ill. 2d 494, 512-13 (1992)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Davisyellow1 sentence1998Challenges to one’s sentence as violating the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, however, are traditionally raised only in the setting of a challenge to the constitutionality of a particular statutory sentencing scheme (see, e.g., People v. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d 495, 499 (1997)) or in arguing that a codefendant received a lesser sentence (see, e.g., People v. St. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cooper v. Hinrichs
green
2 sentences1978In Cooper v. Hindrichs, 10 Ill.2d 269, 272 , this court said: `The terms of the statute do not themselves indicate unequivocally whether the statute is mandatory or discretionary in character. 1978In Cooper v. Hindrichs, 10 Ill. 2d 269, 272 , this court said: ‘The terms of the statute do not themselves indicate unequivocally whether the statute is mandatory or discretionary in character. | 3 | 1974–1978 |
Cooper v. Department of Children & Family Services
green
1 sentence1996There is no evidence to show that they were in any way prejudiced by the delay in the setting of the hearing or by the fact that the hearing was held beyond the 30-day requirement.” Cooper, 234 Ill. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Illinois v. Perkins
green
2 sentences1992(Perkins, 496 U.S. at 307 , 110 L. 1992(Perkins, 496 U.S. at 307 , 110 L. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
People v. Elkow
green
2 sentences1989App. 3d 187 , 521 N.E.2d 290 ), neither does it demonstrate that respondent was denied a meaningful opportunity to confer with counsel or that appointed counsel was not prepared to represent respondent competently. 1989Although the common law record does not indicate that the appointment was concurrent with the setting of the hearing on the petition as contemplated by section 3 — 805 of the Code (In re Elkow (1988), 167 Ill. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
People v. Downing
green
1 sentence1978An explanation of the privilege can be found in People v. Downing (1976), 37 Ill. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
McCray v. Illinois
green
1 sentence1978Ed. 2d 62 , 87 S. Ct. 1056 , where the Supreme Court found that, in the setting of a hearing on a pretrial motion to suppress, the Illinois privilege against the disclosure of an informant did not violate due process of law. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.