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60 California opinions name it 2 courts 1963–2026 37 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cathina W. v. Bessie W.green2 sentences2020“When notice is not given, the parents’ claims of error occurring at the setting hearing may be addressed on review from the disposition following the section 366.26 hearing.” (In re Harmony B., at p. 838; see also In re Cathina W., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 722-726; In re Rashad B. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 442, 450 [“Since appellant was not given notice of her right to file a writ petition, and since that failure of notice is ultimately attributable to an error of the court, appellant’s claims of error are cognizable on appeal even though they would serve to undermine the referral order”].) T 2015(Cf. In re Cathina W. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 716, 722-723 [mother entitled to review of order setting the section 366.26 hearing on appeal from the subsequent order terminating her parental rights because she was not duly advised of the writ requirement; mother was not personally present at the setting hearing, notice was mailed to mother four days after entry of the setting order to her last known address, the notice was returned to the clerk’s office stamped “return to sender” along with a label that contained mother’s new address, and the clerk did not re-mail the notice to that address].) T | 3 | 7 |
In Re Rashad B.green2 sentences2020“When notice is not given, the parents’ claims of error occurring at the setting hearing may be addressed on review from the disposition following the section 366.26 hearing.” (In re Harmony B., at p. 838; see also In re Cathina W., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 722-726; In re Rashad B. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 442, 450 [“Since appellant was not given notice of her right to file a writ petition, and since that failure of notice is ultimately attributable to an error of the court, appellant’s claims of error are cognizable on appeal even though they would serve to undermine the referral order”].) T 2005(In re Cathina W., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 722-726; In re Rashad B. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 442, 450 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 462 ] [“Since appellant was not given notice of her right to file a writ petition, and since that failure of notice is ultimately attributable to an error of the court, appellant’s claims of error are cognizable on appeal even though they would serve to undermine the referral order.”].) The DPSS concedes that the record does not reflect that notice was provided to father informing him of his right to bring a writ petition, and father has therefore shown good cause to raise i | 2 | 4 |
San Bernardino County Children & Family Services v. Kimberly L.green2 sentences2023First, “the waiver rule will be enforced unless due process forbids it.” (In re Janee J. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 198, 208 .) There must be “some defect that fundamentally undermined the statutory scheme so that the parent would have been kept from availing himself or herself of the protections afforded by the scheme as a whole.” (Ibid.) Second, “the courts have found good cause to address the merits of a challenge to orders made at the setting hearing in an appeal from the order terminating parental rights when the juvenile court did not adequately inform the parent of their right to file a writ 2023“A parent who is absent from the setting hearing has only 12 days after the date the notice is mailed to file her notice of intent to file a writ petition (rule 8.450(e)(4)(B)), so strict compliance with the time for giving notice is crucial to implementing the Legislature’s stated intent that reasonable efforts be made to complete appellate review within the applicable time periods for conducting the permanency hearing (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(4)(A)).” (In re A.A. (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1241 .) The juvenile court’s five-day delay in giving father notice thwarted that legislative intent. | 1 | 4 |
In Re Stephanie M.green2 sentences1999IB writ at the setting hearing stage or by earlier appeals, that is, before the point is reached where reunification efforts have ceased and the child’s need for permanence and stability become paramount to the parent’s interest in the child’s care, custody and companionship (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 595 , 867 P.2d 706 ]). 1999IB writ at the setting hearing stage or by earlier appeals, that is, before the point is reached where reunification efforts have ceased and the child’s need for permanence and stability become paramount to the parent’s interest in the child’s care, custody and companionship (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 595 , 867 P.2d 706 ]). | 1 | 2 |
In Re Dsgreen1 sentence2024(See D.S., supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 674.) DISPOSITION The petition for extraordinary writ is denied, as is father’s request for a temporary stay of the December 17, 2024 section 366.26 hearing. 2 In some cases, a parent does have standing even though the challenged order does not directly affect their personal rights. | 1 | 1 |
Mathews v. Eldridgegreen1 sentence2021(See Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 348 [“The essence of due process is the requirement that ‘a person in jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it’”].) If defense counsel had expressly asked for dismissal, the court’s first question should have been, “Pursuant to what legal authority?” And then the issues could have been joined. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Lauren Z.green1 sentence2020(In re A.A. (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1235 [“when a parent is not properly advised of his or her right to 8. challenge the setting order by extraordinary writ, and consequently the parent does not timely file a writ petition, good cause exists to consider issues relating to the setting hearing”] (A.A.); In re Lauren Z. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1110 [mother could challenge order terminating her reunification services where she did not receive a writ advisement]; In re Harmony B. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 831 , 838–839 [because father was not given notice, he could raise issues concerning th | 1 | 1 |
Conservatorship of the Pers. v. D.C.green1 sentence2020(E.g., Conservatorship of D.C. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 487, 492 (D.C.); George, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at pp. 160 & 166.) S.A.’s sole argument against the competence of psychologists in this setting is the rule that the “practice of psychology shall not include prescribing drugs . . . .” (Bus. & Prof. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Christina B.green2 sentences2016Specifically, the guardian may not compromise fundamental rights, including the right to trial, without some countervailing and significant benefit.” (In re Christina B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1454 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 918 ].) The cases cited by CFS do not support the proposition that a guardian ad litem appointed for a parent in a juvenile dependency proceeding has the authority to forgo filing a petition for extraordinary writ — with the consequence of waiving the parent’s right to challenge orders made at the setting hearing — without first consulting with the parent and the parent’s attor 2016Specifically, the guardian may not compromise fundamental rights, including the right to trial, without some countervailing and significant benefit.” (In re Christina B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1454 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 918 ].) The cases cited by CFS do not support the proposition that a guardian ad litem appointed for a parent in a juvenile dependency proceeding has the authority to forgo filing a petition for extraordinary writ — with the consequence of waiving the parent’s right to challenge orders made at the setting hearing — without first consulting with the parent and the parent’s attor | 1 | 1 |
Desiree F. v. Daniel F.green1 sentence2015(Pedro N., supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at pp. 5 The issue of whether a parent’s failure to appeal a juvenile court’s finding that notice under ICWA was unnecessary precludes the parent from subsequently challenging that finding on a subsequent appeal from an order terminating parental rights is currently pending before the California Supreme Court in In re Isaiah W. (2014) 288 Cal.App.4th 981 , review granted October 29, 2014, S221263. 10. 185, 189–190; see In re Desiree F. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 460 , 477–478 [wherein we reversed the juvenile court’s denial of a tribe’s motion to intervene after a f | 1 | 1 |
In Re Pedro N.green2 sentences2015(Pedro N., supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at pp. 5 The issue of whether a parent’s failure to appeal a juvenile court’s finding that notice under ICWA was unnecessary precludes the parent from subsequently challenging that finding on a subsequent appeal from an order terminating parental rights is currently pending before the California Supreme Court in In re Isaiah W. (2014) 288 Cal.App.4th 981 , review granted October 29, 2014, S221263. 10. 185, 189–190; see In re Desiree F. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 460 , 477–478 [wherein we reversed the juvenile court’s denial of a tribe’s motion to intervene after a f 2015(Pedro N., supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at pp. 5 The issue of whether a parent’s failure to appeal a juvenile court’s finding that notice under ICWA was unnecessary precludes the parent from subsequently challenging that finding on a subsequent appeal from an order terminating parental rights is currently pending before the California Supreme Court in In re Isaiah W. (2014) 288 Cal.App.4th 981 , review granted October 29, 2014, S221263. 10. 185, 189–190; see In re Desiree F. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 460 , 477–478 [wherein we reversed the juvenile court’s denial of a tribe’s motion to intervene after a f | 1 | 1 |
| Clement v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Raulet v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. of Milwaukeegreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Merrickgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Matthew C.red | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Denham v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2026(Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 .) A parent seeking review of the court’s orders from the setting hearing must, as mother did here, file an extraordinary writ petition in this court on Judicial Council form JV–825 to initiate writ proceedings. 2026(Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 .) A parent seeking review of the juvenile court’s orders from the setting hearing must file an extraordinary writ petition in this court on Judicial Council form JV-825 to initiate writ proceedings. | 26 | 2020–2026 |
In Re Janee J.
green
2 sentences2023First, “the waiver rule will be enforced unless due process forbids it.” (In re Janee J. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 198, 208 .) There must be “some defect that fundamentally undermined the statutory scheme so that the parent would have been kept from availing himself or herself of the protections afforded by the scheme as a whole.” (Ibid.) Second, “the courts have found good cause to address the merits of a challenge to orders made at the setting hearing in an appeal from the order terminating parental rights when the juvenile court did not adequately inform the parent of their right to file a writ 2021Such ineffective assistance of counsel rendered the review hearings fundamentally unfair. “[L]ate consideration of [IAC] claims defeats a carefully balanced legislative scheme by allowing a back-door review of matters which must be brought for appellate review by rule [8.450] writ at the setting hearing stage or by earlier appeals, that 28 is, before the point is reached where reunification efforts have ceased and the child’s need for permanence and stability become paramount to the parent’s interest in the child’s care, custody and companionship.” (Janee J., supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 208 .) | 3 | 2021–2024 |
People v. Mendoza
green
2 sentences2024(People v. Mendoza (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1340 .) Setting defendant’s words in the context of his history with T.C., there was substantial evidence for the jury to determine the statements were meant to be taken as a threat. 2022(People v. Mendoza (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1340 .) Setting defendant’s words in the context of his history with T.C., there was substantial evidence for the jury to determine the statements were meant to be taken as a threat. | 2 | 2022–2024 |
In Re Harmony B.
green
2 sentences2020(In re A.A. (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1235 [“when a parent is not properly advised of his or her right to 8. challenge the setting order by extraordinary writ, and consequently the parent does not timely file a writ petition, good cause exists to consider issues relating to the setting hearing”] (A.A.); In re Lauren Z. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1110 [mother could challenge order terminating her reunification services where she did not receive a writ advisement]; In re Harmony B. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 831 , 838–839 [because father was not given notice, he could raise issues concerning th 2014“When notice is not given, the parents’ claims of error occurring at the setting hearing may be addressed on review from the disposition following the section 366.26 hearing.” (In re Harmony B. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 831, 838 .) The parent need not demonstrate prejudice from the lack of notice in order to be excepted from the forfeiture rule. | 2 | 2014–2020 |
Maggie S. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2014(Maggie S., at p. 671.) We noted that, when “‘the juvenile court orders a hearing under section 366.26, the court must orally advise all parties present that if the party wishes to preserve any right to review on appeal of the order setting the hearing under section 366.26, the party is required to seek an extraordinary writ. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] This rule applies to all orders . . . made contemporaneously with the setting of the hearing. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) Here, as in Maggie S., supra, 220 Cal.App.4th 662 , mother was present at the hearing at which the court terminated reunification 2014(Maggie S., at p. 671.) We noted that, when “‘the juvenile court orders a hearing under section 366.26, the court must orally advise all parties present that if the party wishes to preserve any right to review on appeal of the order setting the hearing under section 366.26, the party is required to seek an extraordinary writ. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] This rule applies to all orders . . . made contemporaneously with the setting of the hearing. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) Here, as in Maggie S., supra, 220 Cal.App.4th 662 , mother was present at the hearing at which the court terminated reunification | 2 | 2014–2014 |
In Re Anthony
green
2 sentences2006(See, e.g., In re Anthony B., supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1022-1024, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 594 ; In re Charmice G., supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at pp. 664-669, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 212 .) All orders issued at a hearing in which a section 366.26 hearing is ordered are subject to section 366.26, subdivision ( l ) and must be reviewed by extraordinary writ. ( In re Merrick V., supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 248, 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 490 .) The appeals are therefore dismissed. 2006(See, e.g., In re Anthony B., supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1022-1024; In re Charmice G., supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at pp. 664-669.) All orders issued at a hearing in which a section 366.26 hearing is ordered are subject to section 366.26, subdivision (/) and must be reviewed by extraordinary writ. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Arizona v. Fulminante
green
2 sentences2005Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279 [ 113 L.Ed.2d 302 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 ], a criminal case, explained that all constitutional errors are not equal. 2005Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279 [ 113 L.Ed.2d 302 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 ], a criminal case, explained that all constitutional errors are not equal. | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Santosky v. Kramer
green
2 sentences1999Unlike the termination hearings evaluated in Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 , and In re Angelia P. [ (1981) ] 28 Cal.3d 908 , 171 *645 Cal.Rptr. 637, 623 P.2d 198 , the purpose of the section 366.26 hearing is not to accumulate further evidence of parental unfitness and danger to the child, but to begin the task of finding the child a permanent alternative family placement. 1999Unlike the termination hearings evaluated in Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. 745 , and In re Angelia P. [(1981)] 28 Cal.3d 908 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 637 , 623 P.2d 198 ], the purpose of the section 366.26 hearing is not to accumulate further evidence of parental unfitness and danger to the child, but to begin the task of finding the child a permanent alternative family placement. | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Stanislaus County Department of Social Services v. Noeline P.
green
2 sentences1999So does its initial conclusion about the waiver rule: "We decline to carve out an exception to it here even though the issues raised involve the important constitutional and statutory rights to counsel and to the effective assistance of counsel." ( Meranda P., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1151 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 913 , italics added.) Proof of case-specific flexibility is Cathina W., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th 716, 722-724 , 80 Cal. Rptr.2d 480 , where the same court on another.26 appeal entertained a mother's claims of error at the setting hearing, reasoning that the mother's failure to receive notice 1999So does its initial conclusion about the waiver rule: “We decline to carve out an exception to it here even though the issues raised involve the important constitutional and statutory rights to counsel and to the effective assistance of counsel.” (Meranda P., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1151 , italics added.) Proof of case-specific flexibility is Cathina W., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th 716, 722-724 , where the same court on another section 366.26 appeal entertained a mother’s claims of error at the setting hearing, reasoning that the mother’s failure to receive notice of her rule 39.IB review rights | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Department of Social Services v. Ronald P.
red
2 sentences1999Unlike the termination hearings evaluated in Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. 745 , and In re Angelia P. [(1981)] 28 Cal.3d 908 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 637 , 623 P.2d 198 ], the purpose of the section 366.26 hearing is not to accumulate further evidence of parental unfitness and danger to the child, but to begin the task of finding the child a permanent alternative family placement. 1999Unlike the termination hearings evaluated in Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. 745 , and In re Angelia P. [(1981)] 28 Cal.3d 908 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 637 , 623 P.2d 198 ], the purpose of the section 366.26 hearing is not to accumulate further evidence of parental unfitness and danger to the child, but to begin the task of finding the child a permanent alternative family placement. | 2 | 1999–1999 |
People v. Bankers Insurance
green
1 sentence2024Co., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 587 , “There is nothing which suggests the reporter’s transcript is in any way incomplete.” And Allegheny does not dispute the reporter’s transcript is complete. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. French
green
1 sentence2022(See People v. French, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 48-49.) 14 That is precisely what happened at the setting hearing on January 13, 2022. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
In Re Marriage of Straczynski
green
1 sentence2021“The constitutional guarantee of due process requires that a court give notice to a party and an opportunity to respond before sua sponte dismissing an action.” (In re Marriage of Straczynski (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 531, 538 ; see id. at p. 539 [“The proper procedure for the trial court to use in ordering a sua sponte dismissal of the dissolution action would have been the issuance of an order to show cause and the setting of a hearing to consider a dismissal on the specified grounds” (italics added)].) And even if we interpret defense counsel’s statement (“I don’t see what the benefit of conti | 1 | 2021–2021 |
In Re Justice P.
green
1 sentence2021“A juvenile court order may be changed, modified or set aside under section 388 if the petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) new evidence or changed circumstances exist and (2) the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child. [Citation.] A parent need only make a prima facie showing of these elements to trigger the right to a hearing on a section 388 petition and the petition should be liberally construed in favor of granting a hearing to consider the parent’s request. [Citation.] [If] [h]owever, . . . the liberally construed allegations of the pe | 1 | 2021–2021 |
In Re Zachary G.
green
1 sentence2021“A juvenile court order may be changed, modified or set aside under section 388 if the petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) new evidence or changed circumstances exist and (2) the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child. [Citation.] A parent need only make a prima facie showing of these elements to trigger the right to a hearing on a section 388 petition and the petition should be liberally construed in favor of granting a hearing to consider the parent’s request. [Citation.] [If] [h]owever, . . . the liberally construed allegations of the pe | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Santa Barbara County Child Welfare Services v. Jasmin R.
green
1 sentence2021“A juvenile court order may be changed, modified or set aside under section 388 if the petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) new evidence or changed circumstances exist and (2) the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child. [Citation.] A parent need only make a prima facie showing of these elements to trigger the right to a hearing on a section 388 petition and the petition should be liberally construed in favor of granting a hearing to consider the parent’s request. [Citation.] [If] [h]owever, . . . the liberally construed allegations of the pe | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Conservatorship of George H.
green
1 sentence2020(E.g., Conservatorship of D.C. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 487, 492 (D.C.); George, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at pp. 160 & 166.) S.A.’s sole argument against the competence of psychologists in this setting is the rule that the “practice of psychology shall not include prescribing drugs . . . .” (Bus. & Prof. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| In Re Marinna J. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
In Re BR
green
1 sentence2015(Cf. In re Cathina W. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 716, 722-723 [mother entitled to review of order setting the section 366.26 hearing on appeal from the subsequent order terminating her parental rights because she was not duly advised of the writ requirement; mother was not personally present at the setting hearing, notice was mailed to mother four days after entry of the setting order to her last known address, the notice was returned to the clerk’s office stamped “return to sender” along with a label that contained mother’s new address, and the clerk did not re-mail the notice to that address].) T | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Ranger Insurance
green
1 sentence2015Co. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1301 , “[a] defendant’s presence is ‘lawfully required’ when there is ‘a specific court order commanding his appearance at a date and time certain’ [citation], or when a defendant has notice because he or she is present when the date and time for a mandatory appearance are set, even though the court did not specifically order his or her personal presence.” (Id. at p. 1304.) In defendant’s case, the preliminary setting hearing was a mandatory appearance under section 977 and Local Rule 3, since defendant had not executed a written waiver of her right to be personally pr | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Steve J. v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Stanislaus Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Sonya G. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Speelman v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Jarrett v. Jarrett green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Jarrett v. Jarrett green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Bollenbach v. United States green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| People v. Calloway green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.