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8 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Colemangreen2 sentences1992Rather, the unifying principle is that these factors relate to whether the child declarant was particularly likely to be telling the truth when the statement was made.'" Coleman, 205 Ill. 1992Rather, the unifying principle is that these factors relate to whether the child declarant was particularly likely to be telling the truth when the statement was made.’ ” Coleman, 205 Ill. | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Idaho v. Wright
green
2 sentences1993Rather, the unifying principle is that these factors relate to whether the child declarant was particularly likely to be telling the truth when the statement was made.” Wright, 497 U.S. at 822 , 111 L. 1993Rather, the unifying principle is that these factors relate to whether the child declarant was particularly likely to be telling the truth when the statement was made.” Wright, 497 U.S. at 822 , 111 L. | 5 | 1990–1993 |
People v. Campa
green
2 sentences2019This understanding of the escape statute was confirmed yet again in Beachem where, once more, this court unanimously held that a “ ‘defendant cannot escape unless he is first in custody’ ” (Beachem, 229 Ill. 2d at 253 (quoting Campa, 217 Ill. 2d at 259 )) and once more reaffirmed that escape from custody, whether physical or constructive, is the unifying principle that underlies all the forms of escape set forth in section 31-6(a). ¶ 94 For almost 40 years, this court has held that the plain and ordinary meaning of escape under section 31-6(a) means an intentional, unauthorized departure from 2019This understanding of the escape statute was confirmed yet again in Beachem where, once more, this court unanimously held that a “ ‘defendant cannot escape unless he is first in custody’ ” (Beachem, 229 Ill. 2d at 253 (quoting Campa, 217 Ill. 2d at 259 )) and once more reaffirmed that escape from custody, whether physical or constructive, is the unifying principle that underlies all the forms of escape set forth in section 31-6(a). ¶ 94 For almost 40 years, this court has held that the plain and ordinary meaning of escape under section 31-6(a) means an intentional, unauthorized departure from | 3 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Beachem
green
2 sentences2019This understanding of the escape statute was confirmed yet again in Beachem where, once more, this court unanimously held that a “ ‘defendant cannot escape unless he is first in custody’ ” (Beachem, 229 Ill. 2d at 253 (quoting Campa, 217 Ill. 2d at 259 )) and once more reaffirmed that escape from custody, whether physical or constructive, is the unifying principle that underlies all the forms of escape set forth in section 31-6(a). ¶ 94 For almost 40 years, this court has held that the plain and ordinary meaning of escape under section 31-6(a) means an intentional, unauthorized departure from 2019This understanding of the escape statute was confirmed yet again in Beachem where, once more, this court unanimously held that a “ ‘defendant cannot escape unless he is first in custody’ ” (Beachem, 229 Ill. 2d at 253 (quoting Campa, 217 Ill. 2d at 259 )) and once more reaffirmed that escape from custody, whether physical or constructive, is the unifying principle that underlies all the forms of escape set forth in section 31-6(a). ¶ 94 For almost 40 years, this court has held that the plain and ordinary meaning of escape under section 31-6(a) means an intentional, unauthorized departure from | 3 | 2019–2019 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.