unifying principle in Connecticut

2025Overall, ‘‘the integ- rity of the judicial system serves as a unifying principle behind the seemingly disparate use of our supervisory powers.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Anderson, 255 Conn. 425, 439 , 773 A.2d 287 (2001).

2025Overall, ‘‘the integ- rity of the judicial system serves as a unifying principle behind the seemingly disparate use of our supervisory powers.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Anderson, 255 Conn. 425, 439 , 773 A.2d 287 (2001).

2011Rather, the standards are flexible and are to be determined in the interests of justice. . . . [0]ur supervisory authority [however] is not a form of free-floating justice, untethered to legal principle. . . . [T]he integrity of the juridical system serves as a unifying principle behind the seemingly disparate use of our supervisory powers. . . . [0]ur supervisory powers are invoked only in the rare circumstance where [the] traditional protections are inadequate to ensure the fair and just administration of the courts . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mukhtaar, 253 Conn. 28

2011Rather, the standards are flexible and are to be determined in the interests of justice. . . . [0]ur supervisory authority [however] is not a form of free-floating justice, untethered to legal principle. . . . [T]he integrity of the juridical system serves as a unifying principle behind the seemingly disparate use of our supervisory powers. . . . [0]ur supervisory powers are invoked only in the rare circumstance where [the] traditional protections are inadequate to ensure the fair and just administration of the courts . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mukhtaar, 253 Conn. 28

2005Rather, the integrity of the judicial system serves as a unifying principle behind the seemingly disparate use of our supervisory powers. . . . [E]ven a sensible and efficient use of the supervisory power ... is invalid if it conflicts with constitutional or statutory provisions.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Higgins, 265 Conn. 35 , 61 n.26, 826 A.2d 1126 (2003).

2005Rather, the integrity of the judicial system serves as a unifying principle behind the seemingly disparate use of our supervisory powers. . . . [E]ven a sensible and efficient use of the supervisory power ... is invalid if it conflicts with constitutional or statutory provisions.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Higgins, 265 Conn. 35 , 61 n.26, 826 A.2d 1126 (2003).

2013“Appellate courts possess an inherent supervisory authority over the administration of justice. . . . [T]he standards are flexible and are to be determined in the interests of justice. . . . [0]ur supervisory authority [however] is not a form of free-floating justice, untethered to legal principle. . . . [T]he integrity of the judicial system serves as a unifying principle .... [0]ur supervisory powers are invoked only in the rare circumstance where [the] traditional protections are inadequate to ensure the fair and just administration of the courts . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

2013“Appellate courts possess an inherent supervisory authority over the administration of justice. . . . [T]he standards are flexible and are to be determined in the interests of justice. . . . [0]ur supervisory authority [however] is not a form of free-floating justice, untethered to legal principle. . . . [T]he integrity of the judicial system serves as a unifying principle .... [0]ur supervisory powers are invoked only in the rare circumstance where [the] traditional protections are inadequate to ensure the fair and just administration of the courts . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

2025Thus, we are more likely to invoke our supervisory powers when there is a ‘‘pervasive and significant prob- lem’’; State v. Hill, 307 Conn. 689 , 706, 59 A.3d 196 (2013); or when the conduct or violation at issue is ‘‘offensive to the sound administration of justice . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colon, 272 Conn. 106 , 239–40, 864 A.2d 666 (2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 848 , 126 S. Ct. 102 , 163 L.

2025Thus, we are more likely to invoke our supervisory powers when there is a ‘‘pervasive and significant prob- lem’’; State v. Hill, 307 Conn. 689 , 706, 59 A.3d 196 (2013); or when the conduct or violation at issue is ‘‘offensive to the sound administration of justice . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colon, 272 Conn. 106 , 239–40, 864 A.2d 666 (2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 848 , 126 S. Ct. 102 , 163 L.

2025Thus, we are more likely to invoke our supervisory powers when there is a ‘‘pervasive and significant prob- lem’’; State v. Hill, 307 Conn. 689 , 706, 59 A.3d 196 (2013); or when the conduct or violation at issue is ‘‘offensive to the sound administration of justice . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colon, 272 Conn. 106 , 239–40, 864 A.2d 666 (2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 848 , 126 S. Ct. 102 , 163 L.

2025Thus, we are more likely to invoke our supervisory powers when there is a ‘‘pervasive and significant prob- lem’’; State v. Hill, 307 Conn. 689 , 706, 59 A.3d 196 (2013); or when the conduct or violation at issue is ‘‘offensive to the sound administration of justice . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colon, 272 Conn. 106 , 239–40, 864 A.2d 666 (2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 848 , 126 S. Ct. 102 , 163 L.

2025Thus, we are more likely to invoke our supervisory powers when there is a ‘‘pervasive and significant prob- lem’’; State v. Hill, 307 Conn. 689 , 706, 59 A.3d 196 (2013); or when the conduct or violation at issue is ‘‘offensive to the sound administration of justice . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colon, 272 Conn. 106 , 239–40, 864 A.2d 666 (2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 848 , 126 S. Ct. 102 , 163 L.

2022Thus, we are more likely to invoke our supervisory powers when there is a ‘‘pervasive and significant prob- lem’’; State v. Hill, 307 Conn. 689 , 706, 59 A.3d 196 (2013); or when the conduct or violation at issue is ‘‘offensive to the sound administration of justice . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colon, 272 Conn. 106 , 239–40, 864 A.2d 666 (2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 848 , 126 S. Ct. 102 , 163 L.

2025Thus, a defendant seeking review of an unpreserved claim under our supervisory authority must demonstrate that his claim is one that, as a matter of policy, is relevant to the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole, most typically in that it lends itself to the adop- tion of a procedural rule that will guide the lower courts in the administration of justice in all aspects of the criminal process.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Leach, 165 Conn. App. 28 , 35–36, 138 A.3d 445 , cert. denied, 323 Conn. 948 , 169 A.3d 792 (2016). ‘‘Our supervisory powers are not a last

2025Thus, a defendant seeking review of an unpreserved claim under our supervisory authority must demonstrate that his claim is one that, as a matter of policy, is relevant to the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole, most typically in that it lends itself to the adop- tion of a procedural rule that will guide the lower courts in the administration of justice in all aspects of the criminal process.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Leach, 165 Conn. App. 28 , 35–36, 138 A.3d 445 , cert. denied, 323 Conn. 948 , 169 A.3d 792 (2016). ‘‘Our supervisory powers are not a last

2017Additionally, the petitioner argues that this court "should exercise its supervisory authority to require a jury instruction concerning the sentence modification procedure in Connecticut any time the state represents to a sentenced inmate that the state will make the witness' cooperation known." "[O]ur supervisory authority ... is not a form of free-floating justice, untethered to legal principle.... [T]he integrity of the judicial system serves as a unifying principle behind the seemingly disparate use of our supervisory powers.... [O]ur supervisory powers are invoked only in the rare circums

2017Additionally, the petitioner argues that this court "should exercise its supervisory authority to require a jury instruction concerning the sentence modification procedure in Connecticut any time the state represents to a sentenced inmate that the state will make the witness' cooperation known." "[O]ur supervisory authority ... is not a form of free-floating justice, untethered to legal principle.... [T]he integrity of the judicial system serves as a unifying principle behind the seemingly disparate use of our supervisory powers.... [O]ur supervisory powers are invoked only in the rare circums

2013“Supervisory powers are exercised to direct trial courts to adopt judicial procedures that will address matters that are of utmost seriousness, not only for the integrity of a particular trial but also for the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ouellette, 271 Conn. 740 , 762 n.28, 859 A.2d 907 (2004).

2013“Supervisory powers are exercised to direct trial courts to adopt judicial procedures that will address matters that are of utmost seriousness, not only for the integrity of a particular trial but also for the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ouellette, 271 Conn. 740 , 762 n.28, 859 A.2d 907 (2004).

2010Rather, the standards are flexible and are to be determined in the interests of justice.... [O]ur supervisory authority [however] is not a form of free-floating justice, untethered to legal principle.... [T]he integrity of the judicial system serves as a unifying principle behind the seemingly disparate use of our supervisory powers." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Santiago, 245 Conn. 301, 332-33 , 715 A.2d 1 (1998).

2010Rather, the standards are flexible and are to be determined in the interests of justice.... [O]ur supervisory authority [however] is not a form of free-floating justice, untethered to legal principle.... [T]he integrity of the judicial system serves as a unifying principle behind the seemingly disparate use of our supervisory powers." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Santiago, 245 Conn. 301, 332-33 , 715 A.2d 1 (1998).

2026Thus, we are more likely to invoke our supervisory powers when there is a pervasive and significant problem . . . or when the conduct or violation at issue is offensive to the sound administration of justice . . . .” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Aisjaha N., 343 Conn. 709 , 724–25, 275 A.3d 1181 (2022); see also, e.g., State v. King, 350 Conn. 303 , 335–36, 324 A.3d 81 (2024) (discussing cir- cumstances in which supervisory authority rules are applied prospectively and thus do not require reversal of judgment).

2026Thus, we are more likely to invoke our supervisory powers when there is a pervasive and significant problem . . . or when the conduct or violation at issue is offensive to the sound administration of justice . . . .” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Aisjaha N., 343 Conn. 709 , 724–25, 275 A.3d 1181 (2022).

2025Thus, a defendant seeking review of an unpreserved claim under our supervisory authority must demonstrate that his claim is one that, as a matter of policy, is relevant to the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole, most typically in that it lends itself to the adop- tion of a procedural rule that will guide the lower courts in the administration of justice in all aspects of the criminal process.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Leach, 165 Conn. App. 28 , 35–36, 138 A.3d 445 , cert. denied, 323 Conn. 948 , 169 A.3d 792 (2016). ‘‘Our supervisory powers are not a last

2019Thus, a defendant seeking review of an unpreserved claim under our supervisory authority must demonstrate that his claim is one that, as a matter of policy, is relevant to the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole, most typically in that it lends itself to the adoption of a procedural rule that will guide the lower courts in the administration of justice in all aspects of the criminal process.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Leach, 165 Conn. App. 28 , 35–36, 138 A.3d 445 , cert. denied, 323 Conn. 948 , 169 A.3d 792 (2016).

2025Thus, a defendant seeking review of an unpreserved claim under our supervisory authority must demonstrate that his claim is one that, as a matter of policy, is relevant to the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole, most typically in that it lends itself to the adop- tion of a procedural rule that will guide the lower courts in the administration of justice in all aspects of the criminal process.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Leach, 165 Conn. App. 28 , 35–36, 138 A.3d 445 , cert. denied, 323 Conn. 948 , 169 A.3d 792 (2016). ‘‘Our supervisory powers are not a last

2019Thus, a defendant seeking review of an unpreserved claim under our supervisory authority must demonstrate that his claim is one that, as a matter of policy, is relevant to the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole, most typically in that it lends itself to the adoption of a procedural rule that will guide the lower courts in the administration of justice in all aspects of the criminal process.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Leach, 165 Conn. App. 28 , 35–36, 138 A.3d 445 , cert. denied, 323 Conn. 948 , 169 A.3d 792 (2016).

2010Additionally, "[i]n certain instances, dictated by the interests of justice, we may, sua sponte, exercise our inherent supervisory power to review an unpreserved claim that has not been raised appropriately under the Golding or plain error doctrines." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jones, 281 Conn. 613 , 618 n. 5, 916 A.2d 17 , cert. denied, 552 U.S. 868 , 128 S.Ct. 164 , 169 L.Ed.2d 112 (2007). *767 In State v. Revelo, 256 Conn. 494, 504 , 775 A.2d 260 , cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1052 , 122 S.Ct. 639 , 151 L.Ed.2d 558 (2001), our Supreme Court held that supervisory review is someti

2010Additionally, "[i]n certain instances, dictated by the interests of justice, we may, sua sponte, exercise our inherent supervisory power to review an unpreserved claim that has not been raised appropriately under the Golding or plain error doctrines." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jones, 281 Conn. 613 , 618 n. 5, 916 A.2d 17 , cert. denied, 552 U.S. 868 , 128 S.Ct. 164 , 169 L.Ed.2d 112 (2007). *767 In State v. Revelo, 256 Conn. 494, 504 , 775 A.2d 260 , cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1052 , 122 S.Ct. 639 , 151 L.Ed.2d 558 (2001), our Supreme Court held that supervisory review is someti

2001Rather, the integrity of the judicial system serves as a unifying principle behind the seemingly disparate use of our supervisory powers.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Delvalle, 250 Conn. 466 , 476 n.13, 736 A.2d 125 (1999); see also Practice Book § 60-2 (“[t]he supervision and control of the proceedings on appeal shall be in tire court having appellate jurisdiction from the time the appeal is filed, or earlier, if appropriate").

2001Rather, the integrity of the judicial system serves as a unifying principle behind the seemingly disparate use of our supervisory powers.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Delvalle, 250 Conn. 466 , 476 n.13, 736 A.2d 125 (1999); see also Practice Book § 60-2 (“[t]he supervision and control of the proceedings on appeal shall be in tire court having appellate jurisdiction from the time the appeal is filed, or earlier, if appropriate").

2003See State v. Hines, 243 Conn. 796, 815 , 709 A.2d 522 (1998) ([o]ur supervisory powers are invoked only in the rare circumstance where [the] traditional protections are inadequate to ensure the fair and just administration of the courts); State v. Coleman, 242 Conn. 523, 540 , 700 A.2d 14 (1997) ([w]e previously have exercised our supervisory powers to direct trial courts to adopt judicial procedures that will address matters that are of utmost seriousness, not only for the integrity of a particular trial but also for the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole).” (Internal quotat

2003See State v. Hines, 243 Conn. 796, 815 , 709 A.2d 522 (1998) ([o]ur supervisory powers are invoked only in the rare circumstance where [the] traditional protections are inadequate to ensure the fair and just administration of the courts); State v. Coleman, 242 Conn. 523, 540 , 700 A.2d 14 (1997) ([w]e previously have exercised our supervisory powers to direct trial courts to adopt judicial procedures that will address matters that are of utmost seriousness, not only for the integrity of a particular trial but also for the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole).” (Internal quotat

2020Thus, we are more likely to invoke our supervisory powers when there is a pervasive and significant problem . . . or when the conduct or violation at issue is offensive to the sound administration of justice . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DeChellis v. DeChellis, 190 Conn. App. 853 , 870–71, 213 A.3d 1 , cert. denied, 333 Conn. 913 , 215 A.3d 1210 (2019).

2020Thus, we are more likely to invoke our supervisory powers when there is a pervasive and significant problem . . . or when the conduct or violation at issue is offensive to the sound administration of justice . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DeChellis v. DeChellis, 190 Conn. App. 853 , 870–71, 213 A.3d 1 , cert. denied, 333 Conn. 913 , 215 A.3d 1210 (2019).

2018"Our Supreme Court has specifically stated: In exercising our supervisory power we have frequently given only prospective effect to changes strictly on policy considerations that do not carry constitutional implications." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Holloway v. Commissioner of Correction , 72 Conn. App. 244 , 250, 804 A.2d 995 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 944 , 808 A.2d 1136 (2002) ; see also In re Daniel N. , 323 Conn. 640 , 150 A.3d 657 (2016) (holding retroactive application of rule would exceed scope of supervisory authority).

2018"Our Supreme Court has specifically stated: In exercising our supervisory power we have frequently given only prospective effect to changes strictly on policy considerations that do not carry constitutional implications." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Holloway v. Commissioner of Correction , 72 Conn. App. 244 , 250, 804 A.2d 995 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 944 , 808 A.2d 1136 (2002) ; see also In re Daniel N. , 323 Conn. 640 , 150 A.3d 657 (2016) (holding retroactive application of rule would exceed scope of supervisory authority).

2018"Our Supreme Court has specifically stated: In exercising our supervisory power we have frequently given only prospective effect to changes strictly on policy considerations that do not carry constitutional implications." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Holloway v. Commissioner of Correction , 72 Conn. App. 244 , 250, 804 A.2d 995 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 944 , 808 A.2d 1136 (2002) ; see also In re Daniel N. , 323 Conn. 640 , 150 A.3d 657 (2016) (holding retroactive application of rule would exceed scope of supervisory authority).

2018"Our Supreme Court has specifically stated: In exercising our supervisory power we have frequently given only prospective effect to changes strictly on policy considerations that do not carry constitutional implications." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Holloway v. Commissioner of Correction , 72 Conn. App. 244 , 250, 804 A.2d 995 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 944 , 808 A.2d 1136 (2002) ; see also In re Daniel N. , 323 Conn. 640 , 150 A.3d 657 (2016) (holding retroactive application of rule would exceed scope of supervisory authority).

2015In State v. Patterson, 276 Conn. 452 , 469–70, 886 A.2d 777 (2005), our Supreme Court required that a special credibility instruction be given when a jailhouse infor- mant testified regarding a confession he overheard while incarcerated in exchange for benefits from the state.

2015In State v. Patterson, 276 Conn. 452 , 469–70, 886 A.2d 777 (2005), our Supreme Court required that a special credibility instruction be given when a jailhouse infor- mant testified regarding a confession he overheard while incarcerated in exchange for benefits from the state.

2015Thus, we are more likely to invoke our supervisory powers when there is a pervasive and significant problem . . . or when the conduct or violation at issue is offensive to the sound administration of justice . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Edwards, 314 Conn. 465 , 498–99, 102 A.3d 52 (2014); see also State v. Rose, 305 Conn. 594 , 607, 46 A.3d 146 (2012) (emphasizing well-settled view that supervisory authority is an extraordinary remedy to be exercised sparingly); State v. Wade, 297 Conn. 262, 296 , 998 A.2d 1114 (2010) (same); State

2015Thus, we are more likely to invoke our supervisory powers when there is a pervasive and significant problem . . . or when the conduct or violation at issue is offensive to the sound administration of justice . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Edwards, 314 Conn. 465 , 498–99, 102 A.3d 52 (2014); see also State v. Rose, 305 Conn. 594 , 607, 46 A.3d 146 (2012) (emphasizing well-settled view that supervisory authority is an extraordinary remedy to be exercised sparingly); State v. Wade, 297 Conn. 262, 296 , 998 A.2d 1114 (2010) (same); State

2015Thus, we are more likely to invoke our supervisory powers when there is a pervasive and significant problem . . . or when the conduct or violation at issue is offensive to the sound administration of justice . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Edwards, 314 Conn. 465 , 498–99, 102 A.3d 52 (2014); see also State v. Rose, 305 Conn. 594 , 607, 46 A.3d 146 (2012) (emphasizing well-settled view that supervisory authority is an extraordinary remedy to be exercised sparingly); State v. Wade, 297 Conn. 262, 296 , 998 A.2d 1114 (2010) (same); State

2015Thus, we are more likely to invoke our supervisory powers when there is a pervasive and significant problem . . . or when the conduct or violation at issue is offensive to the sound administration of justice . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Edwards, 314 Conn. 465 , 498–99, 102 A.3d 52 (2014); see also State v. Rose, 305 Conn. 594 , 607, 46 A.3d 146 (2012) (emphasizing well-settled view that supervisory authority is an extraordinary remedy to be exercised sparingly); State v. Wade, 297 Conn. 262, 296 , 998 A.2d 1114 (2010) (same); State

2014Our use of our supervisory authority to resolve these claims in Payne and Ubaldi remains consistent with the unifying principle that the supervisory power should be utilized when necessary to protect the system’s integrity; leaving the prosecutorial violations in those cases unaddressed would have adversely affected public perception of the criminal justice system—at least in those particular judicial districts. 32 Compare North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726 , 89 S. Ct. 2072 , 23 L.

2014Our use of our supervisory authority to resolve these claims in Payne and Ubaldi remains consistent with the unifying principle that the supervisory power should be utilized when necessary to protect the system’s integrity; leaving the prosecutorial violations in those cases unaddressed would have adversely affected public perception of the criminal justice system—at least in those particular judicial districts. 32 Compare North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726 , 89 S. Ct. 2072 , 23 L.

2014Thus, we turn to the merits of the defendant’s claims to deter- mine whether they implicate the perceived fairness of the system as a whole.31 B This Court’s Supervisory Powers in the Sentencing Context 1 Background We have previously utilized our supervisory powers to craft procedural rules that protect against the appear- ance of a judge penalizing a defendant for the exercise of his constitutional rights because ‘‘[t]o punish a per- son because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort . . . .’’ (Citation omitted.) Bordenkircher v. H

2014Thus, we turn to the merits of the defendant’s claims to deter- mine whether they implicate the perceived fairness of the system as a whole.31 B This Court’s Supervisory Powers in the Sentencing Context 1 Background We have previously utilized our supervisory powers to craft procedural rules that protect against the appear- ance of a judge penalizing a defendant for the exercise of his constitutional rights because ‘‘[t]o punish a per- son because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort . . . .’’ (Citation omitted.) Bordenkircher v. H