unifying principle in California

2003Rather, the unifying principle is that these factors relate to whether the child declarant was particularly likely to be telling the truth when the statement was made.” (Id. at p. 822 [ 110 S.Ct. at p. 3150 ].) We independently review the trial court’s ruling the statement was trustworthy.

2001It emphasized that there was no “mechanical test for determining ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’ ” and that “the unifying principle is that these factors relate to whether the child declarant was particularly likely to be telling the truth when the statement was made.” (Idaho v. Wright, supra, 497 U.S. 805, 821-822 [ 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3149-3150 ].) *444 Section 1360 was enacted five years later. 4 (Stats. 1995, ch. 87, § 3.) 5 It provides: “(a) In a criminal prosecution where the victim is a minor, a statement made by the victim when under the age of 12 describing any act of child

2005Closely related to plaintiff’s conspiracy theory is its aiding and abetting theory. “ ‘Liability may ... be imposed on one who aids and abets the commission of an intentional tort if the person (a) knows the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other to so act or (b) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and the person’s own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.’ ” (Fiol v. Doellstedt (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1325-1326 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 308 ].) T

2005Closely related to plaintiff’s conspiracy theory is its aiding and abetting theory. “ ‘Liability may ... be imposed on one who aids and abets the commission of an intentional tort if the person (a) knows the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other to so act or (b) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and the person’s own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.’ ” (Fiol v. Doellstedt (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1325-1326 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 308 ].) T

2003(People v. Roberto V. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1374 [ 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 804 ].) Johnson’s second statement to the police, while he was in the hospital, fails to contain sufficient indicia of trustworthiness to be admitted in the face of defendant’s confrontation clause objection.

2003(People v. Roberto V. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1374 [ 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 804 ].) Johnson’s second statement to the police, while he was in the hospital, fails to contain sufficient indicia of trustworthiness to be admitted in the face of defendant’s confrontation clause objection.

1972The court there held that liability existed because under the circumstances of that case (which are also the circumstances of this case) “we must conclude that the parties knowingly bargained for the very protection here in issue.” (201 Cal.App.2d at p. 376.) Here MacDonald secured San Jose’s agreement for such protection and should not be deprived of it. 6 A petition for a rehearing was denied January 3, 1973.