relationship test in Kansas

2011In that case, a search of social guests was legitimate in part because officers had probable cause to believe that the social guests present were involved in the drug sales. 208 Kan. at 898-99 .

2011People v. Frederick, 142 Cal. App. 4th 400, 411 , 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 585 (2006).

2011People v. Frederick, 142 Cal. App. 4th 400, 411 , 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 585 (2006).

2011If the relationship exception is not met, then the rule considers police knowledge or constructive knowledge as to the ownership of an object. “ ‘ “[Wjithout notice of some sort of the ownership of a belonging, the police are entitled to assume that all objects within premises lawfully subject to the search under a warrant are part of those premises for the purpose of executing the warrant.” ’ [Citation omitted.]” Brown v. State, 181 Ga. App. 768, 772 , 353 S.E.2d 572 (1987).

2011If the relationship exception is not met, then the rule considers police knowledge or constructive knowledge as to the ownership of an object. “ ‘ “[Wjithout notice of some sort of the ownership of a belonging, the police are entitled to assume that all objects within premises lawfully subject to the search under a warrant are part of those premises for the purpose of executing the warrant.” ’ [Citation omitted.]” Brown v. State, 181 Ga. App. 768, 772 , 353 S.E.2d 572 (1987).

2011Consequently, if we determine the notice test is to be applied, the relationship exception would not be applied. *205 In State v. Lambert, 238 Kan. 444 , 710 P.2d 693 (1985), as police executed a search warrant for an apartment occupied by a man named Randy, they discovered two women seated at a table in the kitchen — neither was a resident of the apartment.

2011Consequently, if we determine the notice test is to be applied, the relationship exception would not be applied. *205 In State v. Lambert, 238 Kan. 444 , 710 P.2d 693 (1985), as police executed a search warrant for an apartment occupied by a man named Randy, they discovered two women seated at a table in the kitchen — neither was a resident of the apartment.

1997The Smiths further argue that MRPC 1.9(a) and (b) should be read disjunctively. *462 As support for their disjunctive interpretation, the Smiths cite In re American Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605 , reh. denied 976 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied 507 U.S. 912 (1993) (defendant airline’s former counsel was disqualified from representing plaintiff airline; prior representations involved substantially related matters), in which the court observed: “While the focus of our cases has been on the substantial relationship test, we have indicated that a former client could also disqualify counsel b

1997The Smiths further argue that MRPC 1.9(a) and (b) should be read disjunctively. *462 As support for their disjunctive interpretation, the Smiths cite In re American Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605 , reh. denied 976 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied 507 U.S. 912 (1993) (defendant airline’s former counsel was disqualified from representing plaintiff airline; prior representations involved substantially related matters), in which the court observed: “While the focus of our cases has been on the substantial relationship test, we have indicated that a former client could also disqualify counsel b

1997The Smiths further argue that MRPC 1.9(a) and (b) should be read disjunctively. *462 As support for their disjunctive interpretation, the Smiths cite In re American Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605 , reh. denied 976 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied 507 U.S. 912 (1993) (defendant airline’s former counsel was disqualified from representing plaintiff airline; prior representations involved substantially related matters), in which the court observed: “While the focus of our cases has been on the substantial relationship test, we have indicated that a former client could also disqualify counsel b

1997The Smiths further argue that MRPC 1.9(a) and (b) should be read disjunctively. *462 As support for their disjunctive interpretation, the Smiths cite In re American Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605 , reh. denied 976 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied 507 U.S. 912 (1993) (defendant airline’s former counsel was disqualified from representing plaintiff airline; prior representations involved substantially related matters), in which the court observed: “While the focus of our cases has been on the substantial relationship test, we have indicated that a former client could also disqualify counsel b

1995In Koch, the federal district court stated: “If a substantial relationship is found, an irrebuttable presumption arises that the former client revealed facts requiring the attorney’s disqualification. [Trone v.] Smith, 757 F.2d at 1100 .

1995The Rice court found no actual conflict of interest or appearance of impropriety to preclude the representation in that case. 227 Kan. at 421-22 .

1991Leiker v. Gafford, 245 Kan. 325, 363 , 778 P.2d 823 (1989) (cap on nonpecuniary damages in wrongful death actions); Farley v. Engelken, 241 Kan. 663 , 740 P.2d 1058 , (abrogation of commonlaw collateral source rule); Stephens v. Snyder Clinic Ass'n, 230 Kan. 115, 130 , 631 P.2d 222 (1981) (shortened statute of limitations in medical malpractice cases).

1991Leiker v. Gafford, 245 Kan. 325, 363 , 778 P.2d 823 (1989) (cap on nonpecuniary damages in wrongful death actions); Farley v. Engelken, 241 Kan. 663 , 740 P.2d 1058 , (abrogation of commonlaw collateral source rule); Stephens v. Snyder Clinic Ass'n, 230 Kan. 115, 130 , 631 P.2d 222 (1981) (shortened statute of limitations in medical malpractice cases).

1991Leiker v. Gafford, 245 Kan. 325, 363 , 778 P.2d 823 (1989) (cap on nonpecuniary damages in wrongful death actions); Farley v. Engelken, 241 Kan. 663 , 740 P.2d 1058 , (abrogation of commonlaw collateral source rule); Stephens v. Snyder Clinic Ass'n, 230 Kan. 115, 130 , 631 P.2d 222 (1981) (shortened statute of limitations in medical malpractice cases).

1991Leiker v. Gafford, 245 Kan. 325, 363 , 778 P.2d 823 (1989) (cap on nonpecuniary damages in wrongful death actions); Farley v. Engelken, 241 Kan. 663 , 740 P.2d 1058 , (abrogation of commonlaw collateral source rule); Stephens v. Snyder Clinic Ass'n, 230 Kan. 115, 130 , 631 P.2d 222 (1981) (shortened statute of limitations in medical malpractice cases).

1991Leiker v. Gafford, 245 Kan. 325, 363 , 778 P.2d 823 (1989) (cap on nonpecuniary damages in wrongful death actions); Farley v. Engelken, 241 Kan. 663 , 740 P.2d 1058 , (abrogation of commonlaw collateral source rule); Stephens v. Snyder Clinic Ass'n, 230 Kan. 115, 130 , 631 P.2d 222 (1981) (shortened statute of limitations in medical malpractice cases).

1991Leiker v. Gafford, 245 Kan. 325, 363 , 778 P.2d 823 (1989) (cap on nonpecuniary damages in wrongful death actions); Farley v. Engelken, 241 Kan. 663 , 740 P.2d 1058 , (abrogation of commonlaw collateral source rule); Stephens v. Snyder Clinic Ass'n, 230 Kan. 115, 130 , 631 P.2d 222 (1981) (shortened statute of limitations in medical malpractice cases).

1985Jackson v. City of Kansas City, 235 Kan. 278 , 680 P.2d 877 (1984), considered, as one of the issues on appeal, the question of whether fire fighters by their employment had assumed the risk of being injured while riding upon the fire truck.

1985Jackson v. City of Kansas City, 235 Kan. 278 , 680 P.2d 877 (1984), considered, as one of the issues on appeal, the question of whether fire fighters by their employment had assumed the risk of being injured while riding upon the fire truck.

1965(Gibbs v. Mikesell, 183 Kan. 123 , 325 P. 2d 359 .) The relationship of this rule and the “physical fact” rule was analyzed and applied in Sullivan v. Johnston, supra. Considering the evidence under the foregoing rules, there was no showing in the instant case upon the record presented that plaintiffs insured, Carpenter, failed to exercise reasonable care in driving his motor vehicle under the existing conditions at the time of the collision.

1965(Gibbs v. Mikesell, 183 Kan. 123 , 325 P. 2d 359 .) The relationship of this rule and the “physical fact” rule was analyzed and applied in Sullivan v. Johnston, supra. Considering the evidence under the foregoing rules, there was no showing in the instant case upon the record presented that plaintiffs insured, Carpenter, failed to exercise reasonable care in driving his motor vehicle under the existing conditions at the time of the collision.