defendant has standing challenge in Massachusetts

2021"Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the question whether the defendant has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a search or seizure is merged with the determination whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched," and therefore, "a defendant has no standing if he has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched." Commonwealth v. Mubdi, 456 Mass. 385, 391 (2010), citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-139 (1978).

2018"Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the question whether the defendant has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a search or seizure is merged with the determination whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched." Commonwealth v. Mubdi , 456 Mass. 385 , 391 (2010).

2019A defendant has standing to challenge a search and seizure under art. 14 if he or she "has a possessory interest in the place searched or in the property seized or if [he or she] was present when the search occurred." Commonwealth v. Williams , 453 Mass. 203 , 208, 900 N.E.2d 871 (2009).

2019A defendant has standing to challenge a search and seizure under art. 14 if he or she "has a possessory interest in the place searched or in the property seized or if [he or she] was present when the search occurred." Commonwealth v. Williams , 453 Mass. 203 , 208, 900 N.E.2d 871 (2009).

2021"Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the question whether the defendant has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a search or seizure is merged with the determination whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched," and therefore, "a defendant has no standing if he has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched." Commonwealth v. Mubdi, 456 Mass. 385, 391 (2010), citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-139 (1978).

2010See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-139 (1978).

2021Under art. 14, "the question of standing remains separate from the question of reasonable expectation of privacy." Mubdi, supra. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 453 Mass. 203, 208 (2009) ("Although the two concepts [of standing Mass. 385, 390 (2010); Commonwealth v. Frazier, 410 Mass. 235, 241 (1991); Commonwealth v. Ware, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 220, 227 (2009). 7 It is immaterial whether the defendant is charged with possession on a theory of constructive possession or actual possession, so long as he or she is charged with possession at the time of the search or seizure.

2021Under art. 14, "the question of standing remains separate from the question of reasonable expectation of privacy." Mubdi, supra. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 453 Mass. 203, 208 (2009) ("Although the two concepts [of standing Mass. 385, 390 (2010); Commonwealth v. Frazier, 410 Mass. 235, 241 (1991); Commonwealth v. Ware, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 220, 227 (2009). 7 It is immaterial whether the defendant is charged with possession on a theory of constructive possession or actual possession, so long as he or she is charged with possession at the time of the search or seizure.

2019I agree with the court that under Commonwealth v. Rousseau, 465 Mass. 372, 382 (2013), the defendant has standing to challenge the search of Cassio's cell phone because his movements were tracked for six days.1 Because the electronic 1 In Commonwealth v. Rousseau, 465 Mass. 372, 382 (2013), we concluded that "under art. 14 [of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights], a person may reasonably expect not to be subjected to extended [global positioning system] electronic surveillance by the government, targeted at his movements, without judicial oversight and a showing of probable cause." We did

2019I agree with the court that under *182 Commonwealth v. Rousseau , 465 Mass. 372 , 382, 990 N.E.2d 543 (2013), the defendant has standing to challenge the search of Cassio's cell phone because his movements were tracked for six days. 1 Because the electronic tracking of the cell phone was **87 ongoing while police searched the defendant's apartment and there was no temporal break between the unlawful police activity and the search of the defendant's apartment, I also agree that the defendant's consent to search his apartment was not attenuated from the police's illegal conduct.

2019See Commonwealth v. Gentile , 466 Mass. 817 , 831, 2 N.E.3d 873 (2014).

2019See Commonwealth v. Gentile , 466 Mass. 817 , 831, 2 N.E.3d 873 (2014).

2017Additionally, the defendant is required to provide sufficient detail in the affidavit required under Mass.R.Crim.P. 13(a)(2), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1516 (2004), "so that the prosecution may determine which witnesses it should call and what evidence it should offer to meet its burden of proving probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or consent." Mubdi, supra, citing Costa v. Commonwealth, 440 Mass. 1003, 1004 (2003).

1991See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, supra .

1991See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, supra. We stated in Amendola that a defendant will have standing to challenge a search if possession is an essential element of the crime with which he is charged.