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8 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1961–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dillard v. Pittway Corp.green1 sentence2007Dillard v. Pittway Corp., 719 So.2d 188, 192-93 (Ala.1998) Grant of summary judgment in favor of manufacturer in a wrongful death action based on theory that a smoke detector malfunctioned reversed; because it was foreseeable that a delay in warning by the smoke detector could result in injury to occupants, defendant was not entitled to a “no- *532 causal-relation” defense even if it did not contribute to the defective condition of the smoke detectors. | 1 | 1 |
Interstate Engineering, Inc. v. Burnettegreen1 sentence2007In Interstate Eng’g, Inc. v. Burnette, 474 So.2d 624, 625 (Ala.1985), the court upheld jury finding that, had defective heat detectors not failed to give early warning, victim could have escaped from the house. | 1 | 1 |
Epps v. Stategreen2 sentences1989See Epps, 276 Md. at 111 , 345 A.2d 62 . *538 Reasons for the Delay The hearing judge found that the delay between the appellant’s arrest and the first scheduled trial date in the circuit court was properly characterized as “neutral” and attributable to the orderly administration of justice. 1989See Epps, 276 Md. at 111 , 345 A.2d 62 . *538 Reasons for the Delay The hearing judge found that the delay between the appellant’s arrest and the first scheduled trial date in the circuit court was properly characterized as “neutral” and attributable to the orderly administration of justice. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Ober
green
1 sentence2010Id. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Moon
green
1 sentence1987He concluded, at 291 Md. 475 , 436 A.2d 420 : “The third reason [that this delay should not bar the evidence] ... is the time lag would relate not to admissibility of evidence but as to the presumptions arising from the evidence.” The appellant’s present contention goes only to evidentiary admissibility, not to evidentiary significance. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Boyd v. MERC.-SAFE DEP. & TRUST CO.
green
2 sentences1987Boyd v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 28 Md.App. 18, 26 , 344 A.2d 148 (1975). 1987Boyd v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 28 Md.App. 18, 26 , 344 A.2d 148 (1975). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Major v. State
green
2 sentences1981If the statute in question were applicable to the case at bar, his contentions that this delay should bar the evidence would fail for three reasons, anything in Major v. State, 31 Md. 1981If the statute in question were applicable to the case at bar, his contentions that this delay should bar the evidence would fail for three reasons, anything in Major v. State, 31 Md. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Pollard v. United States
green
2 sentences1976The trial judge said that when the matter came to light neither the Baltimore City criminal assignment office nor the state's attorney's office was willing to accept responsibility for the matter's not having been set down for disposition, each office claiming "that it was not the responsibility of their office to set the case in for disposition or scheduling for further hearings." In this Court Erbe presents three questions, (1) whether the delay here "caused by the negligence of the State is a denial of [his] right to a speedy trial," (2) whether the delay is a violation of due process, and 1976The trial judge said that when the matter came to light neither the Baltimore City criminal assignment office nor the state's attorney's office was willing to accept responsibility for the matter's not having been set down for disposition, each office claiming "that it was not the responsibility of their office to set the case in for disposition or scheduling for further hearings." In this Court Erbe presents three questions, (1) whether the delay here "caused by the negligence of the State is a denial of [his] right to a speedy trial," (2) whether the delay is a violation of due process, and | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Ash v. State
green
2 sentences1976The trial judge said that when the matter came to light neither the Baltimore City criminal assignment office nor the state's attorney's office was willing to accept responsibility for the matter's not having been set down for disposition, each office claiming "that it was not the responsibility of their office to set the case in for disposition or scheduling for further hearings." In this Court Erbe presents three questions, (1) whether the delay here "caused by the negligence of the State is a denial of [his] right to a speedy trial," (2) whether the delay is a violation of due process, and 1976The trial judge said that when the matter came to light neither the Baltimore City criminal assignment office nor the state's attorney's office was willing to accept responsibility for the matter's not having been set down for disposition, each office claiming "that it was not the responsibility of their office to set the case in for disposition or scheduling for further hearings." In this Court Erbe presents three questions, (1) whether the delay here "caused by the negligence of the State is a denial of [his] right to a speedy trial," (2) whether the delay is a violation of due process, and | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Snyder v. Cearfoss
green
2 sentences1961I It is true that said Section 594 states that motions for new trials in criminal cases shall be heard within ten days, and, while this provision should be followed by the trial courts when possible and practical, we consider it directory, and not mandatory, compare Snyder v. Cearfoss, 186 Md. 360, 370 , 46 A. 2d 607 ; hence, the failure to hear the motion for a new trial within ten days, alone, is not a ground for relief under the P. C. 1961I It is true that said Section 594 states that motions for new trials in criminal cases shall be heard within ten days, and, while this provision should be followed by the trial courts when possible and practical, we consider it directory, and not mandatory, compare Snyder v. Cearfoss, 186 Md. 360, 370 , 46 A. 2d 607 ; hence, the failure to hear the motion for a new trial within ten days, alone, is not a ground for relief under the P. C. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.