delay hearing in Texas

2011Reason for the Delay At the hearing on Appellant's speedy trial motion, both the State and defense counsel recognized that Appellant's case had simply "slipped through the cracks." A "neutral" justification such as an overcrowded docket or mere negligence "should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant." Harrison, 282 S.W.3d at 721 (quoting Barker , 407 U.S. at 531 ).

2011Reason for the Delay At the hearing on Appellant's speedy trial motion, both the State and defense counsel recognized that Appellant's case had simply "slipped through the cracks." A "neutral" justification such as an overcrowded docket or mere negligence "should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant." Harrison, 282 S.W.3d at 721 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 ).

2011Reason for the Delay At the hearing on Appellant's speedy trial motion, both the State and defense counsel recognized that Appellant's case had simply "slipped through the cracks." A "neutral" justification such as an overcrowded docket or mere negligence "should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant." Harrison, 282 S.W.3d at 721 (quoting Barker , 407 U.S. at 531 ).

2011Reason for the Delay At the hearing on Appellant's speedy trial motion, both the State and defense counsel recognized that Appellant's case had simply "slipped through the cracks." A "neutral" justification such as an overcrowded docket or mere negligence "should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant." Harrison, 282 S.W.3d at 721 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 ).

2018This claim clearly concerns Carowest’s “past compliance with the Letter Agreement’s indemnification provisions.” Carowest I, 432 S.W.3d at 535 .

2018In 37 Carowest I, this Court rejected the City’s mootness argument, explaining that “even if the release [in the Rule 11 Agreement] is assumed to resolve the delay claim prospectively from the date of its execution, the validity of the delay claim would still remain a live and justiciable issue to the extent it bears upon the parties’ past compliance with the Letter Agreement’s indemnification provisions.” Carowest I, 432 S.W.3d at 535 .

2016To Limit the Possibility that the Defense Will Be Impaired Appellant stated in his motions for speedy trial that he was “being prejudiced by the State’s delay because defense witnesses are becoming unavailable and such witnesses as remain will have forgotten facts that would be beneficial to the Defendant.” Appellant states the affidavit for arrest provided evidence that “there was an unknown 911 caller . . . that the Appellant was not aware of[.]” Citing Phillips, 650 S.W.2d at 402 , appellant also argues that it is not necessary for him to show that the witness would have testified favorably

2015In re Conner, 458 S.W.3d at 534 ; Gantt v. Getz, 2011 WL 1849085 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet).

2013He contends that, with research during the continuance, he could have persuaded the court to grant a mistrial based on counsel’s ineffectiveness due to incorrect advice regarding probation eligibility as occurred in State v. Bounhiza, 294 S.W.3d 780 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.).

1995Id.

1978In Weeks v. State, 161 Tex.Cr.R. 202 , 275 S.W.2d 685 (1955), the refusal of the court to retire the jury at the defendant’s request in order to perfect his bill of exception was held not to be error in view of the court’s recalling and tendering of the witness to the defendant at the conclusion of all the testimony for the purpose of permitting counsel to perfect his bill.

1978In Weeks v. State, 161 Tex.Cr.R. 202 , 275 S.W.2d 685 (1955), the refusal of the court to retire the jury at the defendant's request in order to perfect his bill of exception was held not to be error in view of the court's recalling and tendering of the witness to the defendant at the conclusion of all the testimony for the purpose of permitting counsel to perfect his bill.

1978In Weeks v. State, 161 Tex.Cr.R. 202 , 275 S.W.2d 685 (1955), the refusal of the court to retire the jury at the defendant’s request in order to perfect his bill of exception was held not to be error in view of the court’s recalling and tendering of the witness to the defendant at the conclusion of all the testimony for the purpose of permitting counsel to perfect his bill.

1978In Weeks v. State, 161 Tex.Cr.R. 202 , 275 S.W.2d 685 (1955), the refusal of the court to retire the jury at the defendant's request in order to perfect his bill of exception was held not to be error in view of the court's recalling and tendering of the witness to the defendant at the conclusion of all the testimony for the purpose of permitting counsel to perfect his bill.

1978Art. 42.08, V.A.C.C.P.; Banks v. State, 503 S.W.2d 582 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); McClure v. State, supra. In the instant case, the trial judge ordered that the punishment be cumulated with the punishment received in Lubbock County, but gave appellant credit for time served since the original motion to revoke was filed.