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8 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rowland v. Harrisongreen2 sentences2017Relying on Rowland v. Harrison, 320 Md. *23 223, 577 A.2d 51 (1990), the QACA appellants and Mr. Modell contend that when the same facts may be asserted as either a defense or counterclaim, and the issue raised by the defense is not litigated and determined so as to be precluded by collateral estoppel, a defendant in a previous action is not barred by res judicata from subsequently maintaining an action on the counterclaim. 2012Maryland’s permissive counterclaim rule of procedure, Maryland Rule § 2-331(a), 13 enables Petitioners to raise such a potential counterclaim as a separate action. “[Wjhere the same facts may be asserted as either a defense or a counterclaim, and the issue raised by the defense is not litigated and determined so as to be precluded by collateral estoppel, the defendant in the previous action is not barred by res judicata from subsequently maintaining an action on the counterclaim.” Rowland v. Harrison, 320 Md. 223, 235-36 , 577 A.2d 51, 57 (1990); see also Moore v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp. | 1 | 5 |
Moore v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp.green2 sentences2012Maryland’s permissive counterclaim rule of procedure, Maryland Rule § 2-331(a), 13 enables Petitioners to raise such a potential counterclaim as a separate action. “[Wjhere the same facts may be asserted as either a defense or a counterclaim, and the issue raised by the defense is not litigated and determined so as to be precluded by collateral estoppel, the defendant in the previous action is not barred by res judicata from subsequently maintaining an action on the counterclaim.” Rowland v. Harrison, 320 Md. 223, 235-36 , 577 A.2d 51, 57 (1990); see also Moore v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp. 2012Maryland’s permissive counterclaim rule of procedure, Maryland Rule § 2-331(a), 13 enables Petitioners to raise such a potential counterclaim as a separate action. “[Wjhere the same facts may be asserted as either a defense or a counterclaim, and the issue raised by the defense is not litigated and determined so as to be precluded by collateral estoppel, the defendant in the previous action is not barred by res judicata from subsequently maintaining an action on the counterclaim.” Rowland v. Harrison, 320 Md. 223, 235-36 , 577 A.2d 51, 57 (1990); see also Moore v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Watts v. State
green
2 sentences1979Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals erred when it said that “the rule in Watts [v. State, *408 99 Md. 30 , 57 A. 542 (1904),] is no longer viable.” [Id. 41 Md. 1979Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals erred when it said that “the rule in Watts [v. State, *408 99 Md. 30 , 57 A. 542 (1904),] is no longer viable.” [Id. 41 Md. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Conn v. State
green
1 sentence1979Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals erred when it said that “the rule in Watts [v. State, *408 99 Md. 30 , 57 A. 542 (1904),] is no longer viable.” [Id. 41 Md. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Creighton v. Ruark
green
2 sentences1974Unlike Creighton v. Ruark, 230 Md. 145 , 186 A. 2d 208 (1962), where a plea of res judicata was rejected because the parties, although they had been codefendants in a prior suit were not adversaries under the pleadings in that prior suit, Fonte and Holloway were adversaries in Fonte’s suit. 1974Unlike Creighton v. Ruark, 230 Md. 145 , 186 A. 2d 208 (1962), where a plea of res judicata was rejected because the parties, although they had been codefendants in a prior suit were not adversaries under the pleadings in that prior suit, Fonte and Holloway were adversaries in Fonte’s suit. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Gilbert v. California
green
2 sentences1972If the court finds that the State has met its burden and that the pre-trial confrontation or viewing was legal, an in-court identification by the witness present at the pre-trial confrontation or viewing is admissible as substantive evidence. * * *.” No evidence was produced by the appellant at the hearing on the contested pre-trial identification, and the burden of showing, prima facie, the illegality of the photographic identification was therefore not met. 1 Zeiler extended the holdings of the Supreme Court in United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 , 87 S. Ct. 1926 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), a 1972If the court finds that the State has met its burden and that the pre-trial confrontation or viewing was legal, an in-court identification by the witness present at the pre-trial confrontation or viewing is admissible as substantive evidence. * * *.” No evidence was produced by the appellant at the hearing on the contested pre-trial identification, and the burden of showing, prima facie, the illegality of the photographic identification was therefore not met. 1 Zeiler extended the holdings of the Supreme Court in United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 , 87 S. Ct. 1926 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), a | 1 | 1972–1972 |
United States v. Wade
green
2 sentences1972If the court finds that the State has met its burden and that the pre-trial confrontation or viewing was legal, an in-court identification by the witness present at the pre-trial confrontation or viewing is admissible as substantive evidence. * * *.” No evidence was produced by the appellant at the hearing on the contested pre-trial identification, and the burden of showing, prima facie, the illegality of the photographic identification was therefore not met. 1 Zeiler extended the holdings of the Supreme Court in United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 , 87 S. Ct. 1926 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), a 1972If the court finds that the State has met its burden and that the pre-trial confrontation or viewing was legal, an in-court identification by the witness present at the pre-trial confrontation or viewing is admissible as substantive evidence. * * *.” No evidence was produced by the appellant at the hearing on the contested pre-trial identification, and the burden of showing, prima facie, the illegality of the photographic identification was therefore not met. 1 Zeiler extended the holdings of the Supreme Court in United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 , 87 S. Ct. 1926 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), a | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.