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8 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1938–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State Highway Commission v. United Pacific Insurancegreen2 sentences1975See also State Highway Comm v United Pacific Insurance Co, 52 Mich App 157, 159 ; 216 NW2d 469 (1974). 1975See also State Highway Comm v United Pacific Insurance Co, 52 Mich App 157, 159 ; 216 NW2d 469 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
Vander Laan v. Miedemagreen1 sentence1972The doctrine has been defined thus: "One who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.” Walker v Rebeuhr, 255 Mich 204, 206 (1931); Paton v Stealy, 272 Mich 57, 62 (1935). *105 The Supreme Court defined the circumstances that must come into play before the doctrine ca | 1 | 1 |
Paton v. Stealygreen1 sentence1972The doctrine has been defined thus: "One who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.” Walker v Rebeuhr, 255 Mich 204, 206 (1931); Paton v Stealy, 272 Mich 57, 62 (1935). *105 The Supreme Court defined the circumstances that must come into play before the doctrine ca | 1 | 1 |
Walker v. Rebeuhrgreen1 sentence1972The doctrine has been defined thus: "One who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.” Walker v Rebeuhr, 255 Mich 204, 206 (1931); Paton v Stealy, 272 Mich 57, 62 (1935). *105 The Supreme Court defined the circumstances that must come into play before the doctrine ca | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kirkaldy v. Rim
green
1 sentence2020Following the Supreme Court decision in Kirkaldy, 478 Mich 581 , the harshness of this rule was moderated but still required that the case be refiled, which often required a plaintiff to locate and retain a new expert, provide the expert with the relevant materials, have the expert review them, draft an AOM based on the expert’s findings, have the expert sign the AOM in the presence of a notary and return it to counsel before the case could be refiled. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Stilson v. Gibbs
green
1 sentence1977Stilson v Gibbs, 53 Mich 280 (1884), Wise v Daniel, 221 Mich 229 ; 190 NW 746 (1922), Smith v Jones, 382 Mich 176 ; 169 NW2d 308 (1969) (Adams, J., concurring). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Smith v. Jones
green
2 sentences1977Stilson v Gibbs, 53 Mich 280 (1884), Wise v Daniel, 221 Mich 229 ; 190 NW 746 (1922), Smith v Jones, 382 Mich 176 ; 169 NW2d 308 (1969) (Adams, J., concurring). 1977Stilson v Gibbs, 53 Mich 280 (1884), Wise v Daniel, 221 Mich 229 ; 190 NW 746 (1922), Smith v Jones, 382 Mich 176 ; 169 NW2d 308 (1969) (Adams, J., concurring). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Wise v. Daniel
green
2 sentences1977Stilson v Gibbs, 53 Mich 280 (1884), Wise v Daniel, 221 Mich 229 ; 190 NW 746 (1922), Smith v Jones, 382 Mich 176 ; 169 NW2d 308 (1969) (Adams, J., concurring). 1977Stilson v Gibbs, 53 Mich 280 (1884), Wise v Daniel, 221 Mich 229 ; 190 NW 746 (1922), Smith v Jones, 382 Mich 176 ; 169 NW2d 308 (1969) (Adams, J., concurring). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Dover & Co. v. United Pacific Insurance
neutral
2 sentences1975And the harshness of the rule — as well as the binding precedent set by the Wheeling decision — was recently confirmed in Judge (now Justice) Levin’s concurring opinion in Dover & Co v United Pacific Insurance Co, 38 Mich App 727, 732-734 ; 197 NW2d 126 (1972). 1975And the harshness of the rule — as well as the binding precedent set by the Wheeling decision — was recently confirmed in Judge (now Justice) Levin’s concurring opinion in Dover & Co v United Pacific Insurance Co, 38 Mich App 727, 732-734 ; 197 NW2d 126 (1972). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Moynes v. Applebaum
neutral
1 sentence1975In Moynes v Applebaum, supra, the Court stated that it was not reversible error to permit a late announcement under the adverse party witness statute when no prejudice to the opposing party was shown. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Weaver v. Maxwell Motor Co.
green
1 sentence1970It further argues that the adoption of this provision in § 8a of part 2 was to induce employers to employ handicapped individuals and reduce the harshness of the rule of Weaver v. Maxwell Motor Co. (1915), 186 Mich 588 . | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Tyler v. Weed
green
2 sentences1965The balance of the court’s instruction must certainly have left the jury with the impression that the only way in which the harshness of the rule could be tempered for this plaintiff, of age 6 years, 10-1/2 .months, was by some unexplained manipulation of the proximate canse rule.” The above quotation of appellant discloses that he understood and is not challenging our holding in Tyler v. Weed, 285 Mich 460 , and, in-fact, appellant does not cite or refer to the Tyler Case in his brief. 1965The balance of the court's instruction must certainly have left the jury with the impression that the only way in which the harshness of the rule could be tempered for this plaintiff, of age 6 years, 10-1/2 months, was by some unexplained manipulation of the proximate cause rule." The above quotation of appellant discloses that he understood and is not challenging our holding in Tyler v. Weed, 285 Mich 460 , and, in fact, appellant does not cite or refer to the Tyler Case in his brief. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Tabor v. Michigan Mutual Life Insurance
green
1 sentence1938Co., 44 Mich. 324 , where it was held that though a person is not justified in relying solely on the statement of his legal rights by an adverse *410 agent in' insurance controversies, they may be so mixed with unconscionable conduct as to require relief. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.