Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
8 Michigan opinions name it 1 courts 1974–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Whitegreen2 sentences2017At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. [Citations omitted.] “If the police continue to ‘interrogate’ the defendant after he has invoked his right to remain silent, and the defendant confesses as a result of that ‘interrogation,’ the confession is inadmissible.” White, 493 Mich at 194 (citation omitted). 2017At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. [Citations omitted.] “If the police continue to ‘interrogate’ the defendant after he has invoked his right to remain silent, and the defendant confesses as a result of that ‘interrogation,’ the confession is inadmissible.” White, 493 Mich at 194 (citation omitted). | 2 | 4 |
Miranda v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2018Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked. [ Miranda , 384 U.S. at 473 -474 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 (emphasis added).] However, contrary to defendant's arguments, this "subsequent procedure" to cut off questioning as described *428 in Miranda does not establish a "special warning requirement" regarding the right to terminate an interrogation. *378 People v. Tubbs , 22 Mich. App. 549 , 555-556, 177 N.W.2d 622 (1970). 4 Instead, this right to end t 2018Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked. [ Miranda , 384 U.S. at 473 -474 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 (emphasis added).] However, contrary to defendant's arguments, this "subsequent procedure" to cut off questioning as described *428 in Miranda does not establish a "special warning requirement" regarding the right to terminate an interrogation. *378 People v. Tubbs , 22 Mich. App. 549 , 555-556, 177 N.W.2d 622 (1970). 4 Instead, this right to end t | 1 | 5 |
Michigan v. Mosleygreen2 sentences2018Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked. [Mosley, 423 US at 100-101 , quoting Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 473-474 ; 86 S Ct 1602 ; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).] Consequently, “[i]f the police continue to ‘interrogate’ the defendant after he has invoked his right to remain silent, and the defendant confesses as a result of that ‘interrogation,’ the confession is inadmissible.” People v White, 493 Mich 187, 194 ; 828 NW2d 329 (2013). 2018Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked. [Mosley, 423 US at 100-101 , quoting Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 473-474 ; 86 S Ct 1602 ; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).] Consequently, “[i]f the police continue to ‘interrogate’ the defendant after he has invoked his right to remain silent, and the defendant confesses as a result of that ‘interrogation,’ the confession is inadmissible.” People v White, 493 Mich 187, 194 ; 828 NW2d 329 (2013). | 1 | 3 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rhode Island v. Innis
green
2 sentences2017In White, 493 Mich at 195-196 , our Supreme Court stated: In [Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 300-302 ; 100 S Ct 1682 ; 64 L Ed 2d 297 (1966),] the United States Supreme Court explained the circumstances under which a defendant is deemed to have been subjected to “interrogation”: -4- [T]he Miranda[4] safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. 2017In White, 493 Mich at 195-196 , our Supreme Court stated: In [Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 300-302 ; 100 S Ct 1682 ; 64 L Ed 2d 297 (1966),] the United States Supreme Court explained the circumstances under which a defendant is deemed to have been subjected to “interrogation”: -4- [T]he Miranda[4] safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Tubbs
green
2 sentences2018Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked. [ Miranda , 384 U.S. at 473 -474 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 (emphasis added).] However, contrary to defendant's arguments, this "subsequent procedure" to cut off questioning as described *428 in Miranda does not establish a "special warning requirement" regarding the right to terminate an interrogation. *378 People v. Tubbs , 22 Mich. App. 549 , 555-556, 177 N.W.2d 622 (1970). 4 Instead, this right to end t 2018Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked. [ Miranda , 384 U.S. at 473 -474 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 (emphasis added).] However, contrary to defendant's arguments, this "subsequent procedure" to cut off questioning as described *428 in Miranda does not establish a "special warning requirement" regarding the right to terminate an interrogation. *378 People v. Tubbs , 22 Mich. App. 549 , 555-556, 177 N.W.2d 622 (1970). 4 Instead, this right to end t | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.