person invokes privilege in California

2014At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.” ( Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 473-474, fn. omitted.) “If a suspect’s request for counsel or invocation of the right to remain silent is ambiguous, the police may ‘continue talking with him for the limited purpose of clarifying whether he is waiving or invoking those rights.’ [Citations.]” 7 (People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1194 .) Statements obtained in violation of these

1986At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.” (At pp. 473-474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 723 ].) The court also indicated that where the person to be interrogated “. . .is indecisive in his request for counsel, there may be some question on whether he did or did not waive counsel.

1984If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. [Fn. omitted.] At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise, . . .” {Id., at pp. 473-474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 723 ].) Any words or conduct which reasonably appear “ ‘inconsistent with a present willingness on the part of the suspect to discuss his case freely and completely with poli

1984If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. [Fn. omitted.] At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise, . . .” {Id., at pp. 473-474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 723 ].) Any words or conduct which reasonably appear “ ‘inconsistent with a present willingness on the part of the suspect to discuss his case freely and completely with poli

1985At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise." ( Id. at pp. 473-474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 723 ].) In People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714 [ 68 Cal. Rptr. 817 , 441 P.2d 625 ], we emphasized that questioning must cease once a defendant has invoked his rights.

1985At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise." ( Id. at pp. 473-474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 723 ].) In People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714 [ 68 Cal. Rptr. 817 , 441 P.2d 625 ], we emphasized that questioning must cease once a defendant has invoked his rights.

1984If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. [Fn. omitted.] At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise, . . .” {Id., at pp. 473-474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 723 ].) Any words or conduct which reasonably appear “ ‘inconsistent with a present willingness on the part of the suspect to discuss his case freely and completely with poli

1984If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. [Fn. omitted.] At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise, . . .” {Id., at pp. 473-474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 723 ].) Any words or conduct which reasonably appear “ ‘inconsistent with a present willingness on the part of the suspect to discuss his case freely and completely with poli

1978If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. [Fn. omitted.] At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise." (Pp. 473-474 [16 L.Ed.2d p. 723].) In a long line of cases the California Supreme Court has held that once a suspect has indicated directly or indirectly that he does not wish to waive his privilege against self-incrimin

1978If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. [Fn. omitted.] At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise." (Pp. 473-474 [16 L.Ed.2d p. 723].) In a long line of cases the California Supreme Court has held that once a suspect has indicated directly or indirectly that he does not wish to waive his privilege against self-incrimin

1979At this point he *62 has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.” (Id., at pp. 473-474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 723 ]; fn. omitted.) It was pointed out in People v. Enriquez (1977) 19 Cal.3d 221, 237 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 171 , 561 P.2d 261 ], that “Miranda holds, unequivocally, that ‘[i]f [a suspect who has been advised of the prescribed constitutional rights] states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.’ [

1979At this point he *62 has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.” (Id., at pp. 473-474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 723 ]; fn. omitted.) It was pointed out in People v. Enriquez (1977) 19 Cal.3d 221, 237 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 171 , 561 P.2d 261 ], that “Miranda holds, unequivocally, that ‘[i]f [a suspect who has been advised of the prescribed constitutional rights] states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.’ [

1978If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. [Fn. omitted.] At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise." (Pp. 473-474 [16 L.Ed.2d p. 723].) In a long line of cases the California Supreme Court has held that once a suspect has indicated directly or indirectly that he does not wish to waive his privilege against self-incrimin

1978If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. [Fn. omitted.] At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise." (Pp. 473-474 [16 L.Ed.2d p. 723].) In a long line of cases the California Supreme Court has held that once a suspect has indicated directly or indirectly that he does not wish to waive his privilege against self-incrimin

1978If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. [Fn. omitted.] At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise." (Pp. 473-474 [16 L.Ed.2d p. 723].) In a long line of cases the California Supreme Court has held that once a suspect has indicated directly or indirectly that he does not wish to waive his privilege against self-incrimin

1978If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. [Fn. omitted.] At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise." (Pp. 473-474 [16 L.Ed.2d p. 723].) In a long line of cases the California Supreme Court has held that once a suspect has indicated directly or indirectly that he does not wish to waive his privilege against self-incrimin

1978If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. [Fn. omitted.] At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise." (Pp. 473-474 [16 L.Ed.2d p. 723].) In a long line of cases the California Supreme Court has held that once a suspect has indicated directly or indirectly that he does not wish to waive his privilege against self-incrimin

1978If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. [Fn. omitted.] At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise." (Pp. 473-474 [16 L.Ed.2d p. 723].) In a long line of cases the California Supreme Court has held that once a suspect has indicated directly or indirectly that he does not wish to waive his privilege against self-incrimin

1978If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. [Fn. omitted.] At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise." (Pp. 473-474 [16 L.Ed.2d p. 723].) In a long line of cases the California Supreme Court has held that once a suspect has indicated directly or indirectly that he does not wish to waive his privilege against self-incrimin

1978If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. [Fn. omitted.] At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise." (Pp. 473-474 [16 L.Ed.2d p. 723].) In a long line of cases the California Supreme Court has held that once a suspect has indicated directly or indirectly that he does not wish to waive his privilege against self-incrimin

1978If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. [Fn. omitted.] At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise." (Pp. 473-474 [16 L.Ed.2d p. 723].) In a long line of cases the California Supreme Court has held that once a suspect has indicated directly or indirectly that he does not wish to waive his privilege against self-incrimin

1978If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. [Fn. omitted.] At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise." (Pp. 473-474 [16 L.Ed.2d p. 723].) In a long line of cases the California Supreme Court has held that once a suspect has indicated directly or indirectly that he does not wish to waive his privilege against self-incrimin

1978If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. [Fn. omitted.] At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise." (Pp. 473-474 [16 L.Ed.2d p. 723].) In a long line of cases the California Supreme Court has held that once a suspect has indicated directly or indirectly that he does not wish to waive his privilege against self-incrimin

1978If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. [Fn. omitted.] At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise." (Pp. 473-474 [16 L.Ed.2d p. 723].) In a long line of cases the California Supreme Court has held that once a suspect has indicated directly or indirectly that he does not wish to waive his privilege against self-incrimin

2016At 18 this point he [or she] has shown that he [or she] intends to exercise his [or her] Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.” (Id. at pp. 473-474, fn. omitted.) Although a suspect is not required to use the exact words of the Miranda warnings when invoking his or her right to silence (see People v. Carey (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 99, 104-105 ), the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that, following an initial waiver, a subsequent invocation of the right to remain silent

1995If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.” (See also Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484-486 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 385-387 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 ]; People v. Carey, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at p. 103 [the “clarification rule” requires ambiguity as a precedent to further inquiry].) III.

2016In Berghuis, the court explained the reason for this rule: “A requirement of an unambiguous invocation of Miranda rights results in an objective inquiry that ‘avoid[s] difficulties of proof and . . . provide[s] guidance to officers’ on how to proceed in the face of ambiguity. [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 381-382.) The California Supreme Court has further explained that “when a suspect under interrogation makes an ambiguous statement that could be construed as an invocation of his or her Miranda rights, ‘the interrogators may clarify the suspect’s comprehension of, and desire to invoke or waive, th

1995If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.” (See also Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484-486 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 385-387 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 ]; People v. Carey, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at p. 103 [the “clarification rule” requires ambiguity as a precedent to further inquiry].) III.

1995If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.” (See also Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484-486 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 385-387 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 ]; People v. Carey, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at p. 103 [the “clarification rule” requires ambiguity as a precedent to further inquiry].) III.

1984Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.’” (Italics in original.) (People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714, 718 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 441 P.2d 625 ]; People v. Parker (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 24, 28 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 49 ].) A suspect invokes his Fifth Amendment privilege by words or conduct that “reasonably appears inconsistent with a present willingness . . . to discuss his case freely and completely with police at that time.” (Italics in ori

1984Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.’” (Italics in original.) (People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714, 718 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 441 P.2d 625 ]; People v. Parker (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 24, 28 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 49 ].) A suspect invokes his Fifth Amendment privilege by words or conduct that “reasonably appears inconsistent with a present willingness . . . to discuss his case freely and completely with police at that time.” (Italics in ori

1976At the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the warrant, defendant testified that on the evening of the day of his arrest he was advised that an acetone swab test was to be performed for the purpose of determining the presence of nitrates on his hands; that he asked that an attorney be present; that he was advised that the presence of an attorney was not required (see United States v. Wade (1967) 388 U.S. 218, 227 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 ]; Schmerber v. California (1966) 384 U.S. 757 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 908 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 ]); and that an officer then commenced an interrogation whi

1976At the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the warrant, defendant testified that on the evening of the day of his arrest he was advised that an acetone swab test was to be performed for the purpose of determining the presence of nitrates on his hands; that he asked that an attorney be present; that he was advised that the presence of an attorney was not required (see United States v. Wade (1967) 388 U.S. 218, 227 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 ]; Schmerber v. California (1966) 384 U.S. 757 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 908 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 ]); and that an officer then commenced an interrogation whi

1974If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. [Fn. omitted.] At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. . . .” (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 473-474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 723 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ].) This language was adopted by the California Supreme Court as the basis of its holdings in People v. Burton, 6 Cal.3d 375 [

1974If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. [Fn. omitted.] At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. . . .” (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 473-474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 723 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ].) This language was adopted by the California Supreme Court as the basis of its holdings in People v. Burton, 6 Cal.3d 375 [

1974(See Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 457 [16 L.Ed.2d at pp. 713-714].) A statement is involuntary in the traditional sense if it is the product of physical or psychological coercion. ( Rogers v. Richmond (1961) 365 U.S. 534, 544 [ 5 L.Ed.2d 760, 768 , 81 S.Ct. 735 ]; In re Cameron (1968) 68 Cal.2d 487, 498 [ 67 Cal. Rptr. 529 , 439 P.2d 623 ]; People v. Lopez (1963) 60 Cal.2d 223, 248 [ 32 Cal. Rptr. 424 , 384 P.2d 16 ].) "A principal objective of [ Miranda ] was to establish safeguards that would liberate courts insofar as possible from the difficult and troublesome necessity of *20

1974(See Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 457 [16 L.Ed.2d at pp. 713-714].) A statement is involuntary in the traditional sense if it is the product of physical or psychological coercion. ( Rogers v. Richmond (1961) 365 U.S. 534, 544 [ 5 L.Ed.2d 760, 768 , 81 S.Ct. 735 ]; In re Cameron (1968) 68 Cal.2d 487, 498 [ 67 Cal. Rptr. 529 , 439 P.2d 623 ]; People v. Lopez (1963) 60 Cal.2d 223, 248 [ 32 Cal. Rptr. 424 , 384 P.2d 16 ].) "A principal objective of [ Miranda ] was to establish safeguards that would liberate courts insofar as possible from the difficult and troublesome necessity of *20

1974(See Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 457 [16 L.Ed.2d at pp. 713-714].) A statement is involuntary in the traditional sense if it is the product of physical or psychological coercion. ( Rogers v. Richmond (1961) 365 U.S. 534, 544 [ 5 L.Ed.2d 760, 768 , 81 S.Ct. 735 ]; In re Cameron (1968) 68 Cal.2d 487, 498 [ 67 Cal. Rptr. 529 , 439 P.2d 623 ]; People v. Lopez (1963) 60 Cal.2d 223, 248 [ 32 Cal. Rptr. 424 , 384 P.2d 16 ].) "A principal objective of [ Miranda ] was to establish safeguards that would liberate courts insofar as possible from the difficult and troublesome necessity of *20

1974(See Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 457 [16 L.Ed.2d at pp. 713-714].) A statement is involuntary in the traditional sense if it is the product of physical or psychological coercion. ( Rogers v. Richmond (1961) 365 U.S. 534, 544 [ 5 L.Ed.2d 760, 768 , 81 S.Ct. 735 ]; In re Cameron (1968) 68 Cal.2d 487, 498 [ 67 Cal. Rptr. 529 , 439 P.2d 623 ]; People v. Lopez (1963) 60 Cal.2d 223, 248 [ 32 Cal. Rptr. 424 , 384 P.2d 16 ].) "A principal objective of [ Miranda ] was to establish safeguards that would liberate courts insofar as possible from the difficult and troublesome necessity of *20

1974(See Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 457 [16 L.Ed.2d at pp. 713-714].) A statement is involuntary in the traditional sense if it is the product of physical or psychological coercion. ( Rogers v. Richmond (1961) 365 U.S. 534, 544 [ 5 L.Ed.2d 760, 768 , 81 S.Ct. 735 ]; In re Cameron (1968) 68 Cal.2d 487, 498 [ 67 Cal. Rptr. 529 , 439 P.2d 623 ]; People v. Lopez (1963) 60 Cal.2d 223, 248 [ 32 Cal. Rptr. 424 , 384 P.2d 16 ].) "A principal objective of [ Miranda ] was to establish safeguards that would liberate courts insofar as possible from the difficult and troublesome necessity of *20