person invokes privilege (New York) · Go Syfert
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person invokes privilege in New York

8 New York opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2003 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

CaseFollowedCited
Miranda v. Arizonagreen
scotus · 1966 · cited in 7 New York opinions naming this issue, 1972–2003
2 sentences

2003In Miranda v Arizona ( 384 US 436 [1966]), the Supreme Court held that, once an individual in custody has invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, all “interrogation” must cease: “If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. * * * [A]ny statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.

1983Any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the-product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise (Miranda v Arizona, supra, p 474).

47
Michigan v. Mosleygreen
scotus · 1975 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
1 sentence

2003Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has once been invoked.” (Id. at 473-474.) Furthermore, the exercise of the right to remain silent must be “scrupulously honored” (id. at 479; see also Michigan v Mosley, 423 US 96, 103-104 [1975]; People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 322 [1984], cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985]).

11
People v. Ferrogreen
ny · 1984 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
1 sentence

2003Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has once been invoked.” (Id. at 473-474.) Furthermore, the exercise of the right to remain silent must be “scrupulously honored” (id. at 479; see also Michigan v Mosley, 423 US 96, 103-104 [1975]; People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 322 [1984], cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985]).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (4)

CaseCitedYears
Mourad v. United States green
scotus · 1985
1 sentence

2003Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has once been invoked.” (Id. at 473-474.) Furthermore, the exercise of the right to remain silent must be “scrupulously honored” (id. at 479; see also Michigan v Mosley, 423 US 96, 103-104 [1975]; People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 322 [1984], cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985]).

12003–2003
Rhode Island v. Innis green
scotus · 1980
1 sentence

1983In Rhode Island v Innis ( 446 US 291 ), the Supreme Court construed Miranda as applicable not only to express questioning but to the “functional equivalent” of questioning as well.

11983–1983
Garner v. United States green
scotus · 1976
1 sentence

1978It is presumed that custodial questioning denies an individual the power to exercise his privilege to remain silent, and any statement obtained in the course thereof must be excluded unless the People demonstrate that a knowing and intelligent waiver has been made (Garner v United States, 424 US 648, 657 ).

11978–1978
People v. Kaye green
ny · 1969
1 sentence

1978At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.” "The avowed purpose of the Miranda rules is to restrict 'custodial interrogation’ which the Supreme Court found to be inherently coercive” (People v Kaye, 25 NY2d 139, 143 ).

11978–1978

Where else courts name it

IL 33 (1973–2026) CA 31 (1967–2017) PA 16 (1972–2025) TX 15 (1976–2023) NY 8 (1972–2003) MI 8 (1974–2018) OH 7 (1977–2013) IN 7 (1974–2020) MS 7 (1978–2025) NJ 6 (1986–2008) GA 6 (1990–2018) AZ 6 (1972–2015) FL 5 (1980–2018) VA 5 (1981–2010) MD 5 (1969–1980) NC 5 (1981–2006) WA 4 (1969–2017) OR 4 (1968–1986) ME 3 (1981–1998) MO 3 (1979–1998) TN 3 (1975–2017) WI 3 (1978–2003) AL 3 (1981–1999) KY 3 (2012–2017) WY 2 (2004–2004) ID 2 (1976–1980)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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