emergency aid exception in Oregon

2025The emergency aid exception to Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution applies when officers have an “objectively reasonable belief, based on articulable facts, that a warrantless entry is necessary to either render immediate aid to persons, or to assist persons who have suffered, or who are imminently threatened with suffering, serious physical injury or harm.” State v. Baker, 350 Or 641, 649 , 260 P3d 476 (2011) (footnotes omitted).

2025The emergency aid exception to Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution applies when officers have an “objectively reasonable belief, based on articulable facts, that a warrantless entry is necessary to either render immediate aid to persons, or to assist persons who have suffered, or who are imminently threatened with suffering, serious physical injury or harm.” State v. Baker, 350 Or 641, 649 , 260 P3d 476 (2011) (footnotes omitted).

2018Article I, section 9, provides, in part: "No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure[.]" Prior to Baker , which was decided by the Supreme Court in 2011, cases involving the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement were analyzed under a standard set out in State v. Follett , 115 Or.

2017Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Baker , this court applied the emergency aid exception using the four-element test we established in State v. Follett, 115 Or App 672, 680 , 840 P2d 1298 (1992), rev den, 317 Or 163 (1993).

2016The Supreme Court held that the emergency aid exception did not apply because, before the search, the woman walked out of the hotel room, seemingly undisturbed; any emergency “dissipated at the point she walked out the door.” Id. at 239-40 .

2000See State v. *457 Davis, 295 Or 227, 239-40 , 666 P2d 802 (1983) (once valid emergency dissipates, state may not invoke the emergency aid exception); cf. State v. Martofel, 151 Or App 249, 254-55 , 948 P2d 1253 (1997), rev den 328 Or 82 (1998) (Haselton, J., concurring) (emergency need not, in fact, require immediate police action, but existing circumstances must reasonably indicate that immediate police action is required).

2026See State v. Miller, 300 Or 203, 229 , 709 P2d 225 (1985), cert den, 475 US 1141 (1986) (as relevant to the emergency-aid exception, “the police are not required to accept a lay per- son’s determination of death,” as the officer “might be able to Nonprecedential Memo Op: 346 Or App 467 (2026) 471 render lifesaving medical assistance to the victim”).

2026See State v. Miller, 300 Or 203, 229 , 709 P2d 225 (1985), cert den, 475 US 1141 (1986) (as relevant to the emergency-aid exception, “the police are not required to accept a lay per- son’s determination of death,” as the officer “might be able to Nonprecedential Memo Op: 346 Or App 467 (2026) 471 render lifesaving medical assistance to the victim”).

2026See State v. Miller, 300 Or 203, 229 , 709 P2d 225 (1985), cert den, 475 US 1141 (1986) (as relevant to the emergency-aid exception, “the police are not required to accept a lay per- son’s determination of death,” as the officer “might be able to Nonprecedential Memo Op: 346 Or App 467 (2026) 471 render lifesaving medical assistance to the victim”).

2026See State v. Miller, 300 Or 203, 229 , 709 P2d 225 (1985), cert den, 475 US 1141 (1986) (as relevant to the emergency-aid exception, “the police are not required to accept a lay per- son’s determination of death,” as the officer “might be able to Nonprecedential Memo Op: 346 Or App 467 (2026) 471 render lifesaving medical assistance to the victim”).

2026A speculative belief that someone might require aid does not justify a warrantless search under the emergency aid exception.” State v. Hamilton, 285 Or App 315, 323 , 397 P3d 61 (2017) (citation omitted).

2026A speculative belief that someone might require aid does not justify a warrantless search under the emergency aid exception.” State v. Hamilton, 285 Or App 315, 323 , 397 P3d 61 (2017) (citation omitted).

2017Under Baker , to satisfy the emergency aid exception, the state must prove both that, at the time of the warrantless search, the searching officers had the subjective belief “that there was an immediate need to aid or assist a person who has suffered (or is imminently threatened with suffering) serious physical injury or harm” and that that “belief [was] objectively reasonable.” State v. McCullough, 264 Or App 496, 502-03 , 336 P3d 6 (2014). 1 We begin by noting that defendant concedes, as he did below, that the officers’ initial entry into his home was justified by the emergency aid exception

2017Those aspects include our previous holdings that “the emergency aid exception applies only when an officer has a belief that there is an immediate need to aid or assist a person, and that belief is objectively reasonable.” Id.

2014“The emergency aid doctrine is distinct from the emergency/exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement because the former does not require probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed.” Id. at 236 .

2011For purposes of Oregon law, this court has acknowledged the existence of a so-called emergency aid exception in only two cases: State v. Davis and State v. Bridewell, 306 Or 231, 236 , 759 P2d 1054 (1988). 4 In Davis , a man had told police that his girlfriend might be being raped in a motel room by a man he had seen carrying an automatic pistol.

2010In State v. Follett, 115 Or App 672, 680 , 840 P2d 1298 (1992), rev den, 317 Or 163 (1993), we held that the emergency aid doctrine applies if four conditions are met: “(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life. “(2) The emergency must be a true emergency — the officer’s good faith belief alone is insufficient. “(3) The search must not be primarily motivated by an intent to arrest or to seize evidence. “(4) The officer must reasonably suspect that the area or place to be searched is as

2010The elements of the emergency aid doctrine, as set out in State v. Follett, 115 Or App 672, 680 , 840 P2d 1298 (1992), rev den, 317 Or 163 (1993), are as follows: “(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life. “(2) The emergency must be a true emergency — the officer’s good faith belief alone is insufficient. “(3) The search must not be primarily motivated by an intent to arrest or to seize evidence. “(4) The officer must reasonably suspect that the area or place to be searched is associa

2014We observed that a warrantless entry is justified under the emergency aid exception when “the police officer *** subjectively believe[s] that his or her assistance is necessary to protect someone’s life and that belief, evaluated at the time of entry and not in light of subsequently discovered facts, [is] reasonable.” Id. at 148 (citing State v. Martofel, 151 Or App 249, 252 , 948 P2d 1253 (1997)).

2010Here, the only dispute concerns the first two prongs of the emergency aid test, which effectively require that “the police officer must subjectively believe that his or her assistance is necessary to protect someone’s life and that belief, evaluated at the time of the entry and not in light of subsequently discovered facts, must be reasonable.” Martin, 222 Or App at 148 (citing State v. Martofel, 151 Or App 249, 252 , 948 P2d 1253 (1997)). 1 The state contends that those requirements were satisfied because Brewster subjectively believed that immediate entry into the residence was necessary to

2012See, e.g., State v. Salisbury, 223 Or App 516, 523 , 196 P3d 1017 (2008) (“Thus, even if the state is able to satisfy the requirements of ORS 133.033, it must also satisfy the requirements of the emergency aid doctrine.”).

2012See, e.g., State v. Salisbury, 223 Or App 516, 523 , 196 P3d 1017 (2008) (“Thus, even if the state is able to satisfy the requirements of ORS 133.033, it must also satisfy the requirements of the emergency aid doctrine.”).

2022First, in State v. Fessenden, 258 Or App 639 , 310 P3d 1163 (2013) (Fessenden I), aff’d, 355 Or 759 (2014) (Fessenden II), we held that the emergency aid exception to the Article I, section 9, warrant requirement permitted an officer to enter the defen- dant’s property and seize a horse without a warrant: “[A] warrantless search or seizure is justified when law enforcement officers have an objectively reasonable belief, based on articulable facts, that the search or seizure is necessary to render immediate aid or assistance to ani- mals that have suffered, or which are imminently threat- ened

2022First, in State v. Fessenden, 258 Or App 639 , 310 P3d 1163 (2013) (Fessenden I), aff’d, 355 Or 759 (2014) (Fessenden II), we held that the emergency aid exception to the Article I, section 9, warrant requirement permitted an officer to enter the defen- dant’s property and seize a horse without a warrant: “[A] warrantless search or seizure is justified when law enforcement officers have an objectively reasonable belief, based on articulable facts, that the search or seizure is necessary to render immediate aid or assistance to ani- mals that have suffered, or which are imminently threat- ened

2014We observed that a warrantless entry is justified under the emergency aid exception when “the police officer *** subjectively believe[s] that his or her assistance is necessary to protect someone’s life and that belief, evaluated at the time of entry and not in light of subsequently discovered facts, [is] reasonable.” Id. at 148 (citing State v. Martofel, 151 Or App 249, 252 , 948 P2d 1253 (1997)).

2014We observed that a warrantless entry is justified under the emergency aid exception when “the police officer *** subjectively believe[s] that his or her assistance is necessary to protect someone’s life and that belief, evaluated at the time of entry and not in light of subsequently discovered facts, [is] reasonable.” Id. at 148 (citing State v. Martofel, 151 Or App 249, 252 , 948 P2d 1253 (1997)).

2026Cite as 347 Or App 594 (2026) 613 Under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, a warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless the search falls within one of the few specifically established and well- delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.5 State v. Fessenden / Dicke, 355 Or 759, 764 , 333 P3d 278 (2014).

2022First, in State v. Fessenden, 258 Or App 639 , 310 P3d 1163 (2013) (Fessenden I), aff’d, 355 Or 759 (2014) (Fessenden II), we held that the emergency aid exception to the Article I, section 9, warrant requirement permitted an officer to enter the defen- dant’s property and seize a horse without a warrant: “[A] warrantless search or seizure is justified when law enforcement officers have an objectively reasonable belief, based on articulable facts, that the search or seizure is necessary to render immediate aid or assistance to ani- mals that have suffered, or which are imminently threat- ened

2010Id. at 142 n 2, 145-46. 4 Although the trial court did not expressly state whether its decision was based on the community caretaking statute, ORS 133.033, or the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement, or was predicated on both, in order for the officers’ search to be “lawful” under ORS 133.033 and to deny suppression, the trial court must have determined that their entry comported with a constitutional exception to the warrant requirement, see Martin, 222 Or App at 146 — and here the only such exception the state invoked was the emergency aid exception. 5 In respondent’s brief, t

2010Id. at 142 n. 2, 145-46, 193 P.3d 993 . [4] Although the trial court did not expressly state whether its decision was based on the community caretaking statute, ORS 133.033, or the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement, or was predicated on both, in order for the officers' search to be "lawful" under ORS 133.033 and to deny suppression, the trial court must have determined that their entry comported with a constitutional exception to the warrant requirement, see Martin, 222 Or.App. at 146 , 193 P.3d 993—and here the only such exception the state invoked was the emergency aid excep

2017See State v. Bistrika, 262 Or App 385, 393 , 324 P3d 584 , rev den, 356 Or 397 (2014), cert den,_US_, 136 S Ct 32 (2015) (noting that, when an emergency justifying a search under the emergency aid exception has dissipated, the searching officers are no longer authorized to remain on the searched property under that exception).

2017See State v. Bistrika, 262 Or App 385, 393 , 324 P3d 584 , rev den, 356 Or 397 (2014), cert den,_US_, 136 S Ct 32 (2015) (noting that, when an emergency justifying a search under the emergency aid exception has dissipated, the searching officers are no longer authorized to remain on the searched property under that exception).

2014See State v. Goodall, 219 Or App 325, 335 , 183 P3d 199 (2008) (analysis under the emergency aid exception required the court to inquire about the officer’s subjective belief and determine whether that belief was objectively reasonable); State v. Pierce, 226 Or App 336, 342 , 203 P3d 343 (2009) (emergency aid exception did not justify warrantless entry where record was “devoid of any evidence that either of the officers * * * had a good faith belief — let alone reasonable grounds to believe — that [circumstances] indicated an immediate need for their assistance” (internal quotation marks omitt

2014See State v. Goodall, 219 Or App 325, 335 , 183 P3d 199 (2008) (analysis under the emergency aid exception required the court to inquire about the officer’s subjective belief and determine whether that belief was objectively reasonable); State v. Pierce, 226 Or App 336, 342 , 203 P3d 343 (2009) (emergency aid exception did not justify warrantless entry where record was “devoid of any evidence that either of the officers * * * had a good faith belief — let alone reasonable grounds to believe — that [circumstances] indicated an immediate need for their assistance” (internal quotation marks omitt

2008In Burdick , this court analyzed the emergency aid doctrine as applied to other cases with analogous facts, including State v. Russell, 118 Or App 652 , 848 P2d 657 , rev den, 317 Or 272 (1993) (unresponsive mother — in plain sight — in locked home with young children). 209 Or App at 581 .

2008In Burdick , this court analyzed the emergency aid doctrine as applied to other cases with analogous facts, including State v. Russell, 118 Or App 652 , 848 P2d 657 , rev den, 317 Or 272 (1993) (unresponsive mother — in plain sight — in locked home with young children). 209 Or App at 581 .

2006See State v. Will, 131 Or App 498, 501-04 , 885 P2d 715 (1994) (explaining that, while the officers’ initial entry into an apartment where they believed a domestic disturbance was occurring was valid under the emergency aid doctrine, their second entry after learning that the victim had left the apartment was unlawful).

2006See State v. Will, 131 Or App 498, 501-04 , 885 P2d 715 (1994) (explaining that, while the officers’ initial entry into an apartment where they believed a domestic disturbance was occurring was valid under the emergency aid doctrine, their second entry after learning that the victim had left the apartment was unlawful).