emergency aid exception in Virginia

2024“One concession to reasonableness” is the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement, which “recognizes the ‘right of the police to enter and investigate’ when someone’s health or physical safety is genuinely threatened.” Kyer, 45 Va. App. at 480 .

2024The emergency aid exception also “takes into account that ‘police owe duties to the public, such as rendering aid to individuals in danger of physical harm, reducing the commission of crimes through patrol and other preventative measures, and providing services on an emergency basis.’” Ross, 61 Va. App. at 760 (quoting Kyer, 45 Va. App. at 480 ).

2024See also Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 (2009) (per curiam) (same); Kyer v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 473, 480 (2005) (en banc) (stating that the emergency-aid exception “recognizes the ‘right of the police to enter and investigate’ when someone’s health or physical safety is genuinely threatened” (quoting Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 430, 437 (1990))).

2021The premise underlying the emergency aid exception is the “commonsense rationale that ‘preservation of human life is paramount to the right of privacy’ protected by the Fourth Amendment.” See Kyer, 45 Va. App. at 480 (quoting Reynolds, 9 Va. App. at 437 ).

2024Under the emergency aid exception, “law enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.” Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403 ; see also Merid v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 104 , 117 (2020) (holding that the emergency aid exception justified entry into the home where the defendant’s brother told officers he was concerned that the defendant was going to commit suicide and where they heard alarming sounds from inside the home).

2024Under the emergency-aid exception, by contrast, “[t]he officer’s subjective motivation is irrelevant.” Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 404 .

2024The exception “rests on the commonsense rationale that ‘preservation of human life is paramount to the right of privacy.’” Id.; see also Brigham City v. Utah, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.” (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978))).

2022See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (holding that “law 3 The emergency aid exception also requires that once police officers enter a residence, the scope of any search they conduct must be “strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.” McCarthy, 73 Va. App. at 643 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978)).

2024See also Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 (2009) (per curiam) (same); Kyer v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 473, 480 (2005) (en banc) (stating that the emergency-aid exception “recognizes the ‘right of the police to enter and investigate’ when someone’s health or physical safety is genuinely threatened” (quoting Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 430, 437 (1990))).

2024See Fisher, 558 U.S. at 49 (“It sufficed to invoke the emergency aid exception that it was reasonable to believe that Fisher had hurt himself (albeit nonfatally) and needed treatment that in his rage he was unable to provide, or that Fisher was about to hurt, or had already hurt, someone else.”).

2024The emergency aid exception also “takes into account that ‘police owe duties to the public, such as rendering aid to individuals in danger of physical harm, reducing the commission of crimes through patrol and other preventative measures, and providing services on an emergency basis.’” Ross, 61 Va. App. at 760 (quoting Kyer, 45 Va. App. at 480 ).

2024Unlike the emergency-aid exception, however, “[t]he community-caretaker exception . . . extends to situations not involving any emergency conditions.” Ross, 61 Va. App. at 760 n.3.

2024We assume without deciding that he took exception to the trial court’s reliance on this basis despite focusing the majority of his argument on appeal on the applicability of the “community caretaker” exception to the Fourth Amendment. 5 Though Harris lived with Evron at the time of the incident, his name was not on the lease for the residence. -4- may be overcome in some circumstances’ because the ‘warrant requirement is subject to certain reasonable exceptions.’” Ross v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 752, 759 (2013) (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011)); see also Kyer v. Commonweal

2024As the Supreme Court explained in King, a “well-recognized exception [to the warrant requirement] applies when ‘“the exigencies of the situation” make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’” 563 U.S. at 460 (second alteration in original) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978)).

2024For instance, the community-caretaker exception will not immunize an inventory search that is not “conducted pursuant to standard police procedures” or that is “a pretextual surrogate for an improper investigatory motive.” Knight v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 771 , 784 (2020) (quoting Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 53, 59 (2015)); Williams v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 723, 731 (2004) (same); King v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 306, 310 (2002) (same); see also Wood, 27 Va. App. at 27 (“Because the evidence indicates that the search was ‘a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive,’

2020It is well-established that under the Fourth Amendment, “[s]earches and seizures conducted without a warrant are presumptively invalid.” Cantrell, 65 Va. App. at 59 .

2024For instance, the community-caretaker exception will not immunize an inventory search that is not “conducted pursuant to standard police procedures” or that is “a pretextual surrogate for an improper investigatory motive.” Knight v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 771 , 784 (2020) (quoting Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 53, 59 (2015)); Williams v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 723, 731 (2004) (same); King v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 306, 310 (2002) (same); see also Wood, 27 Va. App. at 27 (“Because the evidence indicates that the search was ‘a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive,’

2024For instance, the community-caretaker exception will not immunize an inventory search that is not “conducted pursuant to standard police procedures” or that is “a pretextual surrogate for an improper investigatory motive.” Knight v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 771 , 784 (2020) (quoting Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 53, 59 (2015)); Williams v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 723, 731 (2004) (same); King v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 306, 310 (2002) (same); see also Wood, 27 Va. App. at 27 (“Because the evidence indicates that the search was ‘a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive,’

2024For instance, the community-caretaker exception will not immunize an inventory search that is not “conducted pursuant to standard police procedures” or that is “a pretextual surrogate for an improper investigatory motive.” Knight v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 771 , 784 (2020) (quoting Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 53, 59 (2015)); Williams v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 723, 731 (2004) (same); King v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 306, 310 (2002) (same); see also Wood, 27 Va. App. at 27 (“Because the evidence indicates that the search was ‘a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive,’

2024For instance, the community-caretaker exception will not immunize an inventory search that is not “conducted pursuant to standard police procedures” or that is “a pretextual surrogate for an improper investigatory motive.” Knight v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 771 , 784 (2020) (quoting Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 53, 59 (2015)); Williams v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 723, 731 (2004) (same); King v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 306, 310 (2002) (same); see also Wood, 27 Va. App. at 27 (“Because the evidence indicates that the search was ‘a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive,’

2021See, e.g., Stricker v. Township of Cambridge, 710 F.3d 350, 362 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that officers’ search around bedrooms and into drawers and cabinets was “objectively reasonable” because it was “consistent with a search for clues as to what [the overdose victim] ingested, in order to aid EMS in its treatment of [him]”); McKenna v. Edgell, 617 F.3d 432, 444 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that extensive searches are generally reasonable under the “ordinary circumstances” of an overdose case because they are “consistent with a quest for clues about [a person’s] medical condition, information that

2021See id.; see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989) (“The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.”).

2021See, e.g., Stricker v. Township of Cambridge, 710 F.3d 350, 362 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that officers’ search around bedrooms and into drawers and cabinets was “objectively reasonable” because it was “consistent with a search for clues as to what [the overdose victim] ingested, in order to aid EMS in its treatment of [him]”); McKenna v. Edgell, 617 F.3d 432, 444 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that extensive searches are generally reasonable under the “ordinary circumstances” of an overdose case because they are “consistent with a quest for clues about [a person’s] medical condition, information that

2020This type of exigency4 permits entry if the officers have “‘an objectively reasonable basis for believing’ . . . that ‘a person within [the house] is in need of immediate aid.’” Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47 (2009) (per curiam) (quoting Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406 , and Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392 ).5 4 The Supreme Court in Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2173 , characterized “the warrantless entry of private property when there is a need to provide urgent aid to those inside” as a type of exigent circumstance. 5 The Supreme Court recognized the validity of this type of conduct again in 2012, wh

2020Similarly, in State v. Horngren, 617 N.W.2d 508, 513 (Wis. 2000), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that officers may conduct a protective sweep after they have entered a residence to render emergency aid, if reasonable “under the totality of the circumstances.”6 The court held that officers acted reasonably when they conducted a “sweep” of an apartment after entering in response to a suicide threat, because they suspected weapons might be in the apartment, and the occupant told them there was “‘a girl’ in the back bedroom.” Id.

2020Similarly, in State v. Horngren, 617 N.W.2d 508, 513 (Wis. 2000), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that officers may conduct a protective sweep after they have entered a residence to render emergency aid, if reasonable “under the totality of the circumstances.”6 The court held that officers acted reasonably when they conducted a “sweep” of an apartment after entering in response to a suicide threat, because they suspected weapons might be in the apartment, and the occupant told them there was “‘a girl’ in the back bedroom.” Id.

2020In Commonwealth v. Kaeppeler, 42 N.E.3d 1090, 1096 (Mass. 2015), the Supreme Court of Massachusetts addressed entry and search under the emergency aid exception as one entity, requiring that “the police [must have] an objectively reasonable ground to believe that an emergency existed” and that “the conduct of the police after the entry [must be] reasonable under all the circumstances.” C.

2020The Supreme Court of Delaware has held that under the emergency aid exception, police may conduct “not only a search of the premises to find people in need of aid, but also [conduct] a protective sweep to ensure no further danger is present,” provided such action “is limited to ‘those areas necessary to respond to the perceived emergency.’” Guererri v. State, 922 A.2d 403, 407 (Del. 2007).

2007See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Waters, 20 Va. App. 285, 290 , 456 S.E.2d 527, 530 (1995) (holding application of community caretaker exception required a finding that “the officer is not investigating criminal conduct under the pretext of exercising his community caretaking function”); Reynolds, 9 Va. App. at 437, 438 , 388 S.E.2d at 664 (implying that “emergency doctrine” would not apply in case where entry of residence was pretextual).

2007See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Waters, 20 Va. App. 285, 290 , 456 S.E.2d 527, 530 (1995) (holding application of community caretaker exception required a finding that “the officer is not investigating criminal conduct under the pretext of exercising his community caretaking function”); Reynolds, 9 Va. App. at 437, 438 , 388 S.E.2d at 664 (implying that “emergency doctrine” would not apply in case where entry of residence was pretextual).

2007Compare State v. Drennan, 101 P.3d 1218, 1231-32 (Kan. 2004) (evidence sufficient to provide objectively reasonable basis for entry under emergency aid doctrine where police knew of prior history of violence between defendant and live-in girlfriend; neighbor reported hearing argument and woman’s scream followed by silence; defendant did not come to door immediately when officer knocked and rang bell; and when defendant did open door, he was “sweaty and agitated,” refused repeated requests to tell officers where girlfriend was, and eventually told them she was not at home but would not state wh

2005See New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 21 , 110 S.Ct. 1640, 1644-45 , 109 L.Ed.2d 13 (1990).

2005See New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 21 , 110 S.Ct. 1640, 1644-45 , 109 L.Ed.2d 13 (1990).