7 Indiana opinions name it 1 courts 2016–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Michigan v. Fishergreen2 sentences2026In this light, “[o]fficers do not need ironclad proof of ‘a likely serious, life-threatening’ injury to invoke the emergency aid exception.” Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 , 130 S.Ct. 546 , 175 L.Ed.2d 410 (2009). 2026In this light, “[o]fficers do not need ironclad proof of ‘a likely serious, life-threatening’ injury to invoke the emergency aid exception.” Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 , 130 S.Ct. 546 , 175 L.Ed.2d 410 (2009). | 2 | 5 |
Mary Osborne v. State of Indianagreen2 sentences2023Our Courts have recognized this emergency aid exception, see M.O. v. State, 63 N.E.3d 329, 332 (Ind. 2016), but have yet to apply the exception to a search of a person. [22] In M.O., the emergency aid exception was recognized under circumstances where an officer responded to a report that a woman was trapped under her car. 2023While it was not unreasonable for the officer to look for her, the officer noted that she operated her vehicle normally and was not observed committing any traffic infractions or criminal conduct. [23] Our supreme court in M.O. stated that the test for applying the emergency aid exception was objective and that the government must establish that the circumstances as they appeared at the moment would lead a reasonable, experienced law enforcement officer to believe that someone inside the vehicle required immediate assistance. 63 N.E.3d at 333 . | 2 | 3 |
Jennifer Jones and Jamal Jones v. State of Indianagreen2 sentences2026Jones v. State, 54 N.E.3d 1033, 1036-37 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. [22] Officer Bertram first made contact with Meyer by knocking on his front door and speaking to him through it. 2018See Jones v. State, 54 N.E.3d 1033 , 1039 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (holding a protective sweep under emergency aid exception was permissible where it was conducted before the underlying concern of the emergency aid exception was dissipated). | 1 | 2 |
Geimer v. Stategreen2 sentences2020Hence, it is not necessary for police to have a warrant to enter a place “when the facts suggest a reasonable belief that a person within the premises is in need of aid.” Stewart v. State, 688 N.E.2d 1254, 1257 (Ind. 1997) (quoting Geimer v. State, 591 N.E.2d 1016, 1019 (Ind. 1992)). [12] The circumstances here are akin to those presented in both Cruz-Salazar v. State, 63 N.E.3d 1055 (Ind. 2016), and Randall. 2019The test is not what the individual officers believed, "but whether there was 'an objectively reasonable basis for believing' that medical assistance was needed, or persons were in danger." Id. (citing Brigham City v. Stuart , 547 U.S. 398 , 399, 126 S.Ct. 1943 , 1945, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006) ). [32] Snow cites Geimer v. State , 591 N.E.2d 1016 (Ind. 1992), which has a similar set of facts. | 1 | 2 |
Eduardo Cruz-Salazar v. State of Indianagreen2 sentences2020Hence, it is not necessary for police to have a warrant to enter a place “when the facts suggest a reasonable belief that a person within the premises is in need of aid.” Stewart v. State, 688 N.E.2d 1254, 1257 (Ind. 1997) (quoting Geimer v. State, 591 N.E.2d 1016, 1019 (Ind. 1992)). [12] The circumstances here are akin to those presented in both Cruz-Salazar v. State, 63 N.E.3d 1055 (Ind. 2016), and Randall. 2018Under the emergency aid doctrine, an officer may act without a warrant where the officer had "an objectively reasonable basis for believing that medical assistance was needed, or persons were in danger." Michigan v. Fisher , 558 U.S. 45 , 49, 130 S.Ct. 546 , 175 L.Ed.2d 410 (2009) (quotations omitted). [15] Our supreme court recently explored the emergency aid doctrine through two cases decided the same day: M.O. v. State , and Cruz-Salazar v. State , 63 N.E.3d 1055 (Ind. 2016). | 1 | 2 |
Scott Randall v. State of Indianagreen2 sentences2020On the other hand, police officers “do not need ironclad proof of a likely serious, life-threatening injury to invoke the emergency aid exception.” Fisher, 558 U.S. at 49 , see also Randall v. State, 101 N.E.3d 831, 840 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. 2020We affirmed the trial court on the grounds that the seizure of the defendant was permissible under the emergency aid doctrine and determined that the officer’s observations “could give rise to a reasonable concern that emergency medical assistance was needed, prompting further investigation.” Id. at 840 . | 1 | 1 |
Stewart v. Stategreen1 sentence2020Hence, it is not necessary for police to have a warrant to enter a place “when the facts suggest a reasonable belief that a person within the premises is in need of aid.” Stewart v. State, 688 N.E.2d 1254, 1257 (Ind. 1997) (quoting Geimer v. State, 591 N.E.2d 1016, 1019 (Ind. 1992)). [12] The circumstances here are akin to those presented in both Cruz-Salazar v. State, 63 N.E.3d 1055 (Ind. 2016), and Randall. | 1 | 1 |
State of Indiana v. David Browngreen1 sentence2018Meredith v. State , 906 N.E.2d 867 , 873-74 (Ind. 2009). 70 N.E.3d at 335-36 (emphasis added) (some citations and quotations omitted). [34] Although Randall's seizure was initiated by the emergency aid exception, it quickly evolved into a criminal investigation. | 1 | 1 |
State of Indiana v. Molly Graygreen1 sentence2018See Cruz-Salazar , 63 N.E.3d at 1056 (emergency aid exception evolving into criminal investigation); State v. Gray, 997 N.E.2d 1147 , 1152 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) ("Once a justifiable stop is made, the scope of the officer's investigation may be broadened beyond the purpose for which the person was stopped only if additional particularized and objective suspicions come to light."), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Robert Dale Hollowaygreen1 sentence2016In this light, “[ojfficers do not need ironclad proof of ⅛ likely serious, life-threatening1 injury to invoke the emergency aid exception.” Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 , 130 S.Ct. 546 , 175 L.Ed.2d 410 (2009). “[Ejxigent circumstances justify dispensing with the search warrant but do not eliminate the need for probable cause.” Harless v. State, 577 N.E.2d 245, 248 (Ind.Ct.App.1991). “[I]n an emergency, the probable cause requirement may be satisfied where the officers reasonably believe a person is in danger.” United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1338 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denie | 1 | 1 |
State of Iowa v. Jeffrey Dana Kurthgreen1 sentence2016See Kurth, 813 N.W.2d at 277 (espousing a test similar to Wisconsin’s, but in determining whether an officer was engaged in- bona fide community caretaker activity, Iowa considers whether the conduct falls within “(1) the emergency aid doctrine, (2) the automobile impoundment/inventory doctrine, [or] (3) the ‘public servant’ exception”); and State v. Smathers, 232 N.C.App. 120 , 753 S.E.2d 380, 386 (2014) (adopting Wisconsin’s test). [23] Like the “majority of state courts throughout the country” that have adopted the community caretaking exception, we recognize that law enforcement officers d | 1 | 1 |
Harless v. Stategreen1 sentence2016In this light, “[ojfficers do not need ironclad proof of ⅛ likely serious, life-threatening1 injury to invoke the emergency aid exception.” Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 , 130 S.Ct. 546 , 175 L.Ed.2d 410 (2009). “[Ejxigent circumstances justify dispensing with the search warrant but do not eliminate the need for probable cause.” Harless v. State, 577 N.E.2d 245, 248 (Ind.Ct.App.1991). “[I]n an emergency, the probable cause requirement may be satisfied where the officers reasonably believe a person is in danger.” United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1338 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denie | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smathersgreen2 sentences2016See Kurth, 813 N.W.2d at 277 (espousing a test similar to Wisconsin’s, but in determining whether an officer was engaged in- bona fide community caretaker activity, Iowa considers whether the conduct falls within “(1) the emergency aid doctrine, (2) the automobile impoundment/inventory doctrine, [or] (3) the ‘public servant’ exception”); and State v. Smathers, 232 N.C.App. 120 , 753 S.E.2d 380, 386 (2014) (adopting Wisconsin’s test). [23] Like the “majority of state courts throughout the country” that have adopted the community caretaking exception, we recognize that law enforcement officers d 2016See Kurth, 813 N.W.2d at 277 (espousing a test similar to Wisconsin’s, but in determining whether an officer was engaged in- bona fide community caretaker activity, Iowa considers whether the conduct falls within “(1) the emergency aid doctrine, (2) the automobile impoundment/inventory doctrine, [or] (3) the ‘public servant’ exception”); and State v. Smathers, 232 N.C.App. 120 , 753 S.E.2d 380, 386 (2014) (adopting Wisconsin’s test). [23] Like the “majority of state courts throughout the country” that have adopted the community caretaking exception, we recognize that law enforcement officers d | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2023We also conclude that the search was permissible under the emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment because it was reasonable for Sergeant Watkins to 7 See, e.g., State v. Smith, 59 Kan. 2023Under these circumstances, the Court found that the officer’s belief that Smith’s life or safety was in immediate danger because of a potential overdose was objectively reasonable, satisfying the first prong of the emergency aid exception (that is, whether the officers reasonably believe the search was necessary to provide emergency assistance) and upholding the search of Smith’s purse. 59 Kan. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Brigham City v. Stuart
green
2 sentences2019The test is not what the individual officers believed, "but whether there was 'an objectively reasonable basis for believing' that medical assistance was needed, or persons were in danger." Id. (citing Brigham City v. Stuart , 547 U.S. 398 , 399, 126 S.Ct. 1943 , 1945, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006) ). [32] Snow cites Geimer v. State , 591 N.E.2d 1016 (Ind. 1992), which has a similar set of facts. 2019The test is not what the individual officers believed, "but whether there was 'an objectively reasonable basis for believing' that medical assistance was needed, or persons were in danger." Id. (citing Brigham City v. Stuart , 547 U.S. 398 , 399, 126 S.Ct. 1943 , 1945, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006) ). [32] Snow cites Geimer v. State , 591 N.E.2d 1016 (Ind. 1992), which has a similar set of facts. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Mincey v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2018Mincey v. Arizona , 437 U.S. 385 , 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). 2018Mincey v. Arizona , 437 U.S. 385 , 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Meredith v. State
green
1 sentence2018Meredith v. State , 906 N.E.2d 867 , 873-74 (Ind. 2009). 70 N.E.3d at 335-36 (emphasis added) (some citations and quotations omitted). [34] Although Randall's seizure was initiated by the emergency aid exception, it quickly evolved into a criminal investigation. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Litchfield v. State
green
1 sentence2018Conversely, in Cruz-Salazar , the supreme court found that opening the door of a vehicle was reasonable where it had been running for thirty minutes and its occupant was unresponsive to police attempts to awake him. 63 N.E.3d at 1056-57. [26] The combination of the two cases suggests that the "the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred," Litchfield , 824 N.E.2d at 361 , can be read in the context of the emergency aid exception as "the degree of concern that emergency medical assistance was needed," M.O., 63 N.E.3d at 333 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Sanders v. United States
green
1 sentence2016In this light, “[ojfficers do not need ironclad proof of ⅛ likely serious, life-threatening1 injury to invoke the emergency aid exception.” Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 , 130 S.Ct. 546 , 175 L.Ed.2d 410 (2009). “[Ejxigent circumstances justify dispensing with the search warrant but do not eliminate the need for probable cause.” Harless v. State, 577 N.E.2d 245, 248 (Ind.Ct.App.1991). “[I]n an emergency, the probable cause requirement may be satisfied where the officers reasonably believe a person is in danger.” United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1338 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denie | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Hasan v. Department of Labor
green
1 sentence2016In this light, “[ojfficers do not need ironclad proof of ⅛ likely serious, life-threatening1 injury to invoke the emergency aid exception.” Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 , 130 S.Ct. 546 , 175 L.Ed.2d 410 (2009). “[Ejxigent circumstances justify dispensing with the search warrant but do not eliminate the need for probable cause.” Harless v. State, 577 N.E.2d 245, 248 (Ind.Ct.App.1991). “[I]n an emergency, the probable cause requirement may be satisfied where the officers reasonably believe a person is in danger.” United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1338 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denie | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Georgia v. Randolph
green
2 sentences2016The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “customary social usage” 'will have a “substantial bearing on Fourth Amendment reasonableness in specific circumstances.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 121 , 126 S.Ct. 1515 , 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006). [15] Based on a survey of case law of our sister jurisdictions, Jones reached the conclusion that courts have upheld the warrantless entry into residences to assist unattended children of “tender age” or “small children.” See People v. Somas, 68 Misc.2d 450, 458 , 327 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Nassau Co. Ct.1972) (where the court upheld the entry into a 2016The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “customary social usage” 'will have a “substantial bearing on Fourth Amendment reasonableness in specific circumstances.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 121 , 126 S.Ct. 1515 , 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006). [15] Based on a survey of case law of our sister jurisdictions, Jones reached the conclusion that courts have upheld the warrantless entry into residences to assist unattended children of “tender age” or “small children.” See People v. Somas, 68 Misc.2d 450, 458 , 327 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Nassau Co. Ct.1972) (where the court upheld the entry into a | 1 | 2016–2016 |
United States v. Taylor
green
1 sentence2016The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “customary social usage” 'will have a “substantial bearing on Fourth Amendment reasonableness in specific circumstances.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 121 , 126 S.Ct. 1515 , 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006). [15] Based on a survey of case law of our sister jurisdictions, Jones reached the conclusion that courts have upheld the warrantless entry into residences to assist unattended children of “tender age” or “small children.” See People v. Somas, 68 Misc.2d 450, 458 , 327 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Nassau Co. Ct.1972) (where the court upheld the entry into a | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Somas
neutral
2 sentences2016The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “customary social usage” 'will have a “substantial bearing on Fourth Amendment reasonableness in specific circumstances.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 121 , 126 S.Ct. 1515 , 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006). [15] Based on a survey of case law of our sister jurisdictions, Jones reached the conclusion that courts have upheld the warrantless entry into residences to assist unattended children of “tender age” or “small children.” See People v. Somas, 68 Misc.2d 450, 458 , 327 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Nassau Co. Ct.1972) (where the court upheld the entry into a 2016The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “customary social usage” 'will have a “substantial bearing on Fourth Amendment reasonableness in specific circumstances.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 121 , 126 S.Ct. 1515 , 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006). [15] Based on a survey of case law of our sister jurisdictions, Jones reached the conclusion that courts have upheld the warrantless entry into residences to assist unattended children of “tender age” or “small children.” See People v. Somas, 68 Misc.2d 450, 458 , 327 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Nassau Co. Ct.1972) (where the court upheld the entry into a | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Cadmus v. Varano
neutral
1 sentence2016The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “customary social usage” 'will have a “substantial bearing on Fourth Amendment reasonableness in specific circumstances.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 121 , 126 S.Ct. 1515 , 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006). [15] Based on a survey of case law of our sister jurisdictions, Jones reached the conclusion that courts have upheld the warrantless entry into residences to assist unattended children of “tender age” or “small children.” See People v. Somas, 68 Misc.2d 450, 458 , 327 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Nassau Co. Ct.1972) (where the court upheld the entry into a | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Jones v. United States
neutral
1 sentence2016The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “customary social usage” 'will have a “substantial bearing on Fourth Amendment reasonableness in specific circumstances.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 121 , 126 S.Ct. 1515 , 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006). [15] Based on a survey of case law of our sister jurisdictions, Jones reached the conclusion that courts have upheld the warrantless entry into residences to assist unattended children of “tender age” or “small children.” See People v. Somas, 68 Misc.2d 450, 458 , 327 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Nassau Co. Ct.1972) (where the court upheld the entry into a | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.