emergency aid exception in Massachusetts

2025The emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement "permits the police to enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that there may be someone inside who is injured or in imminent danger of physical harm." Commonwealth v. Peters, 453 Mass. 818, 819 (2009).

2019Thus, a protective *269 sweep made pursuant to the emergency aid exception "must be limited in scope to its purpose," Peters , 453 Mass. at 823 , 905 N.E.2d 1111 , e.g., to preventing imminent harm, protecting life or property, 12 or providing aid to one who is injured.

2025"In determining whether entry is justified under the emergency aid exception, we look solely to the objective circumstances known to the police at the time of entry and determine whether those circumstances provide a reasonable basis for entry." Commonwealth v. Entwistle, 463 Mass. 205, 214 (2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1129 (2013).

2025To justify a warrantless entry into a dwelling under the emergency aid exception, the Commonwealth must demonstrate both objectively reasonable grounds to believe that an emergency existed at the time of entry and that the officers' conduct after entry was "reasonable under the circumstances." Arias, supra, citing Entwistle, supra, at 216 .

2019The emergency aid doctrine establishes one such "narrow exception to the warrant requirement." See Commonwealth v. Duncan , 467 Mass. 746 , 754, 7 N.E.3d 469 , cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 224 , 190 L.Ed.2d 170 (2014).

2019The emergency aid doctrine establishes one such "narrow exception to the warrant requirement." See Commonwealth v. Duncan , 467 Mass. 746 , 754, 7 N.E.3d 469 , cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 224 , 190 L.Ed.2d 170 (2014).

2019The "burden rests with the Commonwealth to demonstrate that a warrantless search . . . fits within the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement." Entwistle, supra at 215 , quoting Peters, supra. See Snell, 428 Mass. at 774-775 . i. Objectively reasonable belief.

2018The emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement "applies when the purpose of the police entry is not to gather evidence of criminal activity but rather, because of an emergency, to respond to an immediate need for assistance for the protection of life or property." Commonwealth v. Snell , 428 Mass. 766 , 774, cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1010 (1999), quoting from Commonwealth v. Bates , 28 Mass. App. Ct. 217 , 219 (1990).

2019See Commonwealth v. Snell , 428 Mass. 766 , 774, 705 N.E.2d 236 , cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1010 , 119 S.Ct. 2351 , 144 L.Ed.2d 247 (1999) (entry is reasonable under emergency aid exception when made "not to gather evidence of criminal activity but rather, because of an emergency, to respond to an immediate need for assistance" [citation omitted] ).

2018The emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement "applies when the purpose of the police entry is not to gather evidence of criminal activity but rather, because of an emergency, to respond to an immediate need for assistance for the protection of life or property." Commonwealth v. Snell , 428 Mass. 766 , 774, cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1010 (1999), quoting from Commonwealth v. Bates , 28 Mass. App. Ct. 217 , 219 (1990).

2019See, e.g., Stuart , 547 U.S. at 404 , 126 S.Ct. 1943 ; Entwistle , 463 Mass. at 214 , 973 N.E.2d 115 .

2019See, e.g., Stuart , 547 U.S. at 404 , 126 S.Ct. 1943 ; Entwistle , 463 Mass. at 214 , 973 N.E.2d 115 .

2025"Warrantless searches may be justifiable, however, if the Because we affirm based on the emergency aid doctrine, we 2 do not reach the defendant's additional challenge to the judge's finding that entry into the home was supported by Figueroa's valid consent. 2 circumstances of the search fall within an established exception to the warrant requirement." Commonwealth v. Arias, 481 Mass. 604, 610 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Tuschall, 476 Mass. 581, 584 (2017).

2018This creates the temptation to use traffic stops as a means of investigating other law violations, as to which no probable cause or even articulable suspicion exist." We have applied this same standard of objective reasonableness when assessing, for instance, the validity of a Terry -type investigatory stop, Commonwealth v. Smigliano , 427 Mass. 490 , 493, 694 N.E.2d 341 (1998) ("Because the facts and circumstances known to the officer are sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion ... in a reasonable police officer, a Terry stop is justified regardless of the officer's subjective state of mi

2018See ibid ., quoting from Michigan v. Fisher , 558 U.S. 45 , 49 (2009) (" 'Officers do not need ironclad proof of "a likely serious, life-threatening" injury to invoke the emergency aid exception.' ...

2015“Officers do not need ironclad proof of ‘a likely serious, life-threatening’ injury to invoke the emergency aid exception.” Fisher, 558 U.S. at 49 .

2016See Commonwealth v. Peters, 453 Mass. 818, 825-826 (2009). 8 ”[T]he Commonwealth has the burden of showing that authorities had a reasonable ground to believe that an emergency existed and that the actions of the police were rea *456 sonable in the circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Knowles, 451 Mass. 91, 96 (2008). ‘“In determining whether entry is justified under the emergency aid exception, we look solely to the objective circumstances known to the police at the time of entry and determine whether those circumstances provide a reasonable basis for the entry.” Commonwealth v. Entwistle, supra a

2014Although the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement is “closely related” to the so-called community caretaking exception, Commonwealth v. Knowles, 451 Mass. 91, 96 (2008), the latter has been applied almost exclusively in situations involving searches or seizures of automobiles.

2018The emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement "applies when the purpose of the police entry is not to gather evidence of criminal activity but rather, because of an emergency, to respond to an immediate need for assistance for the protection of life or property." Commonwealth v. Snell , 428 Mass. 766 , 774, cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1010 (1999), quoting from Commonwealth v. Bates , 28 Mass. App. Ct. 217 , 219 (1990).

2015Accordingly, the actions of the police up to the point that the defendant was transported to the hospital were consistent with the emergency aid exception. 4 See id. at 774, quoting Commonwealth v. Bates, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 217, 219 (1990) (“purpose of the police entry [under emergency exception] is not to gather evidence of criminal activity but rather, because of an emergency, to respond to an immediate need for assistance for the protection of life or property”). ii.

2025"Under the emergency aid doctrine, the police 'may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.'" Commonwealth v. Regan, 104 Mass. App. Ct. 623 , 627 (2024), cert. denied, U.S. Supreme Ct., No. 24-6339 (Mar. 3, 2025), quoting Commonwealth v. Townsend, 453 Mass. 413, 425 (2009).

2025"Under the emergency aid doctrine, the police 'may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.'" Commonwealth v. Regan, 104 Mass. App. Ct. 623 , 627 (2024), cert. denied, U.S. Supreme Ct., No. 24-6339 (Mar. 3, 2025), quoting Commonwealth v. Townsend, 453 Mass. 413, 425 (2009).

2019Because the officers lacked an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency existed anywhere in the building, a protective sweep was unjustifiable under the emergency aid doctrine, regardless of the scope of that sweep. 20 Commonwealth v. Young, 382 Mass. 448, 456 (1981) ("Exigencies which may justify a procedure without warrant are a narrow category and must be established by the Commonwealth . . ."); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 800 (1975) ("the standards as to exigency are strict").

2019Because the officers lacked an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency existed anywhere in the building, a protective sweep was unjustifiable under the emergency aid doctrine, regardless of the scope of that sweep. 20 Commonwealth v. Young, 382 Mass. 448, 456 (1981) ("Exigencies which may justify a procedure without warrant are a narrow category and must be established by the Commonwealth . . ."); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 800 (1975) ("the standards as to exigency are strict").

2017First, a warrantless search is reasonable when law enforcement possesses an objectively reasonable basis to conclude that “prompt intervention is necessary to prevent a threatened fire, explosion, or other destructive accident.” Com *585 monwealth v. DiGeronimo, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 714, 723 (1995).

2015As the Washington Supreme Court has observed: “[T]he fact that police are responding to a situation that likely involves domestic violence may be an important factor in evaluating both the subjective belief of the officer that someone likely needs assistance and in assessing the reasonableness of the officer’s belief that there is an imminent threat of injury.” State v. Shultz, 170 Wash. 2d 746, 756 (2011). 12 The defendant contends that this case is controlled by Commonwealth v. DiGeronimo, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 714, 723-725 (1995), in which we concluded that on the fact presented there, the emer

2016This doctrine authorizes the police to lawfully enter a home without probable cause or a warrant ‘“to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006), quoting from Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978).

2012Once they located the bodies, it was within the permissible scope of the search to “go through and look into every single room for any other humans, any place where a human could be.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) (under emergency aid doctrine, “when the police come upon the scene of a homicide they may make a prompt warrantless search of the area to see if there are other victims or if a killer is still on the premises”).

2019See Commonwealth v. Snell , 428 Mass. 766 , 774, 705 N.E.2d 236 , cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1010 , 119 S.Ct. 2351 , 144 L.Ed.2d 247 (1999) (entry is reasonable under emergency aid exception when made "not to gather evidence of criminal activity but rather, because of an emergency, to respond to an immediate need for assistance" [citation omitted] ).

2018In the context of a search of a home, where constitutional protection against unreasonable searches is at its zenith, 7 the courts have recognized an "emergency aid" exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements *638 of the Federal and State constitutions. 8 See Commonwealth v. Snell , 428 Mass. 766 , 774-775, 776 n.7, 705 N.E.2d 236 , cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1010 , 119 S.Ct. 2351 , 144 L.Ed.2d 247 (1999) ; Commonwealth v. Duncan , 467 Mass. 746 , 749-750, 7 N.E.3d 469 , cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 224 , 190 L.Ed.2d 170 (2014) ; Commonwealth v. Cantelli , 83 Mass. App. Ct.

2019Commonwealth v. Entwistle , 463 Mass. 205 , 213, 973 N.E.2d 115 (2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1129 , 133 S.Ct. 945 , 184 L.Ed.2d 736 (2013).

2013See Commonwealth v. Entwistle, 463 Mass. 205, 213 (2012), cert, denied, 133 S. Ct. 945 (2013).

2025To justify a warrantless entry into a dwelling under the emergency aid exception, the Commonwealth must demonstrate both objectively reasonable grounds to believe that an emergency existed at the time of entry and that the officers' conduct after entry was "reasonable under the circumstances." Arias, supra, citing Entwistle, supra, at 216 .

2025"Warrantless searches may be justifiable, however, if the Because we affirm based on the emergency aid doctrine, we 2 do not reach the defendant's additional challenge to the judge's finding that entry into the home was supported by Figueroa's valid consent. 2 circumstances of the search fall within an established exception to the warrant requirement." Commonwealth v. Arias, 481 Mass. 604, 610 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Tuschall, 476 Mass. 581, 584 (2017).

2019"In the absence of a warrant, two conditions must be met in order for a nonconsensual entry to be valid" under the exigent circumstances doctrine: (1) "there must be probable cause" and (2) "there must be exigent circumstances." Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 439 Mass. 616, 619 (2003).

2019See Commonwealth v. Raspberry , 93 Mass. App. Ct. 633 , 640-641, 107 N.E.3d 1195 (2018) (emergency exception applied where police had objectively reasonable grounds to believe that emergency aid might be needed).

2019See Commonwealth v. Raspberry , 93 Mass. App. Ct. 633 , 640-641, 107 N.E.3d 1195 (2018) (emergency exception applied where police had objectively reasonable grounds to believe that emergency aid might be needed).

2019Because the officers lacked an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency existed anywhere in the building, a protective sweep was unjustifiable under the emergency aid doctrine, regardless of the scope of that sweep. 20 Commonwealth v. Young, 382 Mass. 448, 456 (1981) ("Exigencies which may justify a procedure without warrant are a narrow category and must be established by the Commonwealth . . ."); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 800 (1975) ("the standards as to exigency are strict").

2019Because the officers lacked an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency existed anywhere in the building, a protective sweep was unjustifiable under the emergency aid doctrine, regardless of the scope of that sweep. 20 Commonwealth v. Young, 382 Mass. 448, 456 (1981) ("Exigencies which may justify a procedure without warrant are a narrow category and must be established by the Commonwealth . . ."); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 800 (1975) ("the standards as to exigency are strict").

2019In addition, to be reasonable under the emergency aid doctrine, the officers' conduct after entry "may not be expanded into a general search for evidence of criminal activity." See Entwistle , 463 Mass. at 217 , 973 N.E.2d 115 , citing Arizona v. Hicks , 480 U.S. 321 , 325, 107 S.Ct. 1149 , 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987).

2019In addition, to be reasonable under the emergency aid doctrine, the officers' conduct after entry "may not be expanded into a general search for evidence of criminal activity." See Entwistle , 463 Mass. at 217 , 973 N.E.2d 115 , citing Arizona v. Hicks , 480 U.S. 321 , 325, 107 S.Ct. 1149 , 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987).