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38 Ohio opinions name it 3 courts 2008–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mincey v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2022State v. Price, 134 Ohio App.3d 464, 467 , 731 N.E.2d 280 , (1999), quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). {¶21} While the emergency aid exception does not require probable cause, officers must have reasonable grounds to believe there is an immediate need to act in order to protect lives or property, and there must be some reasonable basis for associating an emergency with the location. 2022State v. Price, 134 Ohio App.3d 464, 467 , 731 N.E.2d 280 , (1999), quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). {¶21} While the emergency aid exception does not require probable cause, officers must have reasonable grounds to believe there is an immediate need to act in order to protect lives or property, and there must be some reasonable basis for associating an emergency with the location. | 5 | 8 |
Brigham City v. Stuartgreen2 sentences2016The United States Supreme Court has also recognized the exception, explaining that “[o]ne exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.” Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). {¶9} Officers do not need “ironclad proof” of a likely serious or life-threatening injury to invoke the emergency aid exception. 2014One example of exigent circumstances is the emergency aid exception, which allows officers to “enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006), citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978). | 5 | 7 |
United States v. Donald P. Rohriggreen2 sentences2025“The exigent-circumstances exception has been recognized in situations of hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, imminent destruction of evidence, the need to prevent a suspect's escape, and risk of danger to the police and others.” State v. Methvin, supra, at ¶ 22, citing United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1515 (6th Cir.1996). {¶30} Another subset of the exigent-circumstances category is the emergency-aid exception. 2016United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1515 (6th Cir.1996). {¶20} Another subset of the exigent-circumstances category is the emergency-aid exception. | 3 | 3 |
Michigan v. Fishergreen2 sentences2025See also State v. Stengel, 2018-Ohio-2286, ¶ 35 (5th Dist.), citing Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 (2009) (“Officers do not need ironclad proof of a ‘likely serious, life-threatening’ injury to invoke the emergency aid exception.”). 2019The Supreme Court in Michigan v. Fisher, 588 U.S. 45 , 130 S.Ct. 546 , 175 L.Ed.2d 410 , held, “Officers do not need ironclad proof of ‘a likely serious, life-threatening’ injury to invoke the emergency aid exception. * * * [T]he test * * * [is] whether there was ‘an objectively reasonable basis for believing’ that medical attention was needed * * *.” Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 , 130 S.Ct. 546 , 175 L.Ed.2d 410 . | 2 | 9 |
State v. Whitegreen2 sentences2018Id. citing 2 LaFave, Search & Seizure, [Section] 6.6(a), p. 698. ‘The officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts, which, taken with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant intrusion into protected areas.’ State v. White, 175 Ohio App.3d 302 , 2008-Ohio-657 , 886 N.E.2d 904 ¶17 (9th Dist.). ‘Officers do not need ironclad proof of “a likely serious, life-threatening” injury to invoke the emergency aid exception.’ Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 , 130 S.Ct. 546 , 175 L.Ed.2d 410 (2009).” State v. Stanley, 7th Dist Mahoning No. 13 MA 159, 2014-Ohio- 5636, 2018Id. citing 2 LaFave, Search & Seizure, [Section] 6.6(a), p. 698. ‘The officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts, which, taken with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant intrusion into protected areas.’ State v. White, 175 Ohio App.3d 302 , 2008-Ohio-657 , 886 N.E.2d 904 ¶17 (9th Dist.). ‘Officers do not need ironclad proof of “a likely serious, life-threatening” injury to invoke the emergency aid exception.’ Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 , 130 S.Ct. 546 , 175 L.Ed.2d 410 (2009).” State v. Stanley, 7th Dist Mahoning No. 13 MA 159, 2014-Ohio- 5636, | 2 | 5 |
State v. Gooden, 23764 (1-23-2008)green2 sentences2025Thus, “the emergency aid exception does not require probable cause”; however, “officers must have reasonable grounds to believe there is an immediate need to act in order to protect lives or property, and there must be some reasonable basis for associating an emergency with the location.” Street at ¶ 21 , citing State v. Bubenchick, 2014-Ohio-5056, ¶ 14 (5th Dist.), in turn citing State v. Gooden, 2008-Ohio-178, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.). 2024It is grounded in the “need to protect or preserve life.” Id. {¶18} In discussing the applicability of the emergency-aid exception, the Ohio Supreme Court has used terms that resound in extreme distress. | 1 | 7 |
People v. Davisgreen2 sentences2008Mincey v. Arizona , 437 ___U.S.___385, 392 (1978); People v. Davis , 442 Mich. 1 , 25-26 (1993). 2008Id.; see also Root v. Gauper , 438 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1971) (as cited in Davis , 442 Mich. at 16 ) (holding the emergency aid exception did not justify a warrantless search when police entered the house after they were aware that the victim of the shooting had been removed.). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Stengelgreen2 sentences2025See also State v. Stengel, 2018-Ohio-2286, ¶ 35 (5th Dist.), citing Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 (2009) (“Officers do not need ironclad proof of a ‘likely serious, life-threatening’ injury to invoke the emergency aid exception.”). 2025See also State v. Stengel, 2018-Ohio-2286, ¶ 35 (5th Dist.), citing Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 (2009) (“Officers do not need ironclad proof of a ‘likely serious, life-threatening’ injury to invoke the emergency aid exception.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bubenchikgreen1 sentence2025Thus, “the emergency aid exception does not require probable cause”; however, “officers must have reasonable grounds to believe there is an immediate need to act in order to protect lives or property, and there must be some reasonable basis for associating an emergency with the location.” Street at ¶ 21 , citing State v. Bubenchick, 2014-Ohio-5056, ¶ 14 (5th Dist.), in turn citing State v. Gooden, 2008-Ohio-178, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Longgreen1 sentence2025Standard of Review {¶20} “Appellate review of a trial court's decision to deny a motion to suppress involves a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Methvin, 2014-Ohio- 590, ¶ 19 (5th Dist.), citing State v. Long, 127 Ohio App.3d 328, 332 (4th Dist. 1998). | 1 | 1 |
Lewis L. Wayne v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2024For example, in State v. Applegate, 68 Ohio St.3d 348, 350 , 626 N.E.2d 942 (1994), citing Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C.Cir.1963), the court explained that exigent circumstances counsel against taking time to obtain a warrant because “people could well die.” The court has also characterized situations befitting the emergency-aid exception as placing “life or limb * * * in jeopardy.” State v. Dunn, 131 Ohio St.3d 325 , 2012-Ohio-1008 , 964 N.E.2d 1037 , ¶ 21. 2024For example, in State v. Applegate, 68 Ohio St.3d 348, 350 , 626 N.E.2d 942 (1994), citing Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C.Cir.1963), the court explained that exigent circumstances counsel against taking time to obtain a warrant because “people could well die.” The court has also characterized situations befitting the emergency-aid exception as placing “life or limb * * * in jeopardy.” State v. Dunn, 131 Ohio St.3d 325 , 2012-Ohio-1008 , 964 N.E.2d 1037 , ¶ 21. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mineargreen1 sentence2016See, e.g., State v. Minear, 191 Ohio App.3d 774 , 2010-Ohio-6577 , ¶39 (11th Dist.) (the emergency aid exception involves an objective standard and does not depend on an officer’s subjective intent). {¶28} As stated, officers were dispatched to Mr. Nasca’s residence based upon an anonymous call from an out-of-county informant that his son, Christopher, was alleged to have been contemplating suicide. | 1 | 1 |
Tremaine Nelms v. Wellington Way Apartments, LLCgreen1 sentence2014See Nelms, 513 Fed.Appx. at 545 . {¶14} The State’s sole assignment of error is overruled. | 1 | 1 |
Kirk v. Louisianagreen1 sentence2013Ashtabula No. 2004-A-0044, 2005-Ohio-4657, ¶19 , citing Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 637 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Harold Dean Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Helen Frances Sutton Root v. Isabel H. Gaupergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Applegate
green
2 sentences2024For example, in State v. Applegate, 68 Ohio St.3d 348, 350 , 626 N.E.2d 942 (1994), citing Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C.Cir.1963), the court explained that exigent circumstances counsel against taking time to obtain a warrant because “people could well die.” The court has also characterized situations befitting the emergency-aid exception as placing “life or limb * * * in jeopardy.” State v. Dunn, 131 Ohio St.3d 325 , 2012-Ohio-1008 , 964 N.E.2d 1037 , ¶ 21. 2024For example, in State v. Applegate, 68 Ohio St.3d 348, 350 , 626 N.E.2d 942 (1994), citing Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C.Cir.1963), the court explained that exigent circumstances counsel against taking time to obtain a warrant because “people could well die.” The court has also characterized situations befitting the emergency-aid exception as placing “life or limb * * * in jeopardy.” State v. Dunn, 131 Ohio St.3d 325 , 2012-Ohio-1008 , 964 N.E.2d 1037 , ¶ 21. | 5 | 2008–2024 |
State v. Dunn
green
2 sentences2024For example, in State v. Applegate, 68 Ohio St.3d 348, 350 , 626 N.E.2d 942 (1994), citing Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C.Cir.1963), the court explained that exigent circumstances counsel against taking time to obtain a warrant because “people could well die.” The court has also characterized situations befitting the emergency-aid exception as placing “life or limb * * * in jeopardy.” State v. Dunn, 131 Ohio St.3d 325 , 2012-Ohio-1008 , 964 N.E.2d 1037 , ¶ 21. 2024For example, in State v. Applegate, 68 Ohio St.3d 348, 350 , 626 N.E.2d 942 (1994), citing Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C.Cir.1963), the court explained that exigent circumstances counsel against taking time to obtain a warrant because “people could well die.” The court has also characterized situations befitting the emergency-aid exception as placing “life or limb * * * in jeopardy.” State v. Dunn, 131 Ohio St.3d 325 , 2012-Ohio-1008 , 964 N.E.2d 1037 , ¶ 21. | 5 | 2013–2024 |
Cady v. Dombrowski
green
2 sentences2014The community-caretaking function was set forth in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 , 93 S.Ct. 2523 , 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). 2014The community-caretaking function was set forth in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 , 93 S.Ct. 2523 , 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). | 2 | 2011–2014 |
Scott v. United States
green
2 sentences2013Consequently, “[a]n action is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind, ‘as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.’” (Emphasis added in Stuart.) Stuart at 404 , quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 , 98 S.Ct. 1717 , 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978). {¶23} Here, Detective Spencer testified at the suppression hearing that he only entered Williams’ trailer to “make sure nobody else was dead.” Although his subjective state of mind is not controlling in determining whether the emergency-aid exception to the warrant 2013Consequently, “[a]n action is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind, ‘as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.’” (Emphasis added in Stuart.) Stuart at 404 , quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 , 98 S.Ct. 1717 , 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978). {¶23} Here, Detective Spencer testified at the suppression hearing that he only entered Williams’ trailer to “make sure nobody else was dead.” Although his subjective state of mind is not controlling in determining whether the emergency-aid exception to the warrant | 2 | 2012–2013 |
State v. Price
green
2 sentences2022State v. Price, 134 Ohio App.3d 464, 467 , 731 N.E.2d 280 , (1999), quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). {¶21} While the emergency aid exception does not require probable cause, officers must have reasonable grounds to believe there is an immediate need to act in order to protect lives or property, and there must be some reasonable basis for associating an emergency with the location. 2022State v. Price, 134 Ohio App.3d 464, 467 , 731 N.E.2d 280 , (1999), quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). {¶21} While the emergency aid exception does not require probable cause, officers must have reasonable grounds to believe there is an immediate need to act in order to protect lives or property, and there must be some reasonable basis for associating an emergency with the location. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2020A warrantless search must be “strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.” Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 26 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1882 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 908 . * * * {¶ 21} While the emergency aid exception does not require probable cause, officers must have reasonable grounds to believe there is an immediate need to act in order to protect lives or property, and there must be some reasonable basis for associating an emergency with the location. 2020A warrantless search must be “strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.” Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 26 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1882 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 908 . * * * {¶ 21} While the emergency aid exception does not require probable cause, officers must have reasonable grounds to believe there is an immediate need to act in order to protect lives or property, and there must be some reasonable basis for associating an emergency with the location. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Vargas
green
2 sentences2019Indeed, some courts have held that giving the community caretaking exception a life in the home independent and apart from the emergency aid exception “would render the emergency-aid doctrine obsolete.” [State v.] Vargas, [ 213 N.J. 301 ,] 63 A.3d [175,] at 189 [(2013)]. 2019Indeed, some courts have held that giving the community caretaking exception a life in the home independent and apart from the emergency aid exception “would render the emergency-aid doctrine obsolete.” [State v.] Vargas, [ 213 N.J. 301 ,] 63 A.3d [175,] at 189 [(2013)]. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Campbell
neutral
1 sentence2018Ashtabula No. 2013-A-0035, 2013-Ohio-5823, ¶36 ; see, also, State v. White, 175 Ohio App.3d 302 , 2008-Ohio-657, ¶19 (9th Dist.) (“This court has previously held that the danger that clandestine methamphetamine laboratories pose to occupants, officers, and the community is such that ‘the suspected production of methamphetamine constitutes per se exigent circumstances.’” State v. Sandor, 9th Dist. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Armbruster
neutral
1 sentence2017Summit No. 26645, 2013-Ohio-3119, ¶ 7 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Hendrix
neutral
1 sentence2017No. 27217, 2014-Ohio-3577 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Stanley
neutral
1 sentence2017No. 13 MA 159, 2014-Ohio-5636, ¶ 7 . {¶19} "During a warrantless emergency entry police may seize contraband which is in plain view." State v. Hallam, 2d Dist. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Minnesota v. Olson
green
2 sentences2014Id. citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 , 110 S.Ct. 1684 , 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990). {¶32} The state appears to focus on the emergency-aid exception. 2014Id. citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 , 110 S.Ct. 1684 , 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990). {¶32} The state appears to focus on the emergency-aid exception. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Telshaw
green
2 sentences2014Id. citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 , 110 S.Ct. 1684 , 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990). {¶32} The state appears to focus on the emergency-aid exception. 2014Id. citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 , 110 S.Ct. 1684 , 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990). {¶32} The state appears to focus on the emergency-aid exception. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Martin, Unpublished Decision (6-11-2004)
green
1 sentence2013Portage No. 2002-P-0072, 2004-Ohio-3027, ¶17 . {¶27} Appellant argues the trial court erred in finding that the emergency aid doctrine justified the search in this case. {¶28} “The exigent circumstances doctrine requires * * * probable cause plus exigent circumstances * * * to effectuate a warrantless entry of a home.” State v. Pape, 11th Dist. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Bey
green
1 sentence2013Deputy Thomas also testified that, due to the violent chemical reaction created by the combination of the various chemicals in one-pot meth labs, such as those involved here, they present a “substantial” risk of explosion. 11 {¶41} We therefore hold the trial court did not err in finding that the warrantless search of Olsen’s residence was authorized by the emergency aid doctrine. {¶42} Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled. {¶43} For his second and final assigned error, appellant alleges: {¶44} “The trial court’s failure to determine whether the defendant-appellant made a knowing | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Pape, Unpublished Decision (9-2-2005)
neutral
1 sentence2013Ashtabula No. 2004-A-0044, 2005-Ohio-4657, ¶19 , citing Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 637 (2002). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Ryburn v. Huff green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Williams, Unpublished Decision (9-20-2007) green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Township of Bainbridge v. Kaseda, 2007-G-2797 (5-2-2008) green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Bugaj, Unpublished Decision (2-14-2007) neutral | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| United States v. Jesus Humberto Munoz-Guerra green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Hyde green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Jenkins green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Nields green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Scott M. green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.