emergency aid exception (Ohio) · Go Syfert
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emergency aid exception in Ohio

38 Ohio opinions name it 3 courts 2008–2025 5 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (16)

CaseFollowedCited
Mincey v. Arizonagreen
scotus · 1978 · cited in 8 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2008–2023
2 sentences

2022State v. Price, 134 Ohio App.3d 464, 467 , 731 N.E.2d 280 , (1999), quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). {¶21} While the emergency aid exception does not require probable cause, officers must have reasonable grounds to believe there is an immediate need to act in order to protect lives or property, and there must be some reasonable basis for associating an emergency with the location.

2022State v. Price, 134 Ohio App.3d 464, 467 , 731 N.E.2d 280 , (1999), quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). {¶21} While the emergency aid exception does not require probable cause, officers must have reasonable grounds to believe there is an immediate need to act in order to protect lives or property, and there must be some reasonable basis for associating an emergency with the location.

58
Brigham City v. Stuartgreen
scotus · 2006 · cited in 7 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2008–2021
2 sentences

2016The United States Supreme Court has also recognized the exception, explaining that “[o]ne exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.” Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). {¶9} Officers do not need “ironclad proof” of a likely serious or life-threatening injury to invoke the emergency aid exception.

2014One example of exigent circumstances is the emergency aid exception, which allows officers to “enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006), citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978).

57
United States v. Donald P. Rohriggreen
ca6 · 1996 · cited in 3 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2014–2025
2 sentences

2025“The exigent-circumstances exception has been recognized in situations of hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, imminent destruction of evidence, the need to prevent a suspect's escape, and risk of danger to the police and others.” State v. Methvin, supra, at ¶ 22, citing United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1515 (6th Cir.1996). {¶30} Another subset of the exigent-circumstances category is the emergency-aid exception.

2016United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1515 (6th Cir.1996). {¶20} Another subset of the exigent-circumstances category is the emergency-aid exception.

33
Michigan v. Fishergreen
scotus · 2009 · cited in 9 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2010–2025
2 sentences

2025See also State v. Stengel, 2018-Ohio-2286, ¶ 35 (5th Dist.), citing Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 (2009) (“Officers do not need ironclad proof of a ‘likely serious, life-threatening’ injury to invoke the emergency aid exception.”).

2019The Supreme Court in Michigan v. Fisher, 588 U.S. 45 , 130 S.Ct. 546 , 175 L.Ed.2d 410 , held, “Officers do not need ironclad proof of ‘a likely serious, life-threatening’ injury to invoke the emergency aid exception. * * * [T]he test * * * [is] whether there was ‘an objectively reasonable basis for believing’ that medical attention was needed * * *.” Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 , 130 S.Ct. 546 , 175 L.Ed.2d 410 .

29
State v. Whitegreen
ohioctapp · 2008 · cited in 5 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2008–2018
2 sentences

2018Id. citing 2 LaFave, Search & Seizure, [Section] 6.6(a), p. 698. ‘The officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts, which, taken with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant intrusion into protected areas.’ State v. White, 175 Ohio App.3d 302 , 2008-Ohio-657 , 886 N.E.2d 904 ¶17 (9th Dist.). ‘Officers do not need ironclad proof of “a likely serious, life-threatening” injury to invoke the emergency aid exception.’ Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 , 130 S.Ct. 546 , 175 L.Ed.2d 410 (2009).” State v. Stanley, 7th Dist Mahoning No. 13 MA 159, 2014-Ohio- 5636,

2018Id. citing 2 LaFave, Search & Seizure, [Section] 6.6(a), p. 698. ‘The officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts, which, taken with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant intrusion into protected areas.’ State v. White, 175 Ohio App.3d 302 , 2008-Ohio-657 , 886 N.E.2d 904 ¶17 (9th Dist.). ‘Officers do not need ironclad proof of “a likely serious, life-threatening” injury to invoke the emergency aid exception.’ Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 , 130 S.Ct. 546 , 175 L.Ed.2d 410 (2009).” State v. Stanley, 7th Dist Mahoning No. 13 MA 159, 2014-Ohio- 5636,

25
State v. Gooden, 23764 (1-23-2008)green
ohioctapp · 2008 · cited in 7 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2008–2025
2 sentences

2025Thus, “the emergency aid exception does not require probable cause”; however, “officers must have reasonable grounds to believe there is an immediate need to act in order to protect lives or property, and there must be some reasonable basis for associating an emergency with the location.” Street at ¶ 21 , citing State v. Bubenchick, 2014-Ohio-5056, ¶ 14 (5th Dist.), in turn citing State v. Gooden, 2008-Ohio-178, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.).

2024It is grounded in the “need to protect or preserve life.” Id. {¶18} In discussing the applicability of the emergency-aid exception, the Ohio Supreme Court has used terms that resound in extreme distress.

17
People v. Davisgreen
mich · 1993 · cited in 2 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
2 sentences

2008Mincey v. Arizona , 437 ___U.S.___385, 392 (1978); People v. Davis , 442 Mich. 1 , 25-26 (1993).

2008Id.; see also Root v. Gauper , 438 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1971) (as cited in Davis , 442 Mich. at 16 ) (holding the emergency aid exception did not justify a warrantless search when police entered the house after they were aware that the victim of the shooting had been removed.).

12
State v. Stengelgreen
ohioctapp · 2018 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
2 sentences

2025See also State v. Stengel, 2018-Ohio-2286, ¶ 35 (5th Dist.), citing Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 (2009) (“Officers do not need ironclad proof of a ‘likely serious, life-threatening’ injury to invoke the emergency aid exception.”).

2025See also State v. Stengel, 2018-Ohio-2286, ¶ 35 (5th Dist.), citing Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 (2009) (“Officers do not need ironclad proof of a ‘likely serious, life-threatening’ injury to invoke the emergency aid exception.”).

11
State v. Bubenchikgreen
ohioctapp · 2014 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025Thus, “the emergency aid exception does not require probable cause”; however, “officers must have reasonable grounds to believe there is an immediate need to act in order to protect lives or property, and there must be some reasonable basis for associating an emergency with the location.” Street at ¶ 21 , citing State v. Bubenchick, 2014-Ohio-5056, ¶ 14 (5th Dist.), in turn citing State v. Gooden, 2008-Ohio-178, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.).

11
State v. Longgreen
ohioctapp · 1998 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025Standard of Review {¶20} “Appellate review of a trial court's decision to deny a motion to suppress involves a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Methvin, 2014-Ohio- 590, ¶ 19 (5th Dist.), citing State v. Long, 127 Ohio App.3d 328, 332 (4th Dist. 1998).

11
Lewis L. Wayne v. United Statesgreen
cadc · 1963 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
2 sentences

2024For example, in State v. Applegate, 68 Ohio St.3d 348, 350 , 626 N.E.2d 942 (1994), citing Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C.Cir.1963), the court explained that exigent circumstances counsel against taking time to obtain a warrant because “people could well die.” The court has also characterized situations befitting the emergency-aid exception as placing “life or limb * * * in jeopardy.” State v. Dunn, 131 Ohio St.3d 325 , 2012-Ohio-1008 , 964 N.E.2d 1037 , ¶ 21.

2024For example, in State v. Applegate, 68 Ohio St.3d 348, 350 , 626 N.E.2d 942 (1994), citing Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C.Cir.1963), the court explained that exigent circumstances counsel against taking time to obtain a warrant because “people could well die.” The court has also characterized situations befitting the emergency-aid exception as placing “life or limb * * * in jeopardy.” State v. Dunn, 131 Ohio St.3d 325 , 2012-Ohio-1008 , 964 N.E.2d 1037 , ¶ 21.

11
State v. Mineargreen
ohioctapp · 2010 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016See, e.g., State v. Minear, 191 Ohio App.3d 774 , 2010-Ohio-6577 , ¶39 (11th Dist.) (the emergency aid exception involves an objective standard and does not depend on an officer’s subjective intent). {¶28} As stated, officers were dispatched to Mr. Nasca’s residence based upon an anonymous call from an out-of-county informant that his son, Christopher, was alleged to have been contemplating suicide.

11
Tremaine Nelms v. Wellington Way Apartments, LLCgreen
ca6 · 2013 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014See Nelms, 513 Fed.Appx. at 545 . {¶14} The State’s sole assignment of error is overruled.

11
Kirk v. Louisianagreen
scotus · 2002 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
1 sentence

2013Ashtabula No. 2004-A-0044, 2005-Ohio-4657, ¶19 , citing Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 637 (2002).

11
United States v. Harold Dean Jonesgreen
ca6 · 1981 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
11
Helen Frances Sutton Root v. Isabel H. Gaupergreen
ca8 · 1971 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (25)

CaseCitedYears
State v. Applegate green
ohio · 1994
2 sentences

2024For example, in State v. Applegate, 68 Ohio St.3d 348, 350 , 626 N.E.2d 942 (1994), citing Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C.Cir.1963), the court explained that exigent circumstances counsel against taking time to obtain a warrant because “people could well die.” The court has also characterized situations befitting the emergency-aid exception as placing “life or limb * * * in jeopardy.” State v. Dunn, 131 Ohio St.3d 325 , 2012-Ohio-1008 , 964 N.E.2d 1037 , ¶ 21.

2024For example, in State v. Applegate, 68 Ohio St.3d 348, 350 , 626 N.E.2d 942 (1994), citing Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C.Cir.1963), the court explained that exigent circumstances counsel against taking time to obtain a warrant because “people could well die.” The court has also characterized situations befitting the emergency-aid exception as placing “life or limb * * * in jeopardy.” State v. Dunn, 131 Ohio St.3d 325 , 2012-Ohio-1008 , 964 N.E.2d 1037 , ¶ 21.

52008–2024
State v. Dunn green
ohio · 2012
2 sentences

2024For example, in State v. Applegate, 68 Ohio St.3d 348, 350 , 626 N.E.2d 942 (1994), citing Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C.Cir.1963), the court explained that exigent circumstances counsel against taking time to obtain a warrant because “people could well die.” The court has also characterized situations befitting the emergency-aid exception as placing “life or limb * * * in jeopardy.” State v. Dunn, 131 Ohio St.3d 325 , 2012-Ohio-1008 , 964 N.E.2d 1037 , ¶ 21.

2024For example, in State v. Applegate, 68 Ohio St.3d 348, 350 , 626 N.E.2d 942 (1994), citing Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C.Cir.1963), the court explained that exigent circumstances counsel against taking time to obtain a warrant because “people could well die.” The court has also characterized situations befitting the emergency-aid exception as placing “life or limb * * * in jeopardy.” State v. Dunn, 131 Ohio St.3d 325 , 2012-Ohio-1008 , 964 N.E.2d 1037 , ¶ 21.

52013–2024
Cady v. Dombrowski green
scotus · 1973
2 sentences

2014The community-caretaking function was set forth in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 , 93 S.Ct. 2523 , 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973).

2014The community-caretaking function was set forth in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 , 93 S.Ct. 2523 , 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973).

22011–2014
Scott v. United States green
scotus · 1978
2 sentences

2013Consequently, “[a]n action is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind, ‘as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.’” (Emphasis added in Stuart.) Stuart at 404 , quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 , 98 S.Ct. 1717 , 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978). {¶23} Here, Detective Spencer testified at the suppression hearing that he only entered Williams’ trailer to “make sure nobody else was dead.” Although his subjective state of mind is not controlling in determining whether the emergency-aid exception to the warrant

2013Consequently, “[a]n action is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind, ‘as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.’” (Emphasis added in Stuart.) Stuart at 404 , quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 , 98 S.Ct. 1717 , 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978). {¶23} Here, Detective Spencer testified at the suppression hearing that he only entered Williams’ trailer to “make sure nobody else was dead.” Although his subjective state of mind is not controlling in determining whether the emergency-aid exception to the warrant

22012–2013
State v. Price green
ohioctapp · 1999
2 sentences

2022State v. Price, 134 Ohio App.3d 464, 467 , 731 N.E.2d 280 , (1999), quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). {¶21} While the emergency aid exception does not require probable cause, officers must have reasonable grounds to believe there is an immediate need to act in order to protect lives or property, and there must be some reasonable basis for associating an emergency with the location.

2022State v. Price, 134 Ohio App.3d 464, 467 , 731 N.E.2d 280 , (1999), quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). {¶21} While the emergency aid exception does not require probable cause, officers must have reasonable grounds to believe there is an immediate need to act in order to protect lives or property, and there must be some reasonable basis for associating an emergency with the location.

12022–2022
Terry v. Ohio green
scotus · 1968
2 sentences

2020A warrantless search must be “strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.” Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 26 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1882 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 908 . * * * {¶ 21} While the emergency aid exception does not require probable cause, officers must have reasonable grounds to believe there is an immediate need to act in order to protect lives or property, and there must be some reasonable basis for associating an emergency with the location.

2020A warrantless search must be “strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.” Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 26 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1882 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 908 . * * * {¶ 21} While the emergency aid exception does not require probable cause, officers must have reasonable grounds to believe there is an immediate need to act in order to protect lives or property, and there must be some reasonable basis for associating an emergency with the location.

12020–2020
State v. Vargas green
nj · 2013
2 sentences

2019Indeed, some courts have held that giving the community caretaking exception a life in the home independent and apart from the emergency aid exception “would render the emergency-aid doctrine obsolete.” [State v.] Vargas, [ 213 N.J. 301 ,] 63 A.3d [175,] at 189 [(2013)].

2019Indeed, some courts have held that giving the community caretaking exception a life in the home independent and apart from the emergency aid exception “would render the emergency-aid doctrine obsolete.” [State v.] Vargas, [ 213 N.J. 301 ,] 63 A.3d [175,] at 189 [(2013)].

12019–2019
State v. Campbell neutral
ohioctapp · 2013
1 sentence

2018Ashtabula No. 2013-A-0035, 2013-Ohio-5823, ¶36 ; see, also, State v. White, 175 Ohio App.3d 302 , 2008-Ohio-657, ¶19 (9th Dist.) (“This court has previously held that the danger that clandestine methamphetamine laboratories pose to occupants, officers, and the community is such that ‘the suspected production of methamphetamine constitutes per se exigent circumstances.’” State v. Sandor, 9th Dist.

12018–2018
State v. Armbruster neutral
ohioctapp · 2013
1 sentence

2017Summit No. 26645, 2013-Ohio-3119, ¶ 7 .

12017–2017
State v. Hendrix neutral
ohioctapp · 2014
1 sentence

2017No. 27217, 2014-Ohio-3577 .

12017–2017
State v. Stanley neutral
ohioctapp · 2014
1 sentence

2017No. 13 MA 159, 2014-Ohio-5636, ¶ 7 . {¶19} "During a warrantless emergency entry police may seize contraband which is in plain view." State v. Hallam, 2d Dist.

12017–2017
Minnesota v. Olson green
scotus · 1990
2 sentences

2014Id. citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 , 110 S.Ct. 1684 , 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990). {¶32} The state appears to focus on the emergency-aid exception.

2014Id. citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 , 110 S.Ct. 1684 , 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990). {¶32} The state appears to focus on the emergency-aid exception.

12014–2014
State v. Telshaw green
ohioctapp · 2011
2 sentences

2014Id. citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 , 110 S.Ct. 1684 , 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990). {¶32} The state appears to focus on the emergency-aid exception.

2014Id. citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 , 110 S.Ct. 1684 , 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990). {¶32} The state appears to focus on the emergency-aid exception.

12014–2014
State v. Martin, Unpublished Decision (6-11-2004) green
ohioctapp · 2004
1 sentence

2013Portage No. 2002-P-0072, 2004-Ohio-3027, ¶17 . {¶27} Appellant argues the trial court erred in finding that the emergency aid doctrine justified the search in this case. {¶28} “The exigent circumstances doctrine requires * * * probable cause plus exigent circumstances * * * to effectuate a warrantless entry of a home.” State v. Pape, 11th Dist.

12013–2013
State v. Bey green
ohio · 1999
1 sentence

2013Deputy Thomas also testified that, due to the violent chemical reaction created by the combination of the various chemicals in one-pot meth labs, such as those involved here, they present a “substantial” risk of explosion. 11 {¶41} We therefore hold the trial court did not err in finding that the warrantless search of Olsen’s residence was authorized by the emergency aid doctrine. {¶42} Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled. {¶43} For his second and final assigned error, appellant alleges: {¶44} “The trial court’s failure to determine whether the defendant-appellant made a knowing

12013–2013
State v. Pape, Unpublished Decision (9-2-2005) neutral
ohioctapp · 2005
1 sentence

2013Ashtabula No. 2004-A-0044, 2005-Ohio-4657, ¶19 , citing Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 637 (2002).

12013–2013
Ryburn v. Huff green
scotus · 2012
12012–2012
State v. Williams, Unpublished Decision (9-20-2007) green
ohioctapp · 2007
12010–2010
Township of Bainbridge v. Kaseda, 2007-G-2797 (5-2-2008) green
ohioctapp · 2008
12010–2010
State v. Bugaj, Unpublished Decision (2-14-2007) neutral
ohioctapp · 2007
12010–2010
United States v. Jesus Humberto Munoz-Guerra green
ca5 · 1986
12008–2008
State v. Hyde green
ohioctapp · 1971
12008–2008
State v. Jenkins green
ohioctapp · 1995
12008–2008
State v. Nields green
ohio · 2001
12008–2008
State v. Scott M. green
ohioctapp · 1999
12008–2008

Statutes the citing opinions construe

OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2925.11 (9) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2925.04 (7) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2925.03 (4) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2933.33 (4) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.02 (3) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 4511.19 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

OR 61 (1988–2026) NJ 47 (1994–2026) OH 38 (2008–2025) IA 34 (1996–2025) WA 28 (2001–2024) CA 24 (1999–2025) PA 22 (2013–2026) MI 21 (1993–2026) MA 20 (2009–2025) IL 15 (2012–2023) TX 14 (2003–2026) KS 13 (2004–2026) MN 13 (2007–2026) NM 13 (2001–2022) UT 12 (2000–2024) AZ 11 (1984–2024) VA 10 (2002–2024) AK 9 (1979–2018) WI 8 (2021–2025) KY 8 (2011–2020) CO 8 (2002–2015) IN 7 (2016–2026) MD 6 (1996–2013) NH 5 (2001–2020) NY 5 (2012–2024) CT 4 (2022–2024) WY 4 (2004–2020) FL 3 (1980–2017) ME 3 (2021–2024) DC 2 (2016–2018) TN 2 (2008–2013) ID 2 (2003–2013) SC 2 (2020–2020) SD 2 (2009–2021) AR 2 (2010–2021)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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