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60 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 2013–2025 16 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In re Lipskygreen2 sentences2025Clear and specific evidence requires “enough detail to show the factual basis” of the claim, but it does not “impose an elevated evidentiary standard,” “categorically reject circumstantial evidence,” or “impose a higher burden of proof than that required of the plaintiff at trial.” Id. at 591 . 2025Clear and specific evidence requires “enough detail to show the factual basis” of the claim, but it does not “impose an elevated evidentiary standard,” “categorically reject circumstantial evidence,” or “impose a higher burden of proof than that required of the plaintiff at trial.” Id. at 591 . | 13 | 51 |
Barbara Soules Young and Amy Ganci v. Robert and Hollie Krantzgreen2 sentences2015See Young v. Krantz, 434 S.W.3d 335, 343 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2014, no pet.). 2015Texas courts have rejected this approach, almost uniformly recognizing that the “purposeful inclusion of a ‘clear and specific evidence’ requirement [in the Act] indicates that the nonmovant must satisfy an elevated evidentiary standard under section 27.005(c).” Rehak Creative Servs., Inc., 404 S.W.3d at 725–26, 729 (emphasis added); see e.g., Young v. Krantz, 434 S.W.3d 335 , 343–44 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.); Farias v. Garza, 426 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2014, pet. filed); KBMT Op. Co., LLC v. Toledo, 434 S.W.3d 276, 282 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, pet. filed); Shipp v. Ma | 3 | 5 |
Brett Shipp v. Dr. Richard Malouf and Leanne Maloufgreen2 sentences2015Texas courts have rejected this approach, almost uniformly recognizing that the “purposeful inclusion of a ‘clear and specific evidence’ requirement [in the Act] indicates that the nonmovant must satisfy an elevated evidentiary standard under section 27.005(c).” Rehak Creative Servs., Inc., 404 S.W.3d at 725–26, 729 (emphasis added); see e.g., Young v. Krantz, 434 S.W.3d 335 , 343–44 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.); Farias v. Garza, 426 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2014, pet. filed); KBMT Op. Co., LLC v. Toledo, 434 S.W.3d 276, 282 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, pet. filed); Shipp v. Ma 2015Shipp, 439 S.W.3d at 439 ; Young, 434 S.W.3d at 342–43. | 2 | 4 |
Dr. Hector Farias and Voices in Democratic Action (VIDA) v. Eduardo A. Garza and Uni-Trade Forwarding, L.C.green2 sentences2015Texas courts have rejected this approach, almost uniformly recognizing that the “purposeful inclusion of a ‘clear and specific evidence’ requirement [in the Act] indicates that the nonmovant must satisfy an elevated evidentiary standard under section 27.005(c).” Rehak Creative Servs., Inc., 404 S.W.3d at 725–26, 729 (emphasis added); see e.g., Young v. Krantz, 434 S.W.3d 335 , 343–44 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.); Farias v. Garza, 426 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2014, pet. filed); KBMT Op. Co., LLC v. Toledo, 434 S.W.3d 276, 282 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, pet. filed); Shipp v. Ma 2015Texas courts have rejected this approach, almost uniformly recognizing that the “purposeful inclusion of a ‘clear and specific evidence’ requirement [in the Act] indicates that the nonmovant must satisfy an elevated evidentiary standard under section 27.005(c).” Rehak Creative Servs., Inc., 404 S.W.3d at 725–26, 729 (emphasis added); see e.g., Young v. Krantz, 434 S.W.3d 335 , 343–44 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.); Farias v. Garza, 426 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2014, pet. filed); KBMT Op. Co., LLC v. Toledo, 434 S.W.3d 276, 282 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, pet. filed); Shipp v. Ma | 2 | 2 |
Byron D. Neely, Individually, and Byron D. Neely, M.D., P.A. v. Nanci Wilson, CBS Stations Group of Texas, L.P., D/B/A Keye-Tv and Viacom, Inc.red1 sentence2021Trowe also argues that some of his statements in the posts were not actionable because they were opinions and specifically references his “opinion” that appellees “do not pay employees well,” that “Skydive was not a safe place to jump,” and that its “airplanes were not properly maintained.” “If a statement is not verifiable as false, it is not defamatory.” Dallas Morning News, 554 S.W.3d at 624 (citing Neely v. Wilson, 418 S.W.3d 52, 62 (Tex. 2013)). | 1 | 1 |
D Magazine Partners, L.P. v. Rosenthalgreen1 sentence2019Defamation occurs when “(1) the defendant published a false statement; (2) that defamed the plaintiff; (3) with the requisite degree of fault regarding the truth of the statement (negligence if the plaintiff is a private individual); and (4) damages (unless the statement constitutes defamation per se).” 5 D Magazine Partners, L.P. v. Rosenthal, 529 S.W.3d 429, 434 (Tex. 2017). | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Edwards Transfer Co., Inc.green1 sentence2015Not without a lengthy explanation can the Court 28 E.g., Brown v. Edwards Transfer Co., 764 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Tex. 1988) (paternity of illegitimate person in a wrongful death case); Doubleday & Co. v. Rogers, 674 S.W.2d 751, 755-756 (Tex. 1984) (actual malice in a defamation case involving public officials and public figures); State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 569-570 (Tex. 1979) (civil commitment proceedings); In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 846-847 (Tex. 1980) (involuntary termination of parental rights); TEX. | 1 | 1 |
Doubleday & Co., Inc. v. Rogersgreen1 sentence2015Not without a lengthy explanation can the Court 28 E.g., Brown v. Edwards Transfer Co., 764 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Tex. 1988) (paternity of illegitimate person in a wrongful death case); Doubleday & Co. v. Rogers, 674 S.W.2d 751, 755-756 (Tex. 1984) (actual malice in a defamation case involving public officials and public figures); State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 569-570 (Tex. 1979) (civil commitment proceedings); In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 846-847 (Tex. 1980) (involuntary termination of parental rights); TEX. | 1 | 1 |
In the Interest of G. M.green1 sentence2015Not without a lengthy explanation can the Court 28 E.g., Brown v. Edwards Transfer Co., 764 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Tex. 1988) (paternity of illegitimate person in a wrongful death case); Doubleday & Co. v. Rogers, 674 S.W.2d 751, 755-756 (Tex. 1984) (actual malice in a defamation case involving public officials and public figures); State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 569-570 (Tex. 1979) (civil commitment proceedings); In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 846-847 (Tex. 1980) (involuntary termination of parental rights); TEX. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Addingtongreen1 sentence2015Not without a lengthy explanation can the Court 28 E.g., Brown v. Edwards Transfer Co., 764 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Tex. 1988) (paternity of illegitimate person in a wrongful death case); Doubleday & Co. v. Rogers, 674 S.W.2d 751, 755-756 (Tex. 1984) (actual malice in a defamation case involving public officials and public figures); State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 569-570 (Tex. 1979) (civil commitment proceedings); In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 846-847 (Tex. 1980) (involuntary termination of parental rights); TEX. | 1 | 1 |
KBMT Operating Company, LLC, KBMT License Company, LLC, Brian Burns, Jackie Simien and Tracy Kennick v. Minda Lao Toledogreen1 sentence2015Texas courts have rejected this approach, almost uniformly recognizing that the “purposeful inclusion of a ‘clear and specific evidence’ requirement [in the Act] indicates that the nonmovant must satisfy an elevated evidentiary standard under section 27.005(c).” Rehak Creative Servs., Inc., 404 S.W.3d at 725–26, 729 (emphasis added); see e.g., Young v. Krantz, 434 S.W.3d 335 , 343–44 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.); Farias v. Garza, 426 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2014, pet. filed); KBMT Op. Co., LLC v. Toledo, 434 S.W.3d 276, 282 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, pet. filed); Shipp v. Ma | 1 | 1 |
Sierra Club v. Andrews County, Texas, Andrews Industrial Foundation and Andrews Chamber of Commercegreen1 sentence2015In contrast to Lipsky , the court of appeals here concluded that the statute’s “clear and specific evidence” requirement indicated an elevated evidentiary standard that did not permit the use of circumstantial evidence or reasonable inferences to support the plaintiffs prima facie case. 418 S.W.3d 711, 715-16 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2013). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
KB Home Lone Star Inc. v. Charles Gordon & Cynthia Gordon
green
2 sentences2023“Clear and specific evidence requires ‘enough detail to show the factual basis’ of the claim, but it does not: (1) ‘impose an elevated evidentiary standard,’ (2) ‘categorically reject circumstantial evidence,’ or (3) ‘impose a higher burden of proof than that required of the plaintiff at trial.’” KB Home, 629 S.W.3d at 658 (quoting In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 591 ). 2022A prima facie case “‘refers to evidence sufficient as a matter of law to establish a given fact if it is not rebutted or contradicted.’” KB Home, 629 S.W.3d at 658 (quoting In re -7- Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 590 ). | 2 | 2022–2023 |
Rehak Creative Services, Inc. and Robert Rehak v. Ann L. Witt, Ellen Witt, Raymond Witt and Ann Witt Campaign
green
2 sentences2015Texas courts have rejected this approach, almost uniformly recognizing that the “purposeful inclusion of a ‘clear and specific evidence’ requirement [in the Act] indicates that the nonmovant must satisfy an elevated evidentiary standard under section 27.005(c).” Rehak Creative Servs., Inc., 404 S.W.3d at 725–26, 729 (emphasis added); see e.g., Young v. Krantz, 434 S.W.3d 335 , 343–44 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.); Farias v. Garza, 426 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2014, pet. filed); KBMT Op. Co., LLC v. Toledo, 434 S.W.3d 276, 282 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, pet. filed); Shipp v. Ma 2013Rekak Creative Servs., 404 S.W.3d at 726 . | 2 | 2013–2015 |
the Dallas Morning News, Inc. and Steve Blow v. John Tatum and Mary Ann Tatum
green
1 sentence2021Trowe also argues that some of his statements in the posts were not actionable because they were opinions and specifically references his “opinion” that appellees “do not pay employees well,” that “Skydive was not a safe place to jump,” and that its “airplanes were not properly maintained.” “If a statement is not verifiable as false, it is not defamatory.” Dallas Morning News, 554 S.W.3d at 624 (citing Neely v. Wilson, 418 S.W.3d 52, 62 (Tex. 2013)). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Steven Gregory Sloat, Ed Bryan, Church of Scientology International, David J. Lubow, and Monty Drake v. Monique Rathbun
green
1 sentence2021See id. (explaining that prima facie case is “minimum quantum of evidence necessary to support a rational inference that the allegation of fact is true”); Sloat, 513 S.W.3d at 504 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
the Better Business Bureau of Metropolitan Houston, Inc. v. John Moore Services, Inc. and John Moore Renovation, LLC
green
2 sentences2015Although the court in that case does not specifically refer to an “elevated evidentiary standard,” it applies the same standard as the courts that recognize the standard is heightened: “To avoid dismissal of a claim covered by the TCPA, a plaintiff must establish ‘by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in question.’” Id. at 354–55. 2015Texas courts have rejected this approach, almost uniformly recognizing that the “purposeful inclusion of a ‘clear and specific evidence’ requirement [in the Act] indicates that the nonmovant must satisfy an elevated evidentiary standard under section 27.005(c).” Rehak Creative Servs., Inc., 404 S.W.3d at 725–26, 729 (emphasis added); see e.g., Young v. Krantz, 434 S.W.3d 335 , 343–44 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.); Farias v. Garza, 426 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2014, pet. filed); KBMT Op. Co., LLC v. Toledo, 434 S.W.3d 276, 282 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, pet. filed); Shipp v. Ma | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.