60 California opinions name it 3 courts 1980–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2013(College Hospital, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 719, fn. 6, 772-773.) “[A] motion to amend the complaint to state a punitive damages claim under section 425.13(a) must be granted unless, after reviewing the supporting and opposing materials, the court concludes that the allegations made or the evidence adduced in support of the claim, even if credited, are insufficient as a matter of law to support a judgment for punitive damages.” (Id. at p. 720, fn. 6.) Section 425.13 Section 425.13, subdivision (a) 6 “bars inclusion of a punitive damages claim in certain actions against health care providers unl 1996He also states that Pittman’s claim that the clerk was informed that the case was not “at issue” is an “erroneous assertion.” 3 On October 31, 1994, the Supreme Court clarified the evidentiary burden necessary to satisfy section 425.13. “[A] motion to amend the complaint to state a punitive damages claim under section 425.13(a) must be granted unless, after reviewing the supporting and opposing materials, the court concludes that the allegations made or the evidence adduced in support of the claim, even if credited, are insufficient as a matter of law to support a judgment for punitive damages | 4 | 6 |
Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2014Central Pathology construed section 425.13, which requires a plaintiff to establish a substantial probability of recovering punitive damages before alleging a punitive damages claim “[i]n any action for damages arising out of the professional negligence of a health care provider.” (§ 425.13, italics added; Central Pathology, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 184 .) Although section 425.13 regulates punitive damage claims against health care providers and its requirement the claim must arise out of “professional negligence” is similar to MICRA’s “based on professional negligence” requirement, section 425. 2014Central Pathology construed section 425.13, which requires a plaintiff to establish a substantial probability of recovering punitive damages before alleging a punitive damages claim “[i]n any action for damages arising out of the professional negligence of a health care provider.” (§ 425.13, italics added; see Central Pathology, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 184 .) Although section 425.13 regulates punitive damage claims against health care providers and its requirement the claim must arise out of “professional negligence” is similar to MICRA’s “based on professional negligence” requirement, section | 3 | 5 |
Basich v. Allstate Insurancegreen2 sentences2022Co. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1121 [“[o]n a motion for summary adjudication with respect to a punitive damages claim, the higher evidentiary standard applies. 2018Co. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1112 , 1121, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 153 ["on a motion for summary adjudication with respect to a punitive damages claim, the higher evidentiary standard applies. | 3 | 4 |
American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hamptongreen2 sentences2018If the plaintiff is going to prevail on a punitive damages claim, he or she can only do so by establishing malice, oppression or fraud by clear and convincing evidence"].) Under the clear and convincing standard, the evidence must be " ' " 'so clear as to leave no substantial doubt' " ' " and " ' " 'sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.' " ' " ( Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847 , 891, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 364 .) Although the clear and convincing evidentiary standard is a stringent one, "it does not i 2018If the plaintiff is going to prevail on a punitive damages claim, he or she can only do so by establishing malice, oppression or fraud by clear and convincing evidence"].) Under the clear and convincing standard, the evidence must be " ' " 'so clear as to leave no substantial doubt' " ' " and " ' " 'sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.' " ' " ( Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847 , 891, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 364 .) Although the clear and convincing evidentiary standard is a stringent one, "it does not i | 3 | 3 |
Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2018If the plaintiff is going to prevail on a punitive damages claim, he or she can only do so by establishing malice, oppression or fraud by clear and convincing evidence"].) Under the clear and convincing standard, the evidence must be " ' " 'so clear as to leave no substantial doubt' " ' " and " ' " 'sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.' " ' " ( Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847 , 891, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 364 .) Although the clear and convincing evidentiary standard is a stringent one, "it does not i 2018If the plaintiff is going to prevail on a punitive damages claim, he or she can only do so by establishing malice, oppression or fraud by clear and convincing evidence"].) Under the clear and convincing standard, the evidence must be " ' " 'so clear as to leave no substantial doubt' " ' " and " ' " 'sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.' " ' " ( Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847 , 891, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 364 .) Although the clear and convincing evidentiary standard is a stringent one, "it does not i | 3 | 3 |
Jones v. Mariagreen2 sentences2022(See People v. Figueroa (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 665, 684 [defendant could not waive right that had not yet accrued]; Jones v. Maria (1920) 48 Cal.App. 171, 173 [person in position to assert right may waive it by conduct].) III. 2022(See People v. Figueroa (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 665, 684 [defendant could not waive right that had not yet accrued]; Jones v. Maria (1920) 48 Cal.App. 171, 173 [person in position to assert right may waive it by conduct].) III. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Figueroagreen2 sentences2022(See People v. Figueroa (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 665, 684 [defendant could not waive right that had not yet accrued]; Jones v. Maria (1920) 48 Cal.App. 171, 173 [person in position to assert right may waive it by conduct].) III. 2022(See People v. Figueroa (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 665, 684 [defendant could not waive right that had not yet accrued]; Jones v. Maria (1920) 48 Cal.App. 171, 173 [person in position to assert right may waive it by conduct].) III. | 2 | 2 |
J. Alexander Securities, Inc. v. Mendezgreen2 sentences2017(See Alexander Securities, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 1095 [rejecting challenge to punitive damages 20 arbitration award where "[a]ppellant does not claim that it did not have notice of respondent's claim for punitive damages . . ."]; see also Mave, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 1434 [emphasizing the fact of prior notice of requested damage item]; see also Totem Marine Tug & Barge v. North American Towing (5th Cir. 1979) 607 F.2d 649, 651-652 (Totem Marine) [arbitration award vacated where arbitrator awarded "an unrequested item of damages"].) Plaintiffs do not dispute they were required to pr 2017(See Alexander Securities, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 1095 [rejecting challenge to punitive damages arbitration award where “[ajppellant does not claim that it did not have notice of respondent’s claim for punitive damages . . .”]; see also Mave, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 1434 [emphasizing the fact of prior notice of requested damage item]; Totem Marine Tug & Barge v. North American Towing (5th Cir. 1979) 607 F.2d 649, 651-652 (Totem Marine) [arbitration award vacated where arbitrator awarded “an unrequested item of damages”].) Plaintiffs do not dispute they were required to provide reason | 2 | 2 |
Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. North American Towing, Inc.green2 sentences2017(See Alexander Securities, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 1095 [rejecting challenge to punitive damages 20 arbitration award where "[a]ppellant does not claim that it did not have notice of respondent's claim for punitive damages . . ."]; see also Mave, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 1434 [emphasizing the fact of prior notice of requested damage item]; see also Totem Marine Tug & Barge v. North American Towing (5th Cir. 1979) 607 F.2d 649, 651-652 (Totem Marine) [arbitration award vacated where arbitrator awarded "an unrequested item of damages"].) Plaintiffs do not dispute they were required to pr 2017(See Alexander Securities, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 1095 [rejecting challenge to punitive damages arbitration award where “[ajppellant does not claim that it did not have notice of respondent’s claim for punitive damages . . .”]; see also Mave, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 1434 [emphasizing the fact of prior notice of requested damage item]; Totem Marine Tug & Barge v. North American Towing (5th Cir. 1979) 607 F.2d 649, 651-652 (Totem Marine) [arbitration award vacated where arbitrator awarded “an unrequested item of damages”].) Plaintiffs do not dispute they were required to provide reason | 2 | 2 |
Mave Enterprises, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co.green2 sentences2017(See Alexander Securities, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 1095 [rejecting challenge to punitive damages 20 arbitration award where "[a]ppellant does not claim that it did not have notice of respondent's claim for punitive damages . . ."]; see also Mave, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 1434 [emphasizing the fact of prior notice of requested damage item]; see also Totem Marine Tug & Barge v. North American Towing (5th Cir. 1979) 607 F.2d 649, 651-652 (Totem Marine) [arbitration award vacated where arbitrator awarded "an unrequested item of damages"].) Plaintiffs do not dispute they were required to pr 2017(See Alexander Securities, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 1095 [rejecting challenge to punitive damages arbitration award where “[ajppellant does not claim that it did not have notice of respondent’s claim for punitive damages . . .”]; see also Mave, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 1434 [emphasizing the fact of prior notice of requested damage item]; Totem Marine Tug & Barge v. North American Towing (5th Cir. 1979) 607 F.2d 649, 651-652 (Totem Marine) [arbitration award vacated where arbitrator awarded “an unrequested item of damages”].) Plaintiffs do not dispute they were required to provide reason | 2 | 2 |
Stewart v. Truck Insurance Exchangegreen2 sentences2016Exchange (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 468, 482 (Stewart).)5 Thus, the trial court must keep the higher burden of proof in mind in ruling on a motion for directed verdict on a punitive damages claim. 2003Exchange (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 468, 481 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 338 ].) Assuming that the same principle would apply when a new trial on the punitive damages claim is denied, Mr. Barton proceeds to argue the merits of the nonsuit motion. | 2 | 2 |
Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc.green2 sentences2018If the plaintiff is going to prevail on a punitive damages claim, he or she can only do so by establishing malice, oppression or fraud by clear and convincing evidence"].) Under the clear and convincing standard, the evidence must be " ' " 'so clear as to leave no substantial doubt' " ' " and " ' " 'sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.' " ' " ( Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847 , 891, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 364 .) Although the clear and convincing evidentiary standard is a stringent one, "it does not i 2018If the plaintiff is going to prevail on a punitive damages claim, he or she can only do so by establishing malice, oppression or fraud by clear and convincing evidence"].) Under the clear and convincing standard, the evidence must be " ' " 'so clear as to leave no substantial doubt' " ' " and " ' " 'sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.' " ' " ( Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847 , 891, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 364 .) Although the clear and convincing evidentiary standard is a stringent one, "it does not i | 1 | 5 |
Roby v. McKesson Corp.green2 sentences2026(White, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 567 .) However, “it is important to keep in mind that a corporate defendant cannot be punished for harassment merely because one of its employees has harassed another employee in the workplace; rather, the focus of the punitive damages inquiry must be on the corporation’s individual responsibility, if any, for that harassment.” (Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 714 (Roby).) Indeed, the Supreme Court reiterated in Roby that when “we spoke in White about persons having ‘discretionary authority over . . . corporate policy’ [citation], we were referring 2020(Roby, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 686 .) Before we delve into the analysis, however, we must address U.S. Bank’s argument that the punitive damages analysis should not include the $200,000 awarded for the breach of the implied covenant claim. | 1 | 3 |
Goodstein v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2008The adverse impact of such a tardy assertion on both trial preparation and settlement negotiations is obvious.’ ” (Goodstein, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 1642 .) Goodstein crafted a narrow exception to the statutory deadline. 2004(Goodstein v. Superior Court (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1642 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 459 ].) As discussed, however, in any Elder Abuse Act action issues of egregious conduct are by definition always present, so a defendant has the relevant notice from the outset. | 1 | 2 |
Community Care & Rehabilitation Center v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2001As long as a criminal charge is pending or could still be filed, as long as a criminal judgment is stayed, the potential for open-ended civil litigation would remain.” To avoid this result, Guardian urges that the MICRA statute of limitations must apply, in the same way that the procedural limitations of section 425.13 have been held to apply to a punitive damages claim against a health care provider in an action that alleges intentional torts (Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 181, 191-192 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 208 , 832 P.2d 924 ]) or civil elder ab 2001As long as a criminal charge is pending or could still be filed, as long as a criminal judgment is stayed, the potential for open-ended civil litigation would remain.” To avoid this result, Guardian urges that the MICRA statute of limitations must apply, in the same way that the procedural limitations of section 425.13 have been held to apply to a punitive damages claim against a health care provider in an action that alleges intentional torts (Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 181, 191-192 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 208 , 832 P.2d 924 ]) or civil elder ab | 1 | 2 |
Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwellgreen1 sentence2022(See Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1241 [“Punitive damages are recoverable in those fraud actions involving intentional, but not negligent, misrepresentations.”]; Branch v. Homefed Bank (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 793, 799 [no punitive damages recoverable for negligent misrepresentation]; see also § 3294, subd. (c)(3) [referring to a “fact known to the defendant” to describe fraud].) Newnes’s punitive damages claim fares no better if we consider the sources of evidence Newnes identified after the 1 It is conceivable that, under different circumstances, evidence suggesting | 1 | 1 |
Branch v. Homefed Bankgreen1 sentence2022(See Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1241 [“Punitive damages are recoverable in those fraud actions involving intentional, but not negligent, misrepresentations.”]; Branch v. Homefed Bank (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 793, 799 [no punitive damages recoverable for negligent misrepresentation]; see also § 3294, subd. (c)(3) [referring to a “fact known to the defendant” to describe fraud].) Newnes’s punitive damages claim fares no better if we consider the sources of evidence Newnes identified after the 1 It is conceivable that, under different circumstances, evidence suggesting | 1 | 1 |
| Grieves v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Laws v. County of San Diegogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sanchez v. Claytongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Planned Protective Services, Inc. v. Gortongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Musser v. Provenchergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Martin v. Szetogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Le Francois v. Goelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Campbellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Reader's Digest Assn. v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Michael McCarthy Arthur Waskow v. Richard G. Kleindienstgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Calatayud v. State of Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| PPG Industries, Inc. v. Transamerica Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dorado v. Knudsen Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Looney v. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES CTY.green | 1 | 1 |
| Castro v. Higakigreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wilcox v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Coyne v. Krempelsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Orsetti v. City of Fremontgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc.
green
2 sentences2021(See Pfeifer, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1289-1290 [the jury could apportion the defendant a greater share of liability compared to the Navy because “the evidence supported the inference that [the defendant] was consciously indifferent to the dangers that its products posed to consumers [citation], while the Navy was merely negligent regarding those dangers”].) Pointing out that the trial court granted a motion by Copeland for summary adjudication on the Phippses’ punitive damages claim, Copeland argues permitting the jury to increase its share of liability based on “moral blameworthiness” 2021(See Pfeifer, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1289-1290 [the jury could apportion the defendant a greater share of liability compared to the Navy because “the evidence supported the inference that [the defendant] was consciously indifferent to the dangers that its products posed to consumers [citation], while the Navy was merely negligent regarding those dangers”].) Pointing out that the trial court granted a motion by Copeland for summary adjudication on the Phippses’ punitive damages claim, Copeland argues permitting the jury to increase its share of liability based on “moral blameworthiness” | 3 | 2020–2021 |
Silberg v. California Life Insurance
green
2 sentences2022Co. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 452, 462 .) The Espinozas had more than 18 months between the complaint filing date (Oct. 21, 2019) and the statutory nine-month deadline (Apr. 28, 2021) to gather the evidence needed to support a motion to amend the complaint to add a punitive damages claim. 2022Co. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 452, 462 .) The Espinozas had more than 18 months between the complaint filing date (Oct. 21, 2019) and the statutory nine-month deadline (Apr. 28, 2021) to gather the evidence needed to support a motion to amend the complaint to add a punitive damages claim. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Freedman v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2022They “could have filed a timely motion” and “simply did not.” (Freedman, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 205 .) In another effort to excuse their noncompliance with the statutory time requirements, the Espinozas argue in their return that the trial court’s order 20 granting their motion to amend the complaint to add a claim for punitive damages may be upheld because their “lawsuit is a far cry [from] the ‘meritless punitive damage[s] claims’ . . . section 425.13 was intended to root out,” and they satisfied the statutory requirement of showing “a substantial probability that [they] will prevail o 2022They “could have filed a timely motion” and “simply did not.” (Freedman, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 205 .) In another effort to excuse their noncompliance with the statutory time requirements, the Espinozas argue in their return that the trial court’s order 20 granting their motion to amend the complaint to add a claim for punitive damages may be upheld because their “lawsuit is a far cry [from] the ‘meritless punitive damage[s] claims’ . . . section 425.13 was intended to root out,” and they satisfied the statutory requirement of showing “a substantial probability that [they] will prevail o | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Johnson v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2022(Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center v. Superior Court (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 828, 835 ; Cryolife, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 1157 ; Johnson v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 869, 883 .) Having examined the allegations, we conclude section 425.13 applies to the Espinozas’ punitive damages claim for the reasons set out below. 2022(Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center v. Superior Court (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 828, 835 ; Cryolife, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 1157 ; Johnson v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 869, 883 .) Having examined the allegations, we conclude section 425.13 applies to the Espinozas’ punitive damages claim for the reasons set out below. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Cryolife, Inc. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2022(Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center v. Superior Court (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 828, 835 ; Cryolife, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 1157 ; Johnson v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 869, 883 .) Having examined the allegations, we conclude section 425.13 applies to the Espinozas’ punitive damages claim for the reasons set out below. 2022(Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center v. Superior Court (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 828, 835 ; Cryolife, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 1157 ; Johnson v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 869, 883 .) Having examined the allegations, we conclude section 425.13 applies to the Espinozas’ punitive damages claim for the reasons set out below. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2022(Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center v. Superior Court (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 828, 835 ; Cryolife, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 1157 ; Johnson v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 869, 883 .) Having examined the allegations, we conclude section 425.13 applies to the Espinozas’ punitive damages claim for the reasons set out below. 2022(Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center v. Superior Court (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 828, 835 ; Cryolife, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 1157 ; Johnson v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 869, 883 .) Having examined the allegations, we conclude section 425.13 applies to the Espinozas’ punitive damages claim for the reasons set out below. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc.
green
2 sentences2021(Colucci v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 442 , 455.) Copeland also argues permitting the jury to consider 22 relative culpability in apportioning fault conflicts with “Proposition 51, which ‘shields every “defendant” from any share of noneconomic damages beyond that attributable to his or her own comparative fault’” (quoting DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 602 ).8 But that argument begs the question: As discussed, a defendant’s comparative fault includes its relative culpability. 2021(Colucci v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 442 , 455.) Copeland also argues permitting the jury to consider 22 relative culpability in apportioning fault conflicts with “Proposition 51, which ‘shields every “defendant” from any share of noneconomic damages beyond that attributable to his or her own comparative fault’” (quoting DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 602 ).8 But that argument begs the question: As discussed, a defendant’s comparative fault includes its relative culpability. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Hanna v. Sweeney
green
2 sentences1980“In this state the common-law doctrine of punitive damages. .if it ever did prevail, prevails no longer.” (Hanna v. Sweeney (1906) 78 Conn. 492 [ 62 A. 785 ].) Massachusetts. 1980“In this state the common-law doctrine of punitive damages. .if it ever did prevail, prevails no longer.” (Hanna v. Sweeney (1906) 78 Conn. 492 [ 62 A. 785 ].) Massachusetts. | 2 | 1980–1980 |
O'REILLY v. Curtis Pub. Co.
green
2 sentences1980"Recovery of [punitive] damages [is] not permitted in Massachusetts." ( O'Reilly v. Curtis Publishing Co. (D.Mass. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 364 .) *764 New Hampshire. 1980“Recovery of [punitive] damages [is] not permitted in Massachusetts.” (O’Reilly v. Curtis Publishing Co. (D.Mass. 1940) 31 F.Supp. 364 .) New Hampshire. | 2 | 1980–1980 |
Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer
green
2 sentences1980It seems to us that a practice which leads to so much confusion and uncertainty in the administration of the law, and that is always Hable to lead to injustice, the correction of which is impracticable, cannot be too speedily eradicated from our system of jurisprudence.” (Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer (1891) 2 Wash. 45 [ 25 P. 1072, 1073-1074 ].) A petition for a rehearing was denied October 29, 1980, and the petitions of plaintiffs and respondents and appellant for a hearing by the Supreme Court were denied December 10, 1980. 1980It seems to us that a practice which leads to so much confusion and uncertainty in the administration of the law, and that is always Hable to lead to injustice, the correction of which is impracticable, cannot be too speedily eradicated from our system of jurisprudence.” (Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer (1891) 2 Wash. 45 [ 25 P. 1072, 1073-1074 ].) A petition for a rehearing was denied October 29, 1980, and the petitions of plaintiffs and respondents and appellant for a hearing by the Supreme Court were denied December 10, 1980. | 2 | 1980–1980 |
White v. Ultramar, Inc.
green
1 sentence2026(White, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 567 .) However, “it is important to keep in mind that a corporate defendant cannot be punished for harassment merely because one of its employees has harassed another employee in the workplace; rather, the focus of the punitive damages inquiry must be on the corporation’s individual responsibility, if any, for that harassment.” (Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 714 (Roby).) Indeed, the Supreme Court reiterated in Roby that when “we spoke in White about persons having ‘discretionary authority over . . . corporate policy’ [citation], we were referring | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Davis v. Kiewit Pacific CA4/1
green
1 sentence2022The declarations do not contain sufficient descriptions of the individuals’ job duties and responsibilities to support a reasonable inference that the declarants do not have “ ‘substantial discretionary authority over [significant] aspects of [GEICO’s] business.’ ” (See Davis, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at pp. 369-370.) Yet, even if we were to assume that Bond’s and Gallimore’s declarations passed muster under White and Davis, there remain sufficient disputed material facts on the record before us that make summary judgment on the punitive damages claim unwarranted. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
CRST, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County
green
1 sentence2022In determining whether an individual is a managing agent for purposes of establishing liability for punitive damages, “[t]he key inquiry . . . concerns the employee’s authority to change or establish corporate policy.” (CRST, Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1255, 1273 .) Here, GEICO has stated that its policy is to provide a different fleet vehicle in response to a request for accommodation only if there is medical documentation expressly supporting such a request. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Emerald Aero, LLC v. Kaplan green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| West v. Johnson & Johnson Products, Inc. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Cyrus v. Haveson green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Tudor Ranches, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Tomaselli v. Transamerica Insurance green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Red Mountain, LLC v. Fallbrook Public Utility District green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Zelig v. County of Los Angeles green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| McGee v. Bruce Hospital System green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Hoch v. Allied-Signal, Inc. green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Kleinwort Benson North America, Inc. v. Quantum Financial Services, Inc. green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Hernandez v. City of Pomona green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Trinkle v. California State Lottery green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club v. Narula green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Lazar v. Hertz Corp. green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Williams v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Rowe v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Cappetta v. Lippman green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Hudson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Monica Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Finberg v. Sullivan green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| cluster 393731 green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Howard Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| cluster 425954 green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Adamson v. Bowen green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.