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11 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1996–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
JWCF, LP v. Steven Farruggiagreen2 sentences2026Va. 417, 428, 427 , 752 S.E.2d 571, 581 (2013).5 Here, the circuit court emphasized that the standard of clear and convincing evidence supporting a punitive damages claim differed from the preponderance of the evidence standard required to support claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process. 2026Va. 417, 428, 427 , 752 S.E.2d 571, 581 (2013).5 Here, the circuit court emphasized that the standard of clear and convincing evidence supporting a punitive damages claim differed from the preponderance of the evidence standard required to support claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process. | 2 | 2 |
Peters v. Petersgreen1 sentence2023See supra note 6. 11 The proposed instructions are set forth and discussed infra in greater detail. 8 Va. 56 , 443 S.E.2d 213 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
Voelker v. Frederick Business Properties Co.green2 sentences1997See syl. pt. 4, Voelker v. Frederick Business Properties Co. 195 W.Va. 246 , 465 S.E.2d 246 (1995). 1997See syl. pt. 4, Voelker v. Frederick Business Properties Co. 195 W.Va. 246 , 465 S.E.2d 246 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Enstar Group, Inc. v. Grassgreengreen1 sentence1996Notably, in Enstar Group, Inc. v. Grassgreen, 812 F.Supp. 1562, 1583 (M.D.Ala. 1993), the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama was compelled to follow the current Alabama law that “punitive damages cannot be apportioned among joint tortfeasors according to fault and that a settlement of a punitive damages claim by one joint tortfeasor must be credited against a subsequent punitive award against the other tortfeasor. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014In Quicken I, one of the petitioner’s most significant assignments of error was that the punitive damages award was “grossly excessive and deprived Quicken Loans of due process.” Without addressing, the merits of the punitive damages challenge, the Quicken I Court merely remanded for an order compliant with Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 186 W.Va. 656 , 413 S.E.2d 897 (1991). 2014In Quicken I, one of the petitioner’s most significant assignments of error was that the punitive damages award was “grossly excessive and deprived Quicken Loans of due process.” Without addressing, the merits of the punitive damages challenge, the Quicken I Court merely remanded for an order compliant with Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 186 W.Va. 656 , 413 S.E.2d 897 (1991). | 4 | 2010–2014 |
Vandevender v. Sheetz, Inc.
green
2 sentences2010Subsequent to BMW, in a case styled Vandevender v. Sheetz, Inc., 200 W.Va. 591 , 490 S.E.2d 678 (1997) (per curiam), this Court reexamined the punitive damages analysis established in Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 186 W.Va. 656 , 413 S.E.2d 897 , and concluded that the Garnes analysis satisfied the requirements of BMW. 2010Subsequent to BMW, in a case styled Vandevender v. Sheetz, Inc., 200 W.Va. 591 , 490 S.E.2d 678 (1997) (per curiam), this Court reexamined the punitive damages analysis established in Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 186 W.Va. 656 , 413 S.E.2d 897 , and concluded that the Garnes analysis satisfied the requirements of BMW. | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Quicken Loans, Inc. v. Brown
green
2 sentences2014Quicken I, 230 W.Va. at 330 , 737 S.E.2d at 664 . 2014Quicken I, 230 W.Va. at 330 , 737 S.E.2d at 664 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
green
2 sentences1998Allstate contends that the punitive damages standard applicable to first-party claims under W.Va.Code § 33-11-4(9) is the "actual malice" standard which was first articulated by this Court in Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty, 177 W.Va. 323 , 352 S.E.2d 73 (1986). 1998Allstate contends that the punitive damages standard applicable to first-party claims under W.Va.Code § 33-11-4(9) is the "actual malice" standard which was first articulated by this Court in Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty, 177 W.Va. 323 , 352 S.E.2d 73 (1986). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Harless v. First National Bank in Fairmont
green
2 sentences1997This Court first recognized the tort of outrage in syllabus point 6 of Harless, supra: “One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.” “[T]he hallmark of this tort ... is intentional and outrageous conduct.” Harless, 169 W.Va. at 695 , 289 S.E.2d at 704 . 1997This Court first recognized the tort of outrage in syllabus point 6 of Harless, supra: “One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.” “[T]he hallmark of this tort ... is intentional and outrageous conduct.” Harless, 169 W.Va. at 695 , 289 S.E.2d at 704 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Dzinglski v. Weirton Steel Corp.
green
2 sentences1997Punitive Damages In its second cross-assignment of error, Ashland asserts that the circuit court wrongly failed to dismiss the appellants’ punitive damages claim. 8 Ashland argues that claims for punitive damages are not recoverable as a matter of law in this case, and bases its argument on Dzinglski v. Weirton Steel Corp., 191 W.Va. 278 , 445 S.E.2d 219 (1994) where this Court did not allow punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages for the tort of outrageous conduct where there was no physical injury, holding that “damages awarded for tort of outrageous conduct are essentially puni 1997Punitive Damages In its second cross-assignment of error, Ashland asserts that the circuit court wrongly failed to dismiss the appellants’ punitive damages claim. 8 Ashland argues that claims for punitive damages are not recoverable as a matter of law in this case, and bases its argument on Dzinglski v. Weirton Steel Corp., 191 W.Va. 278 , 445 S.E.2d 219 (1994) where this Court did not allow punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages for the tort of outrageous conduct where there was no physical injury, holding that “damages awarded for tort of outrageous conduct are essentially puni | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Black Belt Wood Co., Inc. v. Sessions
green
1 sentence1996Tatum v. Schering Corp., 523 So.2d 1042 (Ala.1988); Black Belt Wood Co. v. Sessions, 514 So.2d 1249 (Ala.1986).” In a telling footnote, however, the court expressed its reluctance and disapproval: “Since punitive damages are meant to punish the defendant for his wrongdoing and to deter others from similar wrongdoing rather than to compensate the plaintiff, it is illogical to say that joint tort-feasors are jointly liable for punitive damages regardless of the degree of their individual fault simply because all contributed to the same injury.... [h]owever, the court considers itself bound by th | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Tatum v. Schering Corp.
green
2 sentences1996Tatum v. Schering Corp., 523 So.2d 1042 (Ala.1988); Black Belt Wood Co. v. Sessions, 514 So.2d 1249 (Ala.1986).” In a telling footnote, however, the court expressed its reluctance and disapproval: “Since punitive damages are meant to punish the defendant for his wrongdoing and to deter others from similar wrongdoing rather than to compensate the plaintiff, it is illogical to say that joint tort-feasors are jointly liable for punitive damages regardless of the degree of their individual fault simply because all contributed to the same injury.... [h]owever, the court considers itself bound by th 1996Tatum v. Schering Corp., 523 So.2d 1042 (Ala.1988); Black Belt Wood Co. v. Sessions, 514 So.2d 1249 (Ala.1986).” In a telling footnote, however, the court expressed its reluctance and disapproval: “Since punitive damages are meant to punish the defendant for his wrongdoing and to deter others from similar wrongdoing rather than to compensate the plaintiff, it is illogical to say that joint tort-feasors are jointly liable for punitive damages regardless of the degree of their individual fault simply because all contributed to the same injury.... [h]owever, the court considers itself bound by th | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.