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8 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Nobrega v. Edison Glen Associatesgreen2 sentences2012See Nobrega v. Edison Glen Assocs., 167 N.J. 520, 536 , 772 A.2d 368 (2001) (holding that, absent evidence of a contrary intention, the words of a statute should be given their ordinary meaning). 2012See Nobrega v. Edison Glen Assocs., 167 N.J. 520, 536 , 772 A.2d 368 (2001) (holding that, absent evidence of a contrary intention, the words of a statute should be given their ordinary meaning). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Andrewsgreen1 sentence2020The trial court rejected Andrews’s arguments but limited access to Andrews’s cellphones “to that which is contained within (1) the ‘Phone’ icon and application on Andrews’s two iPhones, and (2) the ‘Messages’ icon and/or text messaging applications used by Andrews during his communications with Lowery.” The court also ordered that the search “be performed by the State, in camera, in the presence of Andrews’s defense counsel and the [c]ourt,” with the court “review[ing] the PIN or passcode prior to its disclosure to the State.” The Appellate Division affirmed. 457 N.J. Super. 14, 18 (App. Div. | 1 | 1 |
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinsongreen2 sentences1992See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 78 , 106 S.Ct. at 2411 , 91 L.Ed. 2d at 66 (Marshall, J. concurring). 1992See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 78 , 106 S.Ct. at 2411 , 91 L.Ed. 2d at 66 (Marshall, J. concurring). | 1 | 1 |
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.green2 sentences1992In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 , 91 S.Ct. 849, 854 , 28 L.Ed. 2d 158, 165 (1971), the Supreme Court observed that "Congress directed the thrust of [Title VII] to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation." Similarly, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 349 , 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1861 , 52 L.Ed. 2d 396, 423 (1977), the Court stated that "a prima facie Title VII violation may be established by policies or practices that are neutral on their face and in intent but that nonetheless discriminate in effect against a particular 1992In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 , 91 S.Ct. 849, 854 , 28 L.Ed. 2d 158, 165 (1971), the Supreme Court observed that "Congress directed the thrust of [Title VII] to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation." Similarly, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 349 , 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1861 , 52 L.Ed. 2d 396, 423 (1977), the Court stated that "a prima facie Title VII violation may be established by policies or practices that are neutral on their face and in intent but that nonetheless discriminate in effect against a particular | 1 | 1 |
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1992In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 , 91 S.Ct. 849, 854 , 28 L.Ed. 2d 158, 165 (1971), the Supreme Court observed that "Congress directed the thrust of [Title VII] to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation." Similarly, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 349 , 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1861 , 52 L.Ed. 2d 396, 423 (1977), the Court stated that "a prima facie Title VII violation may be established by policies or practices that are neutral on their face and in intent but that nonetheless discriminate in effect against a particular 1992In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 , 91 S.Ct. 849, 854 , 28 L.Ed. 2d 158, 165 (1971), the Supreme Court observed that "Congress directed the thrust of [Title VII] to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation." Similarly, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 349 , 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1861 , 52 L.Ed. 2d 396, 423 (1977), the Court stated that "a prima facie Title VII violation may be established by policies or practices that are neutral on their face and in intent but that nonetheless discriminate in effect against a particular | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Js v. Jf
green
2 sentences2020We therefore have cautioned against rigidly applying the Andrews factors, recommending trial judges "consider the parties' own understanding of their relationship as colored by socio-economic and generational influences." Ibid. 2020We therefore have cautioned against rigidly applying the Andrews factors, recommending trial judges "consider the parties' own understanding of their relationship as colored by socio-economic and generational influences." Ibid. | 2 | 2017–2020 |
Andrews v. Rutherford
green
2 sentences2012Prior to the night in question, there was no “ongoing expectation ] with respect to the relationship,” and the parties did not “demonstrate an affirmation of their relationship before others by statement or conduct.” Andrews, supra, 363 N.J.Super. at 260 , 832 A.2d 379 . 11 In short, the parties’ interaction on the evening in question, prior to the assault, may arguably be viewed as a date but there had been no previous dates and, thus, no “dating relationship.” To take a more expansive view of the circumstances would lead to the unwarranted possibility that the Act would apply “where two peop 2012Prior to the night in question, there was no “ongoing expectation ] with respect to the relationship,” and the parties did not “demonstrate an affirmation of their relationship before others by statement or conduct.” Andrews, supra, 363 N.J.Super. at 260 , 832 A.2d 379 . 11 In short, the parties’ interaction on the evening in question, prior to the assault, may arguably be viewed as a date but there had been no previous dates and, thus, no “dating relationship.” To take a more expansive view of the circumstances would lead to the unwarranted possibility that the Act would apply “where two peop | 2 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Andrews
neutral
1 sentence2020State v. Andrews, 230 N.J. 553 (2017). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Sk v. Jh
green
2 sentences2017In S.K. v. J.H. , 426 N.J. 2017In S.K. v. J.H. , 426 N.J. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Iris McKinney v. Honorable Elizabeth Dole, Secretary of Transportation
red
1 sentence1992However, I reiterate, as discussed on page 649 of this opinion, that section 1604.11(a)(3) should not be read to limit hostile work environment sex discrimination to sexual advances or other conduct of a sexual nature but rather to extend to "any harassment or other unequal treatment of an employee ... that would not occur but for the sex of the employee." McKinney v. Dole, supra, 765 F. 2d at 1138 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Polk v. Cherry Hill Apartments, Inc.
neutral
1 sentence1992For example, in Polk v. Cherry Hill Apartments, Inc., 118 N.J. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
cluster 536506
green
2 sentences1992Initially, we note that we do not agree with the trial judge's application of the first prong of the Andrews test which provides: "[T]he employees suffered intentional discrimination because of their sex." Id. 1992Initially, we note that we do not agree with the trial judge's application of the first prong of the Andrews test which provides: "[T]he employees suffered intentional discrimination because of their sex." Id. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Kerry Ellison v. Nicholas F. Brady, Secretary of the Treasury
green
2 sentences1992Contrary to the trial judge's assertion, we find no requirement under either Andrews or Ellison that "the evidence ... indicate that Baylous' vulgarity affected the totality of the work environment." 924 F. 2d at 878 . ("It is the harasser's conduct which must be pervasive or severe, not the alteration in the conditions of employment.") After applying the third prong of the Andrews test, the trial judge found plaintiff to have been detrimentally affected by defendant's conduct. 1992Contrary to the trial judge's assertion, we find no requirement under either Andrews or Ellison that "the evidence ... indicate that Baylous' vulgarity affected the totality of the work environment." 924 F. 2d at 878 . ("It is the harasser's conduct which must be pervasive or severe, not the alteration in the conditions of employment.") After applying the third prong of the Andrews test, the trial judge found plaintiff to have been detrimentally affected by defendant's conduct. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Mahler v. Board of Adjustment of Borough of Fair Lawn
green
2 sentences1977Super. 173, 184 (App. Div. 1967) aff'd o.b. 55 N.J. 1 (1969), where the court drew a distinction between "uses of an institutional dimension", and others, which, while serving the general welfare in a general sense, were not as vital to the public interest as the former. [5] The breadth and amorphousness of our "special reasons" d. variance under the Andrews doctrine has drawn authoritative criticism. 1977Super. 173, 184 (App. Div. 1967) aff'd o.b. 55 N.J. 1 (1969), where the court drew a distinction between "uses of an institutional dimension", and others, which, while serving the general welfare in a general sense, were not as vital to the public interest as the former. [5] The breadth and amorphousness of our "special reasons" d. variance under the Andrews doctrine has drawn authoritative criticism. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.