8 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1917–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Lucerogreen2 sentences2020See, e.g., State v. Lucero, 2017-NMSC-008, ¶¶ 28-32 , 389 P.3d 1039 (agreeing “that a conviction of intentional child endangerment would be suspect if it were based on proof of some intentional act that accidentally (or even recklessly) placed [a child] in a dangerous situation[,]” but holding that an elements instruction requiring the jury to find that the defendant had “acted intentionally,” separately defined as “purposely do[ing] an act,” was not “incomplete” and did not “permit[] such a result”); Ramos, 2013-NMSC-031, ¶ 38 (Maes, C.J., dissenting) (“Although [UJI 14-141] requires a showin 2020Cf. Lucero, 2017-NMSC-008, ¶¶ 33-39 (indicating in dicta that any error in the correctly-given intent instruction was harmless because the state had “never flinched from its early decision to prove to the jury that [the d]efendant had intentionally, violently abused [the victim], resulting in her death”); Magby, 1998- NMSC-042, ¶ 21 (noting that the state had conceded error in the district court’s giving of the general intent instruction where the state’s sole theory throughout trial had been that the defendant’s conduct was negligent). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ramosgreen1 sentence2020See, e.g., State v. Lucero, 2017-NMSC-008, ¶¶ 28-32 , 389 P.3d 1039 (agreeing “that a conviction of intentional child endangerment would be suspect if it were based on proof of some intentional act that accidentally (or even recklessly) placed [a child] in a dangerous situation[,]” but holding that an elements instruction requiring the jury to find that the defendant had “acted intentionally,” separately defined as “purposely do[ing] an act,” was not “incomplete” and did not “permit[] such a result”); Ramos, 2013-NMSC-031, ¶ 38 (Maes, C.J., dissenting) (“Although [UJI 14-141] requires a showin | 1 | 1 |
Kelley v. Marrongreen2 sentences2009We agree with Defendants. {6} In Kelley v. Marron, our Supreme Court considered an argument identical to that of Plaintiffs. 21 N.M. 239, 241 , 153 P. 262, 262 (1915). 2009We agree with Defendants. {6} In Kelley v. Marron, our Supreme Court considered an argument identical to that of Plaintiffs. 21 N.M. 239, 241 , 153 P. 262, 262 (1915). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2002Accordingly, we respectfully disagree with the dissent's reasoning on this point. {17} "In determining whether a statement is sufficiently trustworthy the statement must be inherently reliable at the time it is made." State v. Williams, 117 N.M. 551, 561 , 874 P.2d 12, 22 (1994). 2002Accordingly, we respectfully disagree with the dissent's reasoning on this point. {17} "In determining whether a statement is sufficiently trustworthy the statement must be inherently reliable at the time it is made." State v. Williams, 117 N.M. 551, 561 , 874 P.2d 12, 22 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Bailey
green
2 sentences2023Boyette, 2008-NMSC- 16 030, ¶¶ 17-21 (“[D]efense of habitation justifies killing an intruder who is assaulting 17 the defendant’s home with the intent of reaching its occupants and committing a 18 felony against them . . . [and] allows one to kill to prevent an intruder’s forced 19 entry.”); State v. Couch, 1946-NMSC-047 , ¶¶ 28-30, 52 N.M. 127 , 193 P.2d 405 12 1 (Defense-of-habitation doctrine “gives the householder the right to kill the 2 aggressor, if such killing is necessary or apparently necessary to prevent or repel the 3 felonious aggression . . . [and] gives the householder the right 2023Boyette, 2008-NMSC- 16 030, ¶¶ 17-21 (“[D]efense of habitation justifies killing an intruder who is assaulting 17 the defendant’s home with the intent of reaching its occupants and committing a 18 felony against them . . . [and] allows one to kill to prevent an intruder’s forced 19 entry.”); State v. Couch, 1946-NMSC-047 , ¶¶ 28-30, 52 N.M. 127 , 193 P.2d 405 12 1 (Defense-of-habitation doctrine “gives the householder the right to kill the 2 aggressor, if such killing is necessary or apparently necessary to prevent or repel the 3 felonious aggression . . . [and] gives the householder the right | 3 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Couch
green
2 sentences2023Boyette, 2008-NMSC- 16 030, ¶¶ 17-21 (“[D]efense of habitation justifies killing an intruder who is assaulting 17 the defendant’s home with the intent of reaching its occupants and committing a 18 felony against them . . . [and] allows one to kill to prevent an intruder’s forced 19 entry.”); State v. Couch, 1946-NMSC-047 , ¶¶ 28-30, 52 N.M. 127 , 193 P.2d 405 12 1 (Defense-of-habitation doctrine “gives the householder the right to kill the 2 aggressor, if such killing is necessary or apparently necessary to prevent or repel the 3 felonious aggression . . . [and] gives the householder the right 2023Boyette, 2008-NMSC- 16 030, ¶¶ 17-21 (“[D]efense of habitation justifies killing an intruder who is assaulting 17 the defendant’s home with the intent of reaching its occupants and committing a 18 felony against them . . . [and] allows one to kill to prevent an intruder’s forced 19 entry.”); State v. Couch, 1946-NMSC-047 , ¶¶ 28-30, 52 N.M. 127 , 193 P.2d 405 12 1 (Defense-of-habitation doctrine “gives the householder the right to kill the 2 aggressor, if such killing is necessary or apparently necessary to prevent or repel the 3 felonious aggression . . . [and] gives the householder the right | 3 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Southworth
green
2 sentences2023Boyette, 2008-NMSC- 030, ¶¶ 17-21 (“[D]efense of habitation justifies killing an intruder who is assaulting the defendant’s home with the intent of reaching its occupants and committing a felony against them . . . [and] allows one to kill to prevent an intruder’s forced entry.”); State v. Couch, 1946-NMSC-047 , ¶¶ 28-30, 52 N.M. 127 , 193 P.2d 405 (Defense-of-habitation doctrine “gives the householder the right to kill the aggressor, if such killing is necessary or apparently necessary to prevent or repel the felonious aggression . . . [and] gives the householder the right to meet force with f 2023Boyette, 2008-NMSC- 16 030, ¶¶ 17-21 (“[D]efense of habitation justifies killing an intruder who is assaulting 17 the defendant’s home with the intent of reaching its occupants and committing a 18 felony against them . . . [and] allows one to kill to prevent an intruder’s forced 19 entry.”); State v. Couch, 1946-NMSC-047 , ¶¶ 28-30, 52 N.M. 127 , 193 P.2d 405 12 1 (Defense-of-habitation doctrine “gives the householder the right to kill the 2 aggressor, if such killing is necessary or apparently necessary to prevent or repel the 3 felonious aggression . . . [and] gives the householder the right | 3 | 2023–2023 |
Colorado v. Connelly
green
2 sentences1990The state relies on Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 , 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986), which held that “coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 167 , 107 S.Ct. at 522 . 1990The state relies on Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 , 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986), which held that “coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 167 , 107 S.Ct. at 522 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
James v. Hood
green
1 sentence1917In the case of James v. Hood, 19 N. M. 234, 142 Pac. 162 , this court held that it was the duty of counsel to point out specifically the instruction excepted to and the ground upon which the exception is based in advance of the reading of the instruction to the jury in order to avoid the expense and trouble of a second trial. | 1 | 1917–1917 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.