reading exception in Michigan

2014A few of the more disturbing accusations are as follows: • There are 973 students enrolled in the HPSD; • 65% of fourth grade students tested below “proficient” on the Michigan Educational Assessment Program (MEAP) Reading test and 87% scored below “proficient” on the MEAP math test;2 • 75% of seventh grade students scored below “proficient” on the MEAP Reading test and 93% scored below “proficient” on the MEAP Math test; • At the high school level, 90% of students failed the Michigan Merit Examination3 Reading test; 97% failed the Math test; 94% failed the Writing test; 100% failed the Social

2014A few of the more disturbing accusations are as follows: • There are 973 students enrolled in the HPSD; • 65% of fourth grade students tested below “proficient” on the Michigan Educational Assessment Program (MEAP) Reading test and 87% scored below “proficient” on the MEAP math test;2 • 75% of seventh grade students scored below “proficient” on the MEAP Reading test and 93% scored below “proficient” on the MEAP Math test; • At the high school level, 90% of students failed the Michigan Merit Examination3 Reading test; 97% failed the Math test; 94% failed the Writing test; 100% failed the Social

2004The Court noted that the Legislature had reacted to the Falcon decision by enacting MCL 600.2912a(2), but, although the Court set forth the statute in a footnote ( Weymers, supra at 649 n 14), the Court did not base its holding in Weymers on a reading or analysis of the statute.

1997Note, however, the different interpretation provided in Bolton v Jones, 156 Mich App 642, 652-654 ; 401 NW2d 894 (1986), vacated and remanded 431 Mich 856 (1988), (On Remand) 173 Mich App 725 ; 434 NW2d 415 (1988), reversed on other grounds 433 Mich 861 (1989). 31 We express no opinion about whether Mr. Daoud established that there was an extrinsic fraud that prevented him from effectively contesting the termination of his parental rights in an adversarial proceeding, or whether such a fraud would allow him to bring an independent action for money damages.

1997Note, however, the different interpretation provided in Bolton v Jones, 156 Mich App 642, 652-654 ; 401 NW2d 894 (1986), vacated and remanded 431 Mich 856 (1988), (On Remand) 173 Mich App 725 ; 434 NW2d 415 (1988), reversed on other grounds 433 Mich 861 (1989). 31 We express no opinion about whether Mr. Daoud established that there was an extrinsic fraud that prevented him from effectively contesting the termination of his parental rights in an adversarial proceeding, or whether such a fraud would allow him to bring an independent action for money damages.

1997Note, however, the different interpretation provided in Bolton v Jones, 156 Mich App 642, 652-654 ; 401 NW2d 894 (1986), vacated and remanded 431 Mich 856 (1988), (On Remand) 173 Mich App 725 ; 434 NW2d 415 (1988), reversed on other grounds 433 Mich 861 (1989). 31 We express no opinion about whether Mr. Daoud established that there was an extrinsic fraud that prevented him from effectively contesting the termination of his parental rights in an adversarial proceeding, or whether such a fraud would allow him to bring an independent action for money damages.

1997Note, however, the different interpretation provided in Bolton v Jones, 156 Mich App 642, 652-654 ; 401 NW2d 894 (1986), vacated and remanded 431 Mich 856 (1988), (On Remand) 173 Mich App 725 ; 434 NW2d 415 (1988), reversed on other grounds 433 Mich 861 (1989). 31 We express no opinion about whether Mr. Daoud established that there was an extrinsic fraud that prevented him from effectively contesting the termination of his parental rights in an adversarial proceeding, or whether such a fraud would allow him to bring an independent action for money damages.

1996This interpretation is consistent with a narrow reading of the exception, with the results in both Scheurman v Transportation Dep’t, 434 Mich 619 ; 456 NW2d 66 (1990), and its companion case, Prokop v Wayne Co Bd of Rd Comm’r, and it is also consistent with cases such as Joslyn v Detroit, 74 Mich 458 ; 42 NW 50 (1889), Longstreet v Mecosta Co, 228 Mich 542 ; 200 NW 248 (1924), and Jewell v Rogers Twp, 208 Mich 318 ; 175 NW 151 (1919), in which liability was imposed for the failure to continue the road in the condition it had been maintained or failure to warn of any changes in the road that cr

1996This interpretation is consistent with a narrow reading of the exception, with the results in both Scheurman v Transportation Dep’t, 434 Mich 619 ; 456 NW2d 66 (1990), and its companion case, Prokop v Wayne Co Bd of Rd Comm’r, and it is also consistent with cases such as Joslyn v Detroit, 74 Mich 458 ; 42 NW 50 (1889), Longstreet v Mecosta Co, 228 Mich 542 ; 200 NW 248 (1924), and Jewell v Rogers Twp, 208 Mich 318 ; 175 NW 151 (1919), in which liability was imposed for the failure to continue the road in the condition it had been maintained or failure to warn of any changes in the road that cr

1996This interpretation is consistent with a narrow reading of the exception, with the results in both Scheurman v Transportation Dep’t, 434 Mich 619 ; 456 NW2d 66 (1990), and its companion case, Prokop v Wayne Co Bd of Rd Comm’r, and it is also consistent with cases such as Joslyn v Detroit, 74 Mich 458 ; 42 NW 50 (1889), Longstreet v Mecosta Co, 228 Mich 542 ; 200 NW 248 (1924), and Jewell v Rogers Twp, 208 Mich 318 ; 175 NW 151 (1919), in which liability was imposed for the failure to continue the road in the condition it had been maintained or failure to warn of any changes in the road that cr

1996This interpretation is consistent with a narrow reading of the exception, with the results in both Scheurman v Transportation Dep’t, 434 Mich 619 ; 456 NW2d 66 (1990), and its companion case, Prokop v Wayne Co Bd of Rd Comm’r, and it is also consistent with cases such as Joslyn v Detroit, 74 Mich 458 ; 42 NW 50 (1889), Longstreet v Mecosta Co, 228 Mich 542 ; 200 NW 248 (1924), and Jewell v Rogers Twp, 208 Mich 318 ; 175 NW 151 (1919), in which liability was imposed for the failure to continue the road in the condition it had been maintained or failure to warn of any changes in the road that cr

1996Comm'r, and it is also consistent with cases such as Joslyn v. Detroit, 74 Mich. 458 , 42 N.W. 50 (1889), Longstreet v. Mecosta Co, 228 Mich. 542 , 200 N.W. 248 (1924), and Jewell v. Rogers Twp., 208 Mich. 318 , 175 N.W. 151 (1919), in which liability was imposed for the failure to continue the road in the condition it had been maintained or failure to warn of any changes in the road that created a dangerous condition.

1996This interpretation is consistent with a narrow reading of the exception, with the results in both Scheurman v Transportation Dep’t, 434 Mich 619 ; 456 NW2d 66 (1990), and its companion case, Prokop v Wayne Co Bd of Rd Comm’r, and it is also consistent with cases such as Joslyn v Detroit, 74 Mich 458 ; 42 NW 50 (1889), Longstreet v Mecosta Co, 228 Mich 542 ; 200 NW 248 (1924), and Jewell v Rogers Twp, 208 Mich 318 ; 175 NW 151 (1919), in which liability was imposed for the failure to continue the road in the condition it had been maintained or failure to warn of any changes in the road that cr

1996Comm'r, and it is also consistent with cases such as Joslyn v. Detroit, 74 Mich. 458 , 42 N.W. 50 (1889), Longstreet v. Mecosta Co, 228 Mich. 542 , 200 N.W. 248 (1924), and Jewell v. Rogers Twp., 208 Mich. 318 , 175 N.W. 151 (1919), in which liability was imposed for the failure to continue the road in the condition it had been maintained or failure to warn of any changes in the road that created a dangerous condition.

1996This interpretation is consistent with a narrow reading of the exception, with the results in both Scheurman v Transportation Dep’t, 434 Mich 619 ; 456 NW2d 66 (1990), and its companion case, Prokop v Wayne Co Bd of Rd Comm’r, and it is also consistent with cases such as Joslyn v Detroit, 74 Mich 458 ; 42 NW 50 (1889), Longstreet v Mecosta Co, 228 Mich 542 ; 200 NW 248 (1924), and Jewell v Rogers Twp, 208 Mich 318 ; 175 NW 151 (1919), in which liability was imposed for the failure to continue the road in the condition it had been maintained or failure to warn of any changes in the road that cr

1996This interpretation is consistent with a narrow reading of the exception, with the results in both Scheurman v Transportation Dep’t, 434 Mich 619 ; 456 NW2d 66 (1990), and its companion case, Prokop v Wayne Co Bd of Rd Comm’r, and it is also consistent with cases such as Joslyn v Detroit, 74 Mich 458 ; 42 NW 50 (1889), Longstreet v Mecosta Co, 228 Mich 542 ; 200 NW 248 (1924), and Jewell v Rogers Twp, 208 Mich 318 ; 175 NW 151 (1919), in which liability was imposed for the failure to continue the road in the condition it had been maintained or failure to warn of any changes in the road that cr

1996This interpretation is consistent with a narrow reading of the exception, with the results in both Scheurman v Transportation Dep’t, 434 Mich 619 ; 456 NW2d 66 (1990), and its companion case, Prokop v Wayne Co Bd of Rd Comm’r, and it is also consistent with cases such as Joslyn v Detroit, 74 Mich 458 ; 42 NW 50 (1889), Longstreet v Mecosta Co, 228 Mich 542 ; 200 NW 248 (1924), and Jewell v Rogers Twp, 208 Mich 318 ; 175 NW 151 (1919), in which liability was imposed for the failure to continue the road in the condition it had been maintained or failure to warn of any changes in the road that cr

1995The purpose of MCR 2.312 is " 'to limit areas of controversy and save time, energy, and expense which otherwise would be spent in proffering proof of matters properly subject to admission.’ ” Janczyk v Davis, 125 Mich App 683, 692 ; 337 NW2d 272 (1983), quoting Fredericks v General Motors Corp, 48 Mich App 580, 588 ; 211 NW2d 44 (1973) (discussing GCR 1963, 312.1, the predecessor of MCR 2.312).

1995The purpose of MCR 2.312 is " 'to limit areas of controversy and save time, energy, and expense which otherwise would be spent in proffering proof of matters properly subject to admission.’ ” Janczyk v Davis, 125 Mich App 683, 692 ; 337 NW2d 272 (1983), quoting Fredericks v General Motors Corp, 48 Mich App 580, 588 ; 211 NW2d 44 (1973) (discussing GCR 1963, 312.1, the predecessor of MCR 2.312).

1995The purpose of MCR 2.312 is " 'to limit areas of controversy and save time, energy, and expense which otherwise would be spent in proffering proof of matters properly subject to admission.’ ” Janczyk v Davis, 125 Mich App 683, 692 ; 337 NW2d 272 (1983), quoting Fredericks v General Motors Corp, 48 Mich App 580, 588 ; 211 NW2d 44 (1973) (discussing GCR 1963, 312.1, the predecessor of MCR 2.312).

1995The purpose of MCR 2.312 is " 'to limit areas of controversy and save time, energy, and expense which otherwise would be spent in proffering proof of matters properly subject to admission.’ ” Janczyk v Davis, 125 Mich App 683, 692 ; 337 NW2d 272 (1983), quoting Fredericks v General Motors Corp, 48 Mich App 580, 588 ; 211 NW2d 44 (1973) (discussing GCR 1963, 312.1, the predecessor of MCR 2.312).

1987In addition, this is an instance in which the reading of the instruction would confuse the jurors or unnecessarily distract them from the material issues in the case, or extend the jury instruction process out of all proportion to the educational benefit to the jurors and fairness to the litigants, or unduly emphasize a potentially prejudicial aspect of the evidence, or simply add nothing to an otherwise balanced and fair jury charge nor enhance the ability of the jurors to decide the case intelligently, fairly, and impartially. [Johnson, supra, p 327 .] Plaintiffs supplemental instruction No.

1970See People v. Floyd (1968), 15 Mich App 284 ; People v. McIntosh (1967), 6 Mich App 62 .