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11 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1961–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Farinacci v. Beaver County Industrial Development Authoritygreen2 sentences2019Development Authority, 511 A.2d 757 759 (Pa. 1986)], requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate “a good-faith effort to effectuate notice of commencement of the action.” In announcing this refinement to the Lamp rule, we acknowledged that the good faith requirement is “not apparent from a reading of the rule itself,” but rather, satisfied the stated purpose of our decision in Lamp which was to avoid the situation where a plaintiff can retain exclusive control over litigation by not making a good faith effort to notify the defendant. 2001Although this good-faith requirement is not apparent from a reading of the rule itself, we interpret the rule mindful of the context in which it was announced.” Id. | 1 | 3 |
Lamp v. Heymangreen2 sentences2001This context was identified in the next sentence by quoting from Lamp that our purpose there was “to avoid the situation in which a plaintiff can bring an action, but, by not making a good-faith effort to notify a defendant, retain exclusive control over it for a period in excess of that permitted by the statute of limitations.” 366 A.2d at 889 . 2001This context was identified in the next sentence by quoting from Lamp that our purpose there was "to avoid the situation in which a plaintiff can bring an action, but, by not making a good-faith effort to notify a defendant, retain exclusive control over it for a period in excess of that permitted by the statute of limitations." 366 A.2d at 889 . | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Pressleygreen1 sentence2016In Commonwealth v. Pressley, 887 A.2d 220, 224 (Pa.Super. 2006), the Court stated, that: 18 "The pertinent rules, therefore, require a specific objection to the charge or an exception to the trial court's ruling on a proposed point to preserve an issue involving a jury instruction. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Houckgreen1 sentence2016This Court put together a jury instruction with input from both attorneys, who stipulated to this Court reading that instruction. "[T]he failure to make a timely and specific objection before the trial court at the appropriate stage of the proceedings will result in waiver of the issue." Com. v. Houck, 102 A.3d 443, 451 (Pa.Super. 2014), reargument denied (Nov. 25, 2014). | 1 | 1 |
Howland, Hess, Guinan & Torpey v. Perzelgreen1 sentence2011The Superior Court has interpreted rule 1006 to give courts of common pleas “a discretionary remedy if a party fails to comply with Rule 1005B.” Howland, Hess, Gninan & Torpey v. Perzel, 667 A.2d 1163, 1164 (Pa. Super. 1995). | 1 | 1 |
Jacob v. New Kensington Y.M.C.A.green2 sentences1986The purpose for the rule, as stated in Lamp , “is to avoid the situation in which a plaintiff can bring an action, but by not making a good-faith effort to notify a defendant, retain exclusive control over it for a period in excess of that permitted by the statute of limitations.” 469 Pa. at 478 , 366 A.2d at 889 [Emphasis supplied]; see also Jacob v. New Kensinqton Y.M.C.A., 312 Pa.Super. 533 , 459 A.2d 350 (1983). 1986The purpose for the rule, as stated in Lamp , “is to avoid the situation in which a plaintiff can bring an action, but by not making a good-faith effort to notify a defendant, retain exclusive control over it for a period in excess of that permitted by the statute of limitations.” 469 Pa. at 478 , 366 A.2d at 889 [Emphasis supplied]; see also Jacob v. New Kensinqton Y.M.C.A., 312 Pa.Super. 533 , 459 A.2d 350 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Getting, H. & V. v. Mark Sales & Leasing, Inc.
green
1 sentence2024The trial court stated further that, “[i]t is clear from a reading of the rule [Pa.R.Civ.P. 238] that the Supreme Court intended to except delays that Defendants were not responsible for.” Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Commonwealth v. Flowers
green
2 sentences1981Neither the rule, nor Com. v. Flowers, 245 Pa. Superior Ct. 198 , 369 A. 2d 362 (1976), which spawned it, prevents the issuing authority from considering evidence outside the affidavit, if that evidence is the substance or an element of the crime. 1981Neither the rule, nor Com. v. Flowers, 245 Pa. Superior Ct. 198 , 369 A. 2d 362 (1976), which spawned it, prevents the issuing authority from considering evidence outside the affidavit, if that evidence is the substance or an element of the crime. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Commonwealth v. McCutchen
green
2 sentences1976In McCutchen , this Court stated: " Under these facts, it is clear that prior to appellant giving his first confession, which was in essence the same as his later formal confession, appellant, age fifteen, was not given the opportunity to consult his mother before he waived his rights, an opportunity, in our opinion, mandated by our Roane decision." 463 Pa. at 92-93 , 343 A.2d at 670 . [Emphasis added]. 1976In McCutchen , this Court stated: " Under these facts, it is clear that prior to appellant giving his first confession, which was in essence the same as his later formal confession, appellant, age fifteen, was not given the opportunity to consult his mother before he waived his rights, an opportunity, in our opinion, mandated by our Roane decision." 463 Pa. at 92-93 , 343 A.2d at 670 . [Emphasis added]. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
O'TOOLE v. Braddock Borough
green
2 sentences1970See: O’Toole v. Braddock Borough, 397 Pa. 562, 565 , 155 A. 2d 848 (1959). 1970See: O’Toole v. Braddock Borough, 397 Pa. 562, 565 , 155 A. 2d 848 (1959). | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Londoner v. City and County of Denver
green
2 sentences1961However, the railroads contend that a reading of the rule in its entirety leads to the conclusion that the parties are entitled to file a written brief as a matter of right.” The court then quoted from several United States Supreme Court cases as follows (page 66) : “In Londoner v. City & County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 , 28 S. Ct. 708, 714 , 52 L. 1961However, the railroads contend that a reading of the rule in its entirety leads to the conclusion that the parties are entitled to file a written brief as a matter of right.” The court then quoted from several United States Supreme Court cases as follows (page 66) : “In Londoner v. City & County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 , 28 S. Ct. 708, 714 , 52 L. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Morgan v. United States
green
2 sentences1961Ed. 1103, 1112 , the court said: “ . . a hearing, in its very essence, demands that he who is entitled to it shall have the right to support his allegations by argument, however brief; and, if need be, by proof, however informal.’ “In Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 481 , 56 S. Ct. 906, 912 , 80 L. 1961Ed. 1103, 1112 , the court said: “ . . a hearing, in its very essence, demands that he who is entitled to it shall have the right to support his allegations by argument, however brief; and, if need be, by proof, however informal.’ “In Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 481 , 56 S. Ct. 906, 912 , 80 L. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.