reading standard in Illinois

2002Based upon the guidance of the Illinois Supreme Court, the standard is as it should be, that the statement “‛“was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.”’” G.O. , 191 Ill. 2d at 54 , quoting People v. Simmons , 60 Ill. 2d 173, 180 (1975), quoting In Re Gault , 387 U.S. 1, 55 , 18 L.

2002Based upon the guidance of the Illinois Supreme Court, the standard is as it should be, that the statement “ ‘ “was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.” ’ ” G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 54 , quoting People v. Simmons, 60 Ill. 2d 173, 180 (1975), quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 , 18 L.

2002Based upon the guidance of the Illinois Supreme Court, the standard is as it should be, that the statement “‛“was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.”’” G.O. , 191 Ill. 2d at 54 , quoting People v. Simmons , 60 Ill. 2d 173, 180 (1975), quoting In Re Gault , 387 U.S. 1, 55 , 18 L.

2002Based upon the guidance of the Illinois Supreme Court, the standard is as it should be, that the statement “‛“was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.”’” G.O. , 191 Ill. 2d at 54 , quoting People v. Simmons , 60 Ill. 2d 173, 180 (1975), quoting In Re Gault , 387 U.S. 1, 55 , 18 L.

1953Neufield v. Rodiminski, 41 Ill.

1948Neufield v. Rodiminski, 41 Ill.

2020Id. 20 misconduct in administering the ISAT, Mitchell testified that she saw Longanecker open the Reading test seals on an ISAT test booklet on February 27, 2014, prior to the administration of the ISAT Reading test.

2020Id. 20 misconduct in administering the ISAT, Mitchell testified that she saw Longanecker open the Reading test seals on an ISAT test booklet on February 27, 2014, prior to the administration of the ISAT Reading test.

2009Ameritech’s entire argument on this issue appears to be premised upon the assertion that, under the test outlined by the supreme court in National Tea Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 97 Ill. 2d 424, 432-33 , 454 N.E.2d 672 (1983), the claimant never qualified for vocational rehabilitation.

2009Ameritech’s entire argument on this issue appears to be premised upon the assertion that, under the test outlined by the supreme court in National Tea Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 97 Ill. 2d 424, 432-33 , 454 N.E.2d 672 (1983), the claimant never qualified for vocational rehabilitation.

1996We regard the exception as encompassing those dismissals which are based on a plaintiff’s failure to comply with a precondition requisite to the Court’s going forward to determine the merits of his substantive claim.” (Emphasis added.) Costello, 365 U.S. at 285 , 5 L.

1996We regard the exception as encompassing those dismissals which are based on a plaintiff’s failure to comply with a precondition requisite to the Court’s going forward to determine the merits of his substantive claim.” (Emphasis added.) Costello, 365 U.S. at 285 , 5 L.

1994But the supreme court in People v. Brooks (1994), 158 Ill. 2d 260, 270 , 633 N.E.2d 692 , held that an amendment to a statute may be indicative of legislative intent even where a statute is not ambiguous.

1994But the supreme court in People v. Brooks (1994), 158 Ill. 2d 260, 270 , 633 N.E.2d 692 , held that an amendment to a statute may be indicative of legislative intent even where a statute is not ambiguous.

1994The general rule has been expressed thus: "Although an amendment generally is presumed to change the law, if an amendment to an ambiguous statute is enacted soon after there were controversies as to the interpretation of the statute it amends, the amendment may be construed as a legislative interpretation of the original statute.” (Santiago v. Kusper (1990), 133 Ill. 2d 318, 329 , 549 N.E.2d 1251 .) A narrow reading of the rule as recited in Santiago could lead to the conclusion that the rule applies only to ambiguous statutes.

1994The general rule has been expressed thus: "Although an amendment generally is presumed to change the law, if an amendment to an ambiguous statute is enacted soon after there were controversies as to the interpretation of the statute it amends, the amendment may be construed as a legislative interpretation of the original statute.” (Santiago v. Kusper (1990), 133 Ill. 2d 318, 329 , 549 N.E.2d 1251 .) A narrow reading of the rule as recited in Santiago could lead to the conclusion that the rule applies only to ambiguous statutes.

1993(People v. Lopez (1992), 228 Ill.

1988(See Carter v. State (1851), 2 Ind. 617 ; State v. Baldwin (1886), 36 Kan. 1 , 12 P. 318 .) Also, experts may testify concerning the general opinion of a profession as to a certain matter.

1988(See Carter v. State (1851), 2 Ind. 617 ; State v. Baldwin (1886), 36 Kan. 1 , 12 P. 318 .) Also, experts may testify concerning the general opinion of a profession as to a certain matter.

1988(See Carter v. State (1851), 2 Ind. 617 ; State v. Baldwin (1886), 36 Kan. 1 , 12 P. 318 .) Also, experts may testify concerning the general opinion of a profession as to a certain matter.

1988(See Carter v. State (1851), 2 Ind. 617 ; State v. Baldwin (1886), 36 Kan. 1 , 12 P. 318 .) Also, experts may testify concerning the general opinion of a profession as to a certain matter.

1988App. 3d 847 , 379 N.E.2d 840 .) Experts may, however, premise their testimony on information and opinions obtained from the reading of standard publications in their fields, and the cases do not impose a requirement experts name the publications on which their opinions are premised.

1988App.3d 847 , *862 379 N.E.2d 840 .) Experts may, however, premise their testimony on information and opinions obtained from the reading of standard publications in their fields, and the cases do not impose a requirement experts name the publications on which their opinions are premised.

1988(See Carter v. State (1851), 2 Ind. 617 ; State v. Baldwin (1886), 36 Kan. 1 , 12 P. 318 .) Also, experts may testify concerning the general opinion of a profession as to a certain matter.

1988(See Carter v. State (1851), 2 Ind. 617 ; State v. Baldwin (1886), 36 Kan. 1 , 12 P. 318 .) Also, experts may testify concerning the general opinion of a profession as to a certain matter.

1986(Agran v. Checker Taxi Co. (1952), 412 Ill. 145, 149 .) The proper reading of this rule contemplates that the statutes mentioned, so long as they do not unduly encroach on the “judicial power,” and the rules promulgated in these areas should complement one another.

1986Again, as with Rule 21(a) (94 Ill.2d R. 21(a)), we cannot agree with the defendant's reading of this rule which would require this court to abandon its duty to protect the authority of the judicial branch of government. ( Agran v. Checker Taxi Co. (1952), 412 Ill. 145, 149 .) The proper reading of this rule contemplates that the statutes mentioned, so long as they do not unduly encroach on the "judicial power," and the rules promulgated in these areas should complement one another.

1975(See People v. Carruthers (1974), 18 Ill.App.3d 255 , 309 N.E.2d 659 .) On remand we direct that the voir dire procedure utilized in this case not be repeated.

1975(See People v. Carruthers (1974), 18 Ill.App.3d 255 , 309 N.E.2d 659 .) On remand we direct that the voir dire procedure utilized in this case not be repeated.

1949Instruction No. 5 given on behalf of defendant also stated that defendant had the right to self-defense “whether the danger was real or apparently real,” An instruction similar to the one complained of was upheld by this court in People v. Priddy, 327 Ill. 50 .

1914A reading- of clause B indicates that the words just quoted have no relation to clause A, and cannot in any way be of benefit to plaintiff with reference to his declaration of forfeiture under clause A. Plaintiff in his brief cites Belinski v. Brand, 76 Ill.

1901But it is contended that this construction renders the statute unconstitutional, under both the State and the Federal constitutions; that it violates section 2 of article 2 of the constitution of this State, which provides that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,” and section 1 of article 9, because the law imposing the tax is not “uniform as to the class upon which it operates,” and the first section of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, which provides “that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty or

1901But it is contended that this construction renders the statute unconstitutional, under both the State and the Federal constitutions; that it violates section 2 of article 2 of the constitution of this State, which provides that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,” and section 1 of article 9, because the law imposing the tax is not “uniform as to the class upon which it operates,” and the first section of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, which provides “that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty or

1901But we have held that the proper reading of the clause, “or remainder to the collateral heir,” etc., should be read “and remainder,” etc., (Ayers v. Chicago Title and Trust Co. 187 Ill. 42 ,) and that the meaning of that provision is, that when the bequest is to the mother, father, husband, wife, brother and sister, widow of the son, or a lineal descendant, during the life or for a term of years, and remainder to the collateral heir of the decedent or to the stranger in blood, etc., such estate for life or for a term of years shall not be subject to any tax, but that where the remainder is to

1901But it is contended that this construction renders the statute unconstitutional, under both the State and the Federal constitutions; that it violates section 2 of article 2 of the constitution of this State, which provides that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,” and section 1 of article 9, because the law imposing the tax is not “uniform as to the class upon which it operates,” and the first section of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, which provides “that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty or