reading rule in Florida

2017See id.

2017See id.

2017See Hechtman, 840 So. 2d at 996 ; Jones, 793 So. 2d at 914-15 .

2017See Hechtman, 840 So.2d at 996 ; Jones, 793 So.2d at 914-15 .

2019We express no opinion about it or about whether Mr. Bolduc could amend his claim to allege something other than a mere failure to object to the reading of a standard instruction, if that is in fact all the record bears out. -5- 999 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) ("We conclude that ignorance of the law on an issue that was pertinent to the overall presentation of Adams' defense meets the first prong of Strickland."); cf. Andujar-Ruiz v. State, 205 So. 3d 803, 806 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (holding that appellate counsel performed deficiently by failing to challenge inaccurate instruction based on 2014 amendments

2017(Emphasis added.) “Reading rule 2.516(a) and (b)(1) together, the word ‘documents’ in subsection (b)(1) is confined in meaning to ‘document[s] filed in any court proceeding.’” Boatright v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 218 So.3d 962, 966 , 2017 WL 1363915, at *4 (alteration in original).

2017(Emphasis added.) “Reading rule 2.516(a) and (b)(1) together, the word ‘documents’ in subsection (b)(1) is confined in meaning to ‘document[s] filed in any court proceeding.’” Boatright v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 218 So.3d 962, 966 , 2017 WL 1363915, at *4 (alteration in original).

2012See Florida Bar v. Cocalis, 959 So.2d 163, 166 (Fla.2007) (holding that Cocalis’s conduct while representing a client in a personal injury suit was unprofessional and unethical and finding no need to address “whether the referee erred in concluding that Cocalis’s conduct did not violate rules 4 — 3.3(a)(1), 4-3.4(a), and 4-8.4(a)(c) and (d), because [it] violated 3-4.3”).

2012Co. v. Boecher, 733 So.2d 993, 998-99 (Fla.1999).

2009See Wells, 967 So.2d at 419 (finding *896 that reading the principals instruction was not harmless error where the verdict did not reveal whether the jury relied on the principals theory to convict and the instruction was likely to cause confusion).

2004See Braggs v. State, 789 So.2d 1151, 1154 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (reversing kidnapping conviction because, although the defendant was charged with kidnapping with intent to commit or facilitate the commission of any felony, jury was also instructed to decide whether he committed a kidnapping with the intent to inflict great bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim; even though there was no objection, convicting a defendant of a crime not charged was fundamental error and the verdict in such a case was a nullity); Taylor v. State, 760 So.2d 298, 299 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (reversing aggravated batt

2004See Braggs v. State, 789 So.2d 1151, 1154 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (reversing kidnapping conviction because, although the defendant was charged with kidnapping with intent to commit or facilitate the commission of any felony, jury was also instructed to decide whether he committed a kidnapping with the intent to inflict great bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim; even though there was no objection, convicting a defendant of a crime not charged was fundamental error and the verdict in such a case was a nullity); Taylor v. State, 760 So.2d 298, 299 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (reversing aggravated batt

2003In support, the appellant relies on this Court's statement in Weddell v. State, 780 So.2d 324, 324 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. granted, 796 So.2d 539 (Fla.2001), rev. dismissed, 813 So.2d 67 (Fla.2002), that "we can think of no valid policy reason why a trial judge should be permitted to comment on evidence of possession of recently stolen property as opposed to any other evidence adduced at trial." Although in Weddell we both certified the question as being of great public importance and expressed, in dicta, our continued concern over the reading of this instruction, we did not hold that such instru

2003In fact, we could not so hold in light of the Florida Supreme Court's specific ruling to the contrary in State v. Young, 217 So.2d 567, 571 (Fla.1968), cert. denied 396 U.S. 853 , 90 S.Ct. 112 , 24 L.Ed.2d 101 (1969).

2002See White v. Moore, 789 So.2d 1118 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)(it is not the province of a reviewing court to rewrite the rules of administrative agencies under the guise of construction).

2002We believe that this reading of the rule and statute is consistent with their purpose which, as we recently noted, "is to provide defendants with a means by which to challenge convictions when there is `credible concern that an injustice may have occurred and DNA testing may resolve the issue.'" Zollman, 820 So.2d 1059 (quoting In re Amendment to Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure Creating Rule 3.853 (DNA Testing), 807 So.2d 633, 636 (Fla.2001) (Anstead, J., concurring)).

2002See id.

2002We believe that this reading of the rule and statute is consistent with their purpose which, as we recently noted, "is to provide defendants with a means by which to challenge convictions when there is `credible concern that an injustice may have occurred and DNA testing may resolve the issue.'" Zollman, 820 So.2d 1059 (quoting In re Amendment to Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure Creating Rule 3.853 (DNA Testing), 807 So.2d 633, 636 (Fla.2001) (Anstead, J., concurring)).

2000In amending rule 4-8.4(d) to add the language underlined above, this Court was responding to "a number of problems faced by minorities and women in the legal profession ... [and] the need for specific rules prohibiting discriminatory practices by members of the Bar." Florida Bar re Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 624 So.2d 720, 721 (Fla.1993).

1994See Ziegler v. Knuck, 419 So.2d 818 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); see also Intracoastal Ventures Corp. v. Safeco Ins.

1993See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 1986).

1990The state adduced proof of compliance with other HRS requirements such as the qualifications of the operator and the type of machine used, but nothing regarding the inspection and maintenance thereof, which brings to mind the comment by the court in State v. Fogle, 254 Or. 268 , 459 P.2d 873, 876 (1969), that "[i]t is difficult to think of a reason why the legislature would consider the competence of the operator to be more important than the accuracy of the equipment." Apropos, also, of the lower court's comment that it was easier for the defendant to prove non-compliance than to require the

1990The state adduced proof of compliance with other HRS requirements such as the qualifications of the operator and the type of machine used, but nothing regarding the inspection and maintenance thereof, which brings to mind the comment by the court in State v. Fogle, 254 Or. 268 , 459 P.2d 873, 876 (1969), that "[i]t is difficult to think of a reason why the legislature would consider the competence of the operator to be more important than the accuracy of the equipment." Apropos, also, of the lower court's comment that it was easier for the defendant to prove non-compliance than to require the

1982In Castor v. State, 365 So.2d 701, 703 (Fla. 1978), the Supreme Court stated that to satisfy the rule, "... an objection must be sufficiently specific both to apprise the trial judge of the putative error and to preserve the issue for intelligent review on appeal." We believe that this statement best describes the objective of Rule 3.390(d).

1978See Hartley v. Hartley, 134 So.2d 281 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961).