declared doctrine in New York

1990As Justice Marshall cautioned in Batson v Kentucky, "[a]ny prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking a juror”. ( 476 US 79, 106 .) If that is all that is required, the majority’s decision proves his point that there is indeed little real protection in defendant’s newly recognized equal protection right.

1984The rule is directed toward controlling the conduct of the nursing homes, not toward restricting the generosity of the relatives and friends of an M.A. recipient.” ( 305 NW2d, at p 314 .) Based upon this, the court declared that the rule did not prohibit the nursing home from receiving voluntary payments for non-M.A. covered items and services.

1975To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers’ whim or caprice.” In People v Valentine ( 17 NY2d 128 ), the court declared that the standard of probable cause, as it applies to police, is that which would be probable cause to a reasonable, cautious, prudent police officer.

1966In Both v. United States (supra, p. 489) the court declared the standard to be used in determining, “ [T]he present critical point in the compromise between candor and shame at which the community may have arrived ” (United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119,121 ) to be “ Whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest. ’ ’ Faced with applying that broad standard in specific instances the court said in Jacobellis v. Ohio (supra, p. 188 ): “ Since it is only ‘ obscenity ’ that is excluded fro

1966In Both v. United States (supra, p. 489) the court declared the standard to be used in determining, “ [T]he present critical point in the compromise between candor and shame at which the community may have arrived ” (United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119,121 ) to be “ Whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest. ’ ’ Faced with applying that broad standard in specific instances the court said in Jacobellis v. Ohio (supra, p. 188 ): “ Since it is only ‘ obscenity ’ that is excluded fro

1960(Moran v. Lehman, 7 Misc 2d 994 ; James v. Saul, 17 Misc 2d 371 ; Light v. Quinn, 17 Misc 2d 1083 ; Moyle v. Cronin, 18 Misc 2d 465 ; contra: Boyne v. Samac Motors, 22 Misc 2d 686 ; Corey v. Central Taxi, 199 Misc. 403 ; Singer v. Banzer, 8 Misc 2d 3 ; see ‘ Collateral Estoppel and the Joint Defendant ’— 24 Albany L.

1960(Moran v. Lehman, 7 Misc 2d 994 ; James v. Saul, 17 Misc 2d 371 ; Light v. Quinn, 17 Misc 2d 1083 ; Moyle v. Cronin, 18 Misc 2d 465 ; contra: Boyne v. Samac Motors, 22 Misc 2d 686 ; Corey v. Central Taxi, 199 Misc. 403 ; Singer v. Banzer, 8 Misc 2d 3 ; see ‘ Collateral Estoppel and the Joint Defendant ’— 24 Albany L.

1960(Moran v. Lehman, 7 Misc 2d 994 ; James v. Saul, 17 Misc 2d 371 ; Light v. Quinn, 17 Misc 2d 1083 ; Moyle v. Cronin, 18 Misc 2d 465 ; contra: Boyne v. Samac Motors, 22 Misc 2d 686 ; Corey v. Central Taxi, 199 Misc. 403 ; Singer v. Banzer, 8 Misc 2d 3 ; see ‘ Collateral Estoppel and the Joint Defendant ’— 24 Albany L.

1960(Moran v. Lehman, 7 Misc 2d 994 ; James v. Saul, 17 Misc 2d 371 ; Light v. Quinn, 17 Misc 2d 1083 ; Moyle v. Cronin, 18 Misc 2d 465 ; contra: Boyne v. Samac Motors, 22 Misc 2d 686 ; Corey v. Central Taxi, 199 Misc. 403 ; Singer v. Banzer, 8 Misc 2d 3 ; see ‘ Collateral Estoppel and the Joint Defendant ’— 24 Albany L.

1960(Moran v. Lehman, 7 Misc 2d 994 ; James v. Saul, 17 Misc 2d 371 ; Light v. Quinn, 17 Misc 2d 1083 ; Moyle v. Cronin, 18 Misc 2d 465 ; contra: Boyne v. Samac Motors, 22 Misc 2d 686 ; Corey v. Central Taxi, 199 Misc. 403 ; Singer v. Banzer, 8 Misc 2d 3 ; see ‘ Collateral Estoppel and the Joint Defendant ’— 24 Albany L.

1960(Moran v. Lehman, 7 Misc 2d 994 ; James v. Saul, 17 Misc 2d 371 ; Light v. Quinn, 17 Misc 2d 1083 ; Moyle v. Cronin, 18 Misc 2d 465 ; contra: Boyne v. Samac Motors, 22 Misc 2d 686 ; Corey v. Central Taxi, 199 Misc. 403 ; Singer v. Banzer, 8 Misc 2d 3 ; see ‘ Collateral Estoppel and the Joint Defendant ’— 24 Albany L.

1960(Moran v. Lehman, 7 Misc 2d 994 ; James v. Saul, 17 Misc 2d 371 ; Light v. Quinn, 17 Misc 2d 1083 ; Moyle v. Cronin, 18 Misc 2d 465 ; contra: Boyne v. Samac Motors, 22 Misc 2d 686 ; Corey v. Central Taxi, 199 Misc. 403 ; Singer v. Banzer, 8 Misc 2d 3 ; see ‘ Collateral Estoppel and the Joint Defendant ’— 24 Albany L.

1947(New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Winthrop, 237 N. Y. 93, 103-104 .) Such words point toward futurity and vesting at the death of the life tenant (Matter of Crane, 164 N. Y. 71 ), and make the decision herein more difficult.

1947(New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Winthrop, 237 N. Y. 93, 103-104 .) Such words point toward futurity and vesting at the death of the life tenant (Matter of Crane, 164 N. Y. 71 ), and make the decision herein more difficult.

1883In the case of the People v. Davis ( 21 Wend. 309 ), the charge excepted to was that the accomplices of the prisoner were not to be believed by the jury unless confirmed by other credible witnesses in respect to the facts connecting the prisoner with the possession of the forged bills, or with the manufacture of them; but the court declared that no error had been committed, because it was not necessary by existing rules that every part of the testimony should be confirmed, the question usually being whether the jury will believe the witness in such parts of his narrative as the confirmation ex

1883The confirmation in People v. Davis, supra, was the possession by the prisoner of the forged bills, which if not of the essence, went to the point of the offence charged, and if believed, the court said, pressed strongly against him and laid a foundation for giving credit to the narrative of his associates.

1820It is the declared rule of the, Court, [Reade v. Ldvingston, 3 Johns.