declared rule in California

1950“In McPheeters v. McMahon, 131 Cal.App. 418, 425 [ 21 P.2d 606 ], this division of the court declared the rule to be that ‘An injunction should rarely, if ever, be issued in a doubtful case.

1950“In McPheeters v. McMahon, 131 Cal.App. 418, 425 [ 21 P.2d 606 ], this division of the court declared the rule to be that ‘An injunction should rarely, if ever, be issued in a doubtful case.

2010Curtis v. Peters (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 597, 603 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 70 ] (Curtis), the court declared that a presumption of prejudice arose from the trial court’s exclusion of the state’s chosen representative during a civil trial.

2010Curtis v. Peters (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 597, 603 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 70 ] (Curtis), the court declared that a presumption of prejudice arose from the trial court’s exclusion of the state’s chosen representative during a civil trial.

1991I of Cal. Const.].) In United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897 [ 82 L.Ed.2d 677 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 ] (hereafter sometimes Leon ), the United States Supreme Court fabricated an exception to the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment that allows "the use in the prosecution's case in chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in [objectively] reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause." ( Id. at p. 900 [ 82 L.Ed.2d at p. 684 ].) The court declared the exception inapplicable when (1) the magistr

1991I of Cal. Const.].) In United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897 [ 82 L.Ed.2d 677 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 ] (hereafter sometimes Leon ), the United States Supreme Court fabricated an exception to the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment that allows "the use in the prosecution's case in chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in [objectively] reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause." ( Id. at p. 900 [ 82 L.Ed.2d at p. 684 ].) The court declared the exception inapplicable when (1) the magistr

1980(DeMott v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 13, 26 [ 320 P.2d 50 ].) Ño factual allegations have been made nor none tendered which would meet the declared standard for malice.

1980(DeMott v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 13, 26 [ 320 P.2d 50 ].) Ño factual allegations have been made nor none tendered which would meet the declared standard for malice.

1973(Smith v. Hensley (Ky.) 354 S.W.2d 744 [ 98 A.L.R.2d 340 ].) In the latter case the court declared that the doctrine of imputed negligence, which would normally bar a partner’s recovery against the partnership, was an artificial rule of law which should yield to reason and practical considerations; since the partnership would have been liable for damages to the property of a stranger, no just reason existed for denying recovery for damages to the property of a partner.” (White v. Cox, supra, 17 Cal.App. 3d 824, 827-828 .) “Under traditional legal concepts the partnership is regarded as an aggr

1973(Smith v. Hensley (Ky.) 354 S.W.2d 744 [ 98 A.L.R.2d 340 ].) In the latter case the court declared that the doctrine of imputed negligence, which would normally bar a partner’s recovery against the partnership, was an artificial rule of law which should yield to reason and practical considerations; since the partnership would have been liable for damages to the property of a stranger, no just reason existed for denying recovery for damages to the property of a partner.” (White v. Cox, supra, 17 Cal.App. 3d 824, 827-828 .) “Under traditional legal concepts the partnership is regarded as an aggr

1971A member of an unincorporated association does not incur liability for acts of the association or acts of its members which he did not authorize or perform. ( Orser v. George, 252 Cal. App.2d 660, 670-671 [ 60 Cal. Rptr. 708 ].) A partner in a business partnership has been allowed to maintain an action against the partnership for the loss of his truck as a result of partnership negligence. ( Smith v. Hensley (Ky.) 354 S.W.2d 744 [ 98 A.L.R.2d 340 ].) In the *828 latter case the court declared that the doctrine of imputed negligence, which would normally bar a partner's recovery against the par

1971A member of an unincorporated association does not incur liability for acts of the association or acts of its members which he did not authorize or perform. ( Orser v. George, 252 Cal. App.2d 660, 670-671 [ 60 Cal. Rptr. 708 ].) A partner in a business partnership has been allowed to maintain an action against the partnership for the loss of his truck as a result of partnership negligence. ( Smith v. Hensley (Ky.) 354 S.W.2d 744 [ 98 A.L.R.2d 340 ].) In the *828 latter case the court declared that the doctrine of imputed negligence, which would normally bar a partner's recovery against the par

1969In its Preliminary Print the court declared that its rule applied whenever a person was “in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any way” (p. 447 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 708 ]; see also pp. 445, 467, 478 [16 L.Ed.2d at pp. 707, 719, 725-726].) However, in the bound volume of its Official Reports the court amended the text of its opinion in several instances to make its rule applicable to a person “in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way” (p. 477 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 725 ]). to one “deprived of his freedom of a

1969In its Preliminary Print the court declared that its rule applied whenever a person was “in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any way” (p. 447 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 708 ]; see also pp. 445, 467, 478 [16 L.Ed.2d at pp. 707, 719, 725-726].) However, in the bound volume of its Official Reports the court amended the text of its opinion in several instances to make its rule applicable to a person “in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way” (p. 477 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 725 ]). to one “deprived of his freedom of a

1962(Loper v. Morrison, 23 Cal.2d 600, 605 [ 145 P.2d 1 ].) In the latter case the court declared the factors to be considered, insofar as pertinent to that case (p. 606), “. . . are the intent of the employee, the nature, time, and place of his conduct, his actual and implied authority, the work he was hired to do, the incidental acts that *606 the employer should reasonably have expected would be done, and the amount of freedom allowed the employee in performing his duties.” In the ease before us there is no evidence that Mrs. Rauseher came to the office, her regular place of employment, on the

1962(Loper v. Morrison, 23 Cal.2d 600, 605 [ 145 P.2d 1 ].) In the latter case the court declared the factors to be considered, insofar as pertinent to that case (p. 606), “. . . are the intent of the employee, the nature, time, and place of his conduct, his actual and implied authority, the work he was hired to do, the incidental acts that *606 the employer should reasonably have expected would be done, and the amount of freedom allowed the employee in performing his duties.” In the ease before us there is no evidence that Mrs. Rauseher came to the office, her regular place of employment, on the

1960(See Foust v. Foust, 47 Cal.2d 121, 123 [ 302 P.2d 11 ]; Arthur v. Arthur, 147 Cal.App.2d 252, 258 [ 305 P.2d 171 ] ; Lubin v. Lubin, 144 Cal.App.2d 781, 788 [ 302 P.2d 49 ].) The cases holding that such an incorporated property settlement agreement cannot be enforced by contempt (e.g., Bradley v. Superior Court, 48 Cal.2d 509, 521 [ 310 P.2d 634 ]; Plumer v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.2d 631, 635 [ 328 P.2d 193 ]) recognize that ordinary procedures for enforcement of a money judgment remain applicable, contempt alone being ruled out.

1960(See Foust v. Foust, 47 Cal.2d 121, 123 [ 302 P.2d 11 ]; Arthur v. Arthur, 147 Cal.App.2d 252, 258 [ 305 P.2d 171 ] ; Lubin v. Lubin, 144 Cal.App.2d 781, 788 [ 302 P.2d 49 ].) The cases holding that such an incorporated property settlement agreement cannot be enforced by contempt (e.g., Bradley v. Superior Court, 48 Cal.2d 509, 521 [ 310 P.2d 634 ]; Plumer v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.2d 631, 635 [ 328 P.2d 193 ]) recognize that ordinary procedures for enforcement of a money judgment remain applicable, contempt alone being ruled out.

1960(See Foust v. Foust, 47 Cal.2d 121, 123 [ 302 P.2d 11 ]; Arthur v. Arthur, 147 Cal.App.2d 252, 258 [ 305 P.2d 171 ] ; Lubin v. Lubin, 144 Cal.App.2d 781, 788 [ 302 P.2d 49 ].) The cases holding that such an incorporated property settlement agreement cannot be enforced by contempt (e.g., Bradley v. Superior Court, 48 Cal.2d 509, 521 [ 310 P.2d 634 ]; Plumer v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.2d 631, 635 [ 328 P.2d 193 ]) recognize that ordinary procedures for enforcement of a money judgment remain applicable, contempt alone being ruled out.

1960(See Foust v. Foust, 47 Cal.2d 121, 123 [ 302 P.2d 11 ]; Arthur v. Arthur, 147 Cal.App.2d 252, 258 [ 305 P.2d 171 ] ; Lubin v. Lubin, 144 Cal.App.2d 781, 788 [ 302 P.2d 49 ].) The cases holding that such an incorporated property settlement agreement cannot be enforced by contempt (e.g., Bradley v. Superior Court, 48 Cal.2d 509, 521 [ 310 P.2d 634 ]; Plumer v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.2d 631, 635 [ 328 P.2d 193 ]) recognize that ordinary procedures for enforcement of a money judgment remain applicable, contempt alone being ruled out.

1960(See Foust v. Foust, 47 Cal.2d 121, 123 [ 302 P.2d 11 ]; Arthur v. Arthur, 147 Cal.App.2d 252, 258 [ 305 P.2d 171 ] ; Lubin v. Lubin, 144 Cal.App.2d 781, 788 [ 302 P.2d 49 ].) The cases holding that such an incorporated property settlement agreement cannot be enforced by contempt (e.g., Bradley v. Superior Court, 48 Cal.2d 509, 521 [ 310 P.2d 634 ]; Plumer v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.2d 631, 635 [ 328 P.2d 193 ]) recognize that ordinary procedures for enforcement of a money judgment remain applicable, contempt alone being ruled out.

1960(See Foust v. Foust, 47 Cal.2d 121, 123 [ 302 P.2d 11 ]; Arthur v. Arthur, 147 Cal.App.2d 252, 258 [ 305 P.2d 171 ] ; Lubin v. Lubin, 144 Cal.App.2d 781, 788 [ 302 P.2d 49 ].) The cases holding that such an incorporated property settlement agreement cannot be enforced by contempt (e.g., Bradley v. Superior Court, 48 Cal.2d 509, 521 [ 310 P.2d 634 ]; Plumer v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.2d 631, 635 [ 328 P.2d 193 ]) recognize that ordinary procedures for enforcement of a money judgment remain applicable, contempt alone being ruled out.

1960But the more deplorable consequence will inevitably be that the administration of justice will fall into disrepute." And again in Smith v. Allwright (1944), 321 U.S. 649, 666, 669 [ 64 S.Ct. 757 , 88 L.Ed. 987 , 151 A.L.R. 1110 ]: The "policy of the court freely to disregard and to overrule considered decisions ... indicates an intolerance for what those who have composed this court in the past have conscientiously and deliberately concluded, and involves an assumption that knowledge and wisdom reside in us which was denied to our predecessors....

1960But the more deplorable consequence will inevitably be that the administration of justice will fall into disrepute." And again in Smith v. Allwright (1944), 321 U.S. 649, 666, 669 [ 64 S.Ct. 757 , 88 L.Ed. 987 , 151 A.L.R. 1110 ]: The "policy of the court freely to disregard and to overrule considered decisions ... indicates an intolerance for what those who have composed this court in the past have conscientiously and deliberately concluded, and involves an assumption that knowledge and wisdom reside in us which was denied to our predecessors....

1960(See Foust v. Foust, 47 Cal.2d 121, 123 [ 302 P.2d 11 ]; Arthur v. Arthur, 147 Cal.App.2d 252, 258 [ 305 P.2d 171 ] ; Lubin v. Lubin, 144 Cal.App.2d 781, 788 [ 302 P.2d 49 ].) The cases holding that such an incorporated property settlement agreement cannot be enforced by contempt (e.g., Bradley v. Superior Court, 48 Cal.2d 509, 521 [ 310 P.2d 634 ]; Plumer v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.2d 631, 635 [ 328 P.2d 193 ]) recognize that ordinary procedures for enforcement of a money judgment remain applicable, contempt alone being ruled out.

1960(See Foust v. Foust, 47 Cal.2d 121, 123 [ 302 P.2d 11 ]; Arthur v. Arthur, 147 Cal.App.2d 252, 258 [ 305 P.2d 171 ] ; Lubin v. Lubin, 144 Cal.App.2d 781, 788 [ 302 P.2d 49 ].) The cases holding that such an incorporated property settlement agreement cannot be enforced by contempt (e.g., Bradley v. Superior Court, 48 Cal.2d 509, 521 [ 310 P.2d 634 ]; Plumer v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.2d 631, 635 [ 328 P.2d 193 ]) recognize that ordinary procedures for enforcement of a money judgment remain applicable, contempt alone being ruled out.

1960(See Foust v. Foust, 47 Cal.2d 121, 123 [ 302 P.2d 11 ]; Arthur v. Arthur, 147 Cal.App.2d 252, 258 [ 305 P.2d 171 ] ; Lubin v. Lubin, 144 Cal.App.2d 781, 788 [ 302 P.2d 49 ].) The cases holding that such an incorporated property settlement agreement cannot be enforced by contempt (e.g., Bradley v. Superior Court, 48 Cal.2d 509, 521 [ 310 P.2d 634 ]; Plumer v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.2d 631, 635 [ 328 P.2d 193 ]) recognize that ordinary procedures for enforcement of a money judgment remain applicable, contempt alone being ruled out.

1960(See Foust v. Foust, 47 Cal.2d 121, 123 [ 302 P.2d 11 ]; Arthur v. Arthur, 147 Cal.App.2d 252, 258 [ 305 P.2d 171 ] ; Lubin v. Lubin, 144 Cal.App.2d 781, 788 [ 302 P.2d 49 ].) The cases holding that such an incorporated property settlement agreement cannot be enforced by contempt (e.g., Bradley v. Superior Court, 48 Cal.2d 509, 521 [ 310 P.2d 634 ]; Plumer v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.2d 631, 635 [ 328 P.2d 193 ]) recognize that ordinary procedures for enforcement of a money judgment remain applicable, contempt alone being ruled out.

1960Co., 16 Cal.2d 744, 751 [ 108 P.2d 410 ].) Also pertinent here is the following passage from Van Orden v. Anderson, 122 Cal.App. 132, 142 [ 9 P.2d 572 ] : “Nor will a contingency as to the amount prevent a valid levy provided the defendant’s interest is capable of certain and definite ascertainment (28 C.

1960Co., 16 Cal.2d 744, 751 [ 108 P.2d 410 ].) Also pertinent here is the following passage from Van Orden v. Anderson, 122 Cal.App. 132, 142 [ 9 P.2d 572 ] : “Nor will a contingency as to the amount prevent a valid levy provided the defendant’s interest is capable of certain and definite ascertainment (28 C.

1960Co., 16 Cal.2d 744, 751 [ 108 P.2d 410 ].) Also pertinent here is the following passage from Van Orden v. Anderson, 122 Cal.App. 132, 142 [ 9 P.2d 572 ] : “Nor will a contingency as to the amount prevent a valid levy provided the defendant’s interest is capable of certain and definite ascertainment (28 C.

1952Three of them correctly hold that the property owner is not a party to the improvement contract and the others are not inconsistent with the declared doctrine that when the special assessment proceedings are completed a contractual relation arises as between the bondholder and the property owner to such an extent that the substantial rights *886 of either may not be impaired by subsequent legislation.” (Italics added.) See, also, County of Los Angeles v. Rockhold, 3 Cal.2d 192, 201-2 [ 44 P.2d 340 , 100 A.L.R. 149 ].

1952Three of them correctly hold that the property owner is not a party to the improvement contract and the others are not inconsistent with the declared doctrine that when the special assessment proceedings are completed a contractual relation arises as between the bondholder and the property owner to such an extent that the substantial rights *886 of either may not be impaired by subsequent legislation.” (Italics added.) See, also, County of Los Angeles v. Rockhold, 3 Cal.2d 192, 201-2 [ 44 P.2d 340 , 100 A.L.R. 149 ].

1950The power should be exercised only when the right is clear, the injury impending and threatened, so as to be averted only by the protecting preventive process of injunction.’ ” (Bank of America v. Williams, 89 Cal.App.2d 21, 23-24 [ 200 P.2d 151 ].) “A complaint for an injunction which alleges only general conclusions, not warranted by any pleading of facts, does not state a cause of action to enjoin the acts complained of. [Citing cases.] ” (E.

1950The power should be exercised only when the right is clear, the injury impending and threatened, so as to be averted only by the protecting preventive process of injunction.’ ” (Bank of America v. Williams, 89 Cal.App.2d 21, 23-24 [ 200 P.2d 151 ].) “A complaint for an injunction which alleges only general conclusions, not warranted by any pleading of facts, does not state a cause of action to enjoin the acts complained of. [Citing cases.] ” (E.

1948Renzel Co. v. Warehousemen’s Union, 16 Cal.2d 369, 373 [ 106 P.2d 1 ], the court stated: “A complaint for an injunction which alleges only general conclusions, not warranted by any pleading of facts, does not state a cause of action to enjoin the acts complained of. ’ ’ In McPheeters v. McMahon, 131 Cal.App. 418, 425 [ 21 P.2d 606 ], this division of the court declared the rule to be that *24 “An injunction should rarely, if ever, be issued in a doubtful ease.

1948Renzel Co. v. Warehousemen’s Union, 16 Cal.2d 369, 373 [ 106 P.2d 1 ], the court stated: “A complaint for an injunction which alleges only general conclusions, not warranted by any pleading of facts, does not state a cause of action to enjoin the acts complained of. ’ ’ In McPheeters v. McMahon, 131 Cal.App. 418, 425 [ 21 P.2d 606 ], this division of the court declared the rule to be that *24 “An injunction should rarely, if ever, be issued in a doubtful ease.

1948The power should be exercised only when the right is clear, the injury impending and threatened, so as to be averted only by the protecting preventive process of injunction.” In Davitt v. American Bakers’ Union, 124 Cal. 99, 101 [ 56 P. 775 ], appears the following comment: “In the face of the demurrer interposed in this case the complaint must fall.

1940R. 123] ; Ley v. Bishopp, 88 Cal. App. 313 [ 263 Pac. 369 ] ; Barham v. Widing, 210 Cal. 206, 214, 215 [ 291 Pac. 173 ].) In the last-cited case, where the judgment was based upon an inference drawn from circumstantial evidence, although the inference was opposed to the direct testimony of the defendant and another witness, the Supreme Court upheld the judgment, declaring at page 215 of 210 Cal.: ‘ ‘ The jurors were entitled to accept the solution to which these circumstances led them in preference, even, to the positive testimony of the defendant and his nurse to the contrary.” In Mah See v.

1940R. 123] ; Ley v. Bishopp, 88 Cal. App. 313 [ 263 Pac. 369 ] ; Barham v. Widing, 210 Cal. 206, 214, 215 [ 291 Pac. 173 ].) In the last-cited case, where the judgment was based upon an inference drawn from circumstantial evidence, although the inference was opposed to the direct testimony of the defendant and another witness, the Supreme Court upheld the judgment, declaring at page 215 of 210 Cal.: ‘ ‘ The jurors were entitled to accept the solution to which these circumstances led them in preference, even, to the positive testimony of the defendant and his nurse to the contrary.” In Mah See v.