declared instruction in Missouri

1987We note in passing that, while the court declared the instruction in Bewley followed the substantive law, Id. at 551-52 , the instruction is not a model of clarity.

1984Thus, in Greene v. Holt, 76 Mo. 677 (1882), a deed to estate property by one coadministrator to the other was declared in violation of the extant statute, and void.

1984In Barnard, v. Keathley, 230 Mo. 209 , 130 S.W. 306 (1910); Gilmore v. Thomas, 252 Mo. 147 , 158 S.W. 577 (1913) the sale of estate property by the executor to a son who then reconveyed to the fiduciary was, in the former case, set aside and, in the latter, denied legal effect.

1984In Barnard, v. Keathley, 230 Mo. 209 , 130 S.W. 306 (1910); Gilmore v. Thomas, 252 Mo. 147 , 158 S.W. 577 (1913) the sale of estate property by the executor to a son who then reconveyed to the fiduciary was, in the former case, set aside and, in the latter, denied legal effect.

1984In Barnard, v. Keathley, 230 Mo. 209 , 130 S.W. 306 (1910); Gilmore v. Thomas, 252 Mo. 147 , 158 S.W. 577 (1913) the sale of estate property by the executor to a son who then reconveyed to the fiduciary was, in the former case, set aside and, in the latter, denied legal effect.

1984In Barnard, v. Keathley, 230 Mo. 209 , 130 S.W. 306 (1910); Gilmore v. Thomas, 252 Mo. 147 , 158 S.W. 577 (1913) the sale of estate property by the executor to a son who then reconveyed to the fiduciary was, in the former case, set aside and, in the latter, denied legal effect.

1980In State v. Smith and Hodges, 592 S.W.2d 165 (Mo.banc 1979), the court declared the test to be applied to determine whether an offense is a lesser included offense by quoting from State v. Amsden, 299 S.W.2d 498, 504 (Mo.1957) as follows: “The statement of the general rule necessarily implies that the lesser crime must be included in the higher crime with which the accused is specifically charged, and that the averment of the indictment describing the manner in which the greater offense was committed must contain allegations essential to constitute a charge of the lesser, to sustain a convicti

1974In State v. Heather, 498 S.W.2d 300 (Mo.App.1973), the court declared the test was whether the statement was reliable; i. e., if the statement is the product of a rational intellect and a free will, it is admissible — the fact of intoxication going only to the weight and credibility to be accorded the statement.

1974Our Supreme Court, in State v. Smith, Mo., 342 S.W.2d 940 (1961) declared that a statement is admissible if the defendant had mental capacity to know what he was saying.

1934Co., 91 Maine, 87, 39 Atl. 352, 356 , the court declared the rule as follows: “It.does not lie in the power of one party to prevent the introduction of relevant evidence by admitting in general terms the fact which such evidence tends to prove, if the presiding justice, in his discretion, deems it proper to receive it.

1916In the case of Thompson v. Furr, 57 Miss. 478, 484 , the court used the following language: “A creditor h'as a perfect right to protect his own interests, but in so doing he must not lend himself to any scheme whereby others may be defrauded; and he does this whenever he knowingly accepts the benefits of an arrangement by which others are deceived and misled, and the interests of the debtor thereby improperly protected from the lawful demands of his creditors. ’ ’ Although that was not a case in which the facts were identical with those of our case, the court declared a principle which we thin

1916In the case of Thompson v. Furr, 57 Miss. 478, 484 , the court used the following language: “A creditor h'as a perfect right to protect his own interests, but in so doing he must not lend himself to any scheme whereby others may be defrauded; and he does this whenever he knowingly accepts the benefits of an arrangement by which others are deceived and misled, and the interests of the debtor thereby improperly protected from the lawful demands of his creditors. ’ ’ Although that was not a case in which the facts were identical with those of our case, the court declared a principle which we thin

1916In the case of Thompson v. Furr, 57 Miss. 478, 484 , the court used the following language: “A creditor h'as a perfect right to protect his own interests, but in so doing he must not lend himself to any scheme whereby others may be defrauded; and he does this whenever he knowingly accepts the benefits of an arrangement by which others are deceived and misled, and the interests of the debtor thereby improperly protected from the lawful demands of his creditors. ’ ’ Although that was not a case in which the facts were identical with those of our case, the court declared a principle which we thin

1915In State v. Strong, 153 Mo. 555 , the court declared an instruction for murder in the second degree erroneous because no definition was given of the words “in a heat of passion,” citing in support thereof the Andrew-case, which has been shown to be an authority to the contrary, and State v. Forsythe, 89 Mo. 667 , and State v. Hickam, 95 Mo. l. c. 330, in each of which the charg*e was for an assault with intent to kill.

1904The same legal principle is approved in Curtis v. Railroad, 18 N. Y. 534 ; Meeter v. Railway, 70 (Sup. Ct.) N. Y., 63 Hun 533 ; Cameron v. Union Trunk Line, 10 Wash. 507 .

1904The same legal principle is approved in Curtis v. Railroad, 18 N. Y. 534 ; Meeter v. Railway, 70 (Sup. Ct.) N. Y., 63 Hun 533 ; Cameron v. Union Trunk Line, 10 Wash. 507 .

1904In Kucera v. Lumber Co., 91 Wis. 637 , the instruction that plaintiff might recover for pain and suffering he was “likely to endure in the future” resulting from the injury, was pronounced error, upon authority of Hardy v. Milwaukee, etc., Co., 89 Wis. 183 , where the language employed in the charge was for pain and suffering which plaintiff “may endure hereafter” and in same State, White v. Railway, 61 Wis. 536 , the court condemned, a finding that an injury “may prove permanent.” In Fry v. Railroad, 45 Iowa 416 , the jury were authorized to give damages for such future pain and suffering, as

1904The same legal principle is approved in Curtis v. Railroad, 18 N. Y. 534 ; Meeter v. Railway, 70 (Sup. Ct.) N. Y., 63 Hun 533 ; Cameron v. Union Trunk Line, 10 Wash. 507 .

1904In Kucera v. Lumber Co., 91 Wis. 637 , the instruction that plaintiff might recover for pain and suffering he was “likely to endure in the future” resulting from the injury, was pronounced error, upon authority of Hardy v. Milwaukee, etc., Co., 89 Wis. 183 , where the language employed in the charge was for pain and suffering which plaintiff “may endure hereafter” and in same State, White v. Railway, 61 Wis. 536 , the court condemned, a finding that an injury “may prove permanent.” In Fry v. Railroad, 45 Iowa 416 , the jury were authorized to give damages for such future pain and suffering, as

1904In Kucera v. Lumber Co., 91 Wis. 637 , the instruction that plaintiff might recover for pain and suffering he was “likely to endure in the future” resulting from the injury, was pronounced error, upon authority of Hardy v. Milwaukee, etc., Co., 89 Wis. 183 , where the language employed in the charge was for pain and suffering which plaintiff “may endure hereafter” and in same State, White v. Railway, 61 Wis. 536 , the court condemned, a finding that an injury “may prove permanent.” In Fry v. Railroad, 45 Iowa 416 , the jury were authorized to give damages for such future pain and suffering, as

1904In Kucera v. Lumber Co., 91 Wis. 637 , the instruction that plaintiff might recover for pain and suffering he was “likely to endure in the future” resulting from the injury, was pronounced error, upon authority of Hardy v. Milwaukee, etc., Co., 89 Wis. 183 , where the language employed in the charge was for pain and suffering which plaintiff “may endure hereafter” and in same State, White v. Railway, 61 Wis. 536 , the court condemned, a finding that an injury “may prove permanent.” In Fry v. Railroad, 45 Iowa 416 , the jury were authorized to give damages for such future pain and suffering, as

1903It is contended that as the policy in question provides that the appellant shall not be liable for injuries resulting directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, from intoxicants, anaesthetics, narcotics, sunstroke, freezing, vertigo, sleepwalking, fits, hernia, orchitis or any disease or bodily infirmity, the latter clause, “any dis ease or bodily infirmity” is limited by the preceding exceptions, viz: intoxicants, etc. In Grumley v. Webb, 44 Mo. 444 , the court declared the rule to be: ‘ ‘Language however general in its form, when used in connection with a particular subject matter, may be

1903Louis v. Laughlin, 49 Mo. 559 , the rule was stated thus: “It is an established rule of construction where general words follow particular ones, to construe the former as applicable to the things or persons particularly mentioned.” In State ex rel. v. Corlrins, 123 Mo. 56 , the rule as stated was held to apply only where the particular words are of the same nature or kind.

1903Louis v. Laughlin, 49 Mo. 559 , the rule was stated thus: “It is an established rule of construction where general words follow particular ones, to construe the former as applicable to the things or persons particularly mentioned.” In State ex rel. v. Corlrins, 123 Mo. 56 , the rule as stated was held to apply only where the particular words are of the same nature or kind.