declared rule in Pennsylvania

1992In upholding the exclusion, the Court stated: “[ujnderinsured motorist coverage is not designed to relieve an insured or his family from the failure to purchase adequate liability coverage.” Id. at 483 .

1968Co. v. Bogie, 422 Pa. 564 , Yarsunas v. Boros, 423 Pa. 364 , and Argo v. Goodstein, 424 Pa. 612 . *366 In Argo v. Goodstein, the majority of this Court declared that the rule mandating a new trial when the judge communicates with a jury in the absence of counsel is “prophylactic.” The writer of this opinion considers that rule more didactic than prophylactic because, under its literal interpretation, a two-month trial could become invalidated if the jury sent a note to the judge asking what time they would have dinner, and the judge, without summoning counsel to hear his portentous announcemen

1968The Commonwealth places itself in sort of a dilemma; if the “interpretation” of the taxing statute was so well settled, the Commonwealth, by its settlement of Bethlehem’s tax reports based upon another “interpretation” of the statute, permitted Bethlehem to overpay its taxes; on the other hand, if there was no such established “interpretation”, then Bethlehem’s “interpretation” later became erroneous only when this Court so declared such error in Com. v. Koppers Company, 397 Pa. 523 , 156 A. 2d 328 .

1968The Commonwealth places itself in sort of a dilemma; if the “interpretation” of the taxing statute was so well settled, the Commonwealth, by its settlement of Bethlehem’s tax reports based upon another “interpretation” of the statute, permitted Bethlehem to overpay its taxes; on the other hand, if there was no such established “interpretation”, then Bethlehem’s “interpretation” later became erroneous only when this Court so declared such error in Com. v. Koppers Company, 397 Pa. 523 , 156 A. 2d 328 .

1968Co. v. Bogie, 422 Pa. 564 , Yarsunas v. Boros, 423 Pa. 364 , and Argo v. Goodstein, 424 Pa. 612 . *366 In Argo v. Goodstein, the majority of this Court declared that the rule mandating a new trial when the judge communicates with a jury in the absence of counsel is “prophylactic.” The writer of this opinion considers that rule more didactic than prophylactic because, under its literal interpretation, a two-month trial could become invalidated if the jury sent a note to the judge asking what time they would have dinner, and the judge, without summoning counsel to hear his portentous announcemen

1968Co. v. Bogie, 422 Pa. 564 , Yarsunas v. Boros, 423 Pa. 364 , and Argo v. Goodstein, 424 Pa. 612 . *366 In Argo v. Goodstein, the majority of this Court declared that the rule mandating a new trial when the judge communicates with a jury in the absence of counsel is “prophylactic.” The writer of this opinion considers that rule more didactic than prophylactic because, under its literal interpretation, a two-month trial could become invalidated if the jury sent a note to the judge asking what time they would have dinner, and the judge, without summoning counsel to hear his portentous announcemen

1965"The burden of proving the existence of contributory negligence is upon the defendant." In Heimbach v. Peltz, 384 Pa. 308 , this Court declared that an instruction which declared that a duty devolved on the plaintiff "to make out a case free of contributory negligence" was misleading and erroneous.

1965“The burden of proving the existence of contributory negligence is upon the defendant.” In Heimbach v. Peltz, 384 Pa. 308 , this Court declared that an instruction which declared that a duty devolved on the plaintiff “to make out a case free of contributory negligence” was misleading and erroneous.

1965In Brown v. Jones, 404 Pa. 513 , we found reversible error in a court's charge which stated that "the plaintiff is obliged to show you a case which is free from contributory negligence." It is a mistaken idea that contributory negligence is a minor incident in a case and can be treated casually *162 in the court's charge.

1965In Brown v. Jones, 404 Pa. 513 , we found reversible error in a court’s charge which stated that “the plaintiff is obliged to show you a case which is free from contributory negligence.” It is a mistaken idea that contributory negligence is a minor incident in a case and can be treated casu ally in the court’s charge.

1963The court declared this instruction was in error, citing Windle v. Davis, 275 Pa. 23 , where this Court said, back in the lush days of 1922: “A jury must compute damages according to law, not merely to their own satisfaction, and when passing upon the question of future damages they can allow, as the present worth, such sum only as put at simple interest will, with the accumulations of interest, amount to such damages at the time or times in the future when the jury find from the evidence they will be sustained.

1963The court declared this instruction was in error, citing Windle v. Davis, 275 Pa. 23 , where this Court said, back in the lush days of 1922: "A jury must compute damages according to law, not merely to their own satisfaction, and when passing upon the question of future damages they can allow, as the present worth, such sum only as put at *587 simple interest will, with the accumulations of interest, amount to such damages at the time or times in the future when the jury find from the evidence they will be sustained.

1915This she must show by proof that is clear, full and satisfactory.” In Taylor v. Paul, 6 Pa. Superior Ct. 496 , this court declared the rule to be: “The property of a husband is not to be covered up or withheld from creditors upon equivocal, suspicious or doubtful evidence of a wife’s right to it.