declared rule in Illinois

1998In People v. Moriarity [citation], the court declared the rule and simply cited to Tamborski.” Andrade, 279 Ill.

1998App. 3d at 298 , 664 N.E.2d at 262 .

1996In People v. Uryasz, 32 Ill.

1996In People v. Moriarity, 33 Ill. 2d 606 , 213 N.E.2d 516 (1966), the court declared the rule and simply cited to Tamborski.

1996In People v. Moriarity, 33 Ill. 2d 606 , 213 N.E.2d 516 (1966), the court declared the rule and simply cited to Tamborski.

1978(Suvada v. White Motor Co. (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 612, 617 , citing as an example of independent contractor liability Paul Harris Furniture Co. v. Morse (1956), 10 Ill. 2d 28 .) This conclusion comports with section 404 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which section reads: “One who as an independent contractor negligently makes, rebuilds, or repairs a chattel for another is subject to the same liability as that imposed upon negligent manufacturers of chattel.” (Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 404 (1965).) Accord, Prosser, Torts sec. 104, at 680-81 (4th ed. 1971); 41 Am.

1978(Suvada v. White Motor Co. (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 612, 617 , citing as an example of independent contractor liability Paul Harris Furniture Co. v. Morse (1956), 10 Ill. 2d 28 .) This conclusion comports with section 404 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which section reads: “One who as an independent contractor negligently makes, rebuilds, or repairs a chattel for another is subject to the same liability as that imposed upon negligent manufacturers of chattel.” (Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 404 (1965).) Accord, Prosser, Torts sec. 104, at 680-81 (4th ed. 1971); 41 Am.

1964Sunbeam Corp. v. Richard’s Appliances, Inc., supra; Lee v. Morris, 326 Ill App 555, 62 NE2d 573 ; Moss v. Balch, 320 Ill App 135, 49 NE2d 801 .

1953There are other cases of like import: American Sunday School Union v. Philadelphia, 161 Pa. 307 , 29 Atl. 26 , 23 L.R.A. 695 ; Gunter v. Jackson, 130 Miss 637, 94 So. 844 .

1953There are other cases of like import: American Sunday School Union v. Philadelphia, 161 Pa. 307 , 29 Atl. 26 , 23 L.R.A. 695 ; Gunter v. Jackson, 130 Miss 637, 94 So. 844 .

1953There are other cases of like import: American Sunday School Union v. Philadelphia, 161 Pa. 307 , 29 Atl. 26 , 23 L.R.A. 695 ; Gunter v. Jackson, 130 Miss 637, 94 So. 844 .

1938It was there said in the opinion: “It [the argument] ignores the essential fact that here the interest is purely statutory, and arises neither from an agreement, express or implied, nor by way of damages or penalty for delay in payment of the principal.” In Blaine v. City of Chicago, 366 Ill. 341 , and in Kamberos v. City of Chicago, id. 471 , this court declared that the rule in the Turk and Feldman cases, and other cases there cited, is the settled law of this State.

1938It was there said in the opinion: “It [the argument] ignores the essential fact that here the interest is purely statutory, and arises neither from an agreement, express or implied, nor by way of damages or penalty for delay in payment of the principal.” In Blaine v. City of Chicago, 366 Ill. 341 , and in Kamberos v. City of Chicago, id. 471 , this court declared that the rule in the Turk and Feldman cases, and other cases there cited, is the settled law of this State.

1936A prior adjudication between the same parties is conclusive upon them, not only as to the matters actually determined, but as to every other thing within the knowledge of the parties which might have been set up as a ground for relief or defense.” The question in Hamilton v. Quimby, 46 Ill. 90 , was whether a contention there made had been decided in a previous suit between the parties, and the court said: “The question seems to have been litigated and judicially determined in the decree, under the bill for an injunction.

1936In Bacon v. Reichelt, 272 Ill. 90 , the court declared the rule to be: “It was the duty of the appellant to set up in that proceeding his interest in the premises, and the decree in that case is conclusive upon Mm, not only as to the issues which were actually made and determined in the case, but also as to every matter which was properly involved and which mig’ht have been raised and determined.

1907Co. v. Cotton, 140 Ill., 486 , cited in the Leonard case, supra, the court declared the rule fundamental that a plaintiff must recover, if at all, upon the ease made by his declaration, and in applying the rule to actions for negligence a plaintiff cannot charge one species of negligence in his declaration and recover upon proof of negligence of a different character.