Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
9 Ohio opinions name it 1 courts 2008–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Sharpegreen2 sentences2023In other words, for the protective sweep exception to apply, “there must be some positive indication that another person or persons remain in the residential premises where a subject is arrested and that they pose a threat to the safety of officers or others.” State v. Sharpe, 174 Ohio App.3d 498 , 2008-Ohio-267 , 882 N.E.2d 960, ¶ 46 (2d Dist.). {¶ 60} Unlike a protective sweep, where there is a concern that someone inside the home poses a danger to police or others on scene, the emergency aid/community caretaking exception applies in situations where police have reason to believe that someon 2023In other words, for the protective sweep exception to apply, “there must be some positive indication that another person or persons remain in the residential premises where a subject is arrested and that they pose a threat to the safety of officers or others.” State v. Sharpe, 174 Ohio App.3d 498 , 2008-Ohio-267 , 882 N.E.2d 960, ¶ 46 (2d Dist.). {¶ 60} Unlike a protective sweep, where there is a concern that someone inside the home poses a danger to police or others on scene, the emergency aid/community caretaking exception applies in situations where police have reason to believe that someon | 1 | 2 |
State v. Levengoodgreen1 sentence2025State v. Mathews, 2015-Ohio-1047 , ¶ 10 (2d Dist.); State v. Levengood, 2016-Ohio-1340, ¶ 23 (5th Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
Lewis L. Wayne v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2023“The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.” Id., quoting Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C.Cir.1963). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Mark Allen Fordgreen1 sentence2020See State v. Mickey, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82844, 2003-Ohio-6878, ¶ 17 (noting that “the instances in which law enforcement can lawfully perform warrantless protective sweeps” has been extended “to include situations where the arrest was made outside of, but near, the home”), citing United States v. Ford, 56 F.3d 265 (D.C.Cir.1995) and United States v. Colbert, 76 F.3d 773 (D.C.Cir.1996). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Lorenzo Cortez Colbertgreen1 sentence2020See State v. Mickey, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82844, 2003-Ohio-6878, ¶ 17 (noting that “the instances in which law enforcement can lawfully perform warrantless protective sweeps” has been extended “to include situations where the arrest was made outside of, but near, the home”), citing United States v. Ford, 56 F.3d 265 (D.C.Cir.1995) and United States v. Colbert, 76 F.3d 773 (D.C.Cir.1996). | 1 | 1 |
Kentucky v. Kinggreen1 sentence2020See King, 563 U.S. at 457 ; 2 Although a difference of opinion exists whether the protective-sweep doctrine permits limited searches of a person’s home “if there is a likelihood that another person may be on the premises who may destroy evidence,” we decline to extend the protective-sweep doctrine to prevent the destruction of evidence here. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mickey, Unpublished Decision (12-18-2003)green1 sentence2020See State v. Mickey, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82844, 2003-Ohio-6878, ¶ 17 (noting that “the instances in which law enforcement can lawfully perform warrantless protective sweeps” has been extended “to include situations where the arrest was made outside of, but near, the home”), citing United States v. Ford, 56 F.3d 265 (D.C.Cir.1995) and United States v. Colbert, 76 F.3d 773 (D.C.Cir.1996). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hollandgreen1 sentence2020See State v. Holland, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-790, 2014-Ohio-1964, ¶ 20 (affirming the trial court’s 3 Because we conclude that law enforcement’s search of the residence in this case was within the scope necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence, we need not address the application of the protective-sweep doctrine in this case. -15- denial of Holland’s motion to suppress evidence “for a different reason than stated in the trial court’s decision”). {¶25} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the tr | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrezgreen1 sentence2018See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 248 F.3d 506, 513-514 (6th Cir.2001); United States v. Miller, 430 F.3d 93, 98-99 (2d Cir.2005); United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 598 F.3d 997, 1006-1007 (8th Cir.2010); United States v. Werra, 638 F.3d 326, 350-351 (1st Cir.2011); United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 584 (5th Cir.2004); Leaf v. Shelnutt, 400 F.3d 1070, 1086-1087 (7th Cir.2005). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Joseph Benjamin Taylor IIIgreen1 sentence2018See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 248 F.3d 506, 513-514 (6th Cir.2001); United States v. Miller, 430 F.3d 93, 98-99 (2d Cir.2005); United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 598 F.3d 997, 1006-1007 (8th Cir.2010); United States v. Werra, 638 F.3d 326, 350-351 (1st Cir.2011); United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 584 (5th Cir.2004); Leaf v. Shelnutt, 400 F.3d 1070, 1086-1087 (7th Cir.2005). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Kelly Donald Gouldred1 sentence2018See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 248 F.3d 506, 513-514 (6th Cir.2001); United States v. Miller, 430 F.3d 93, 98-99 (2d Cir.2005); United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 598 F.3d 997, 1006-1007 (8th Cir.2010); United States v. Werra, 638 F.3d 326, 350-351 (1st Cir.2011); United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 584 (5th Cir.2004); Leaf v. Shelnutt, 400 F.3d 1070, 1086-1087 (7th Cir.2005). | 1 | 1 |
Larry J. Leaf, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of John P. Leaf, Deceased, Martha A. Leaf, John P. Leaf v. Ronald Shelnuttgreen1 sentence2018See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 248 F.3d 506, 513-514 (6th Cir.2001); United States v. Miller, 430 F.3d 93, 98-99 (2d Cir.2005); United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 598 F.3d 997, 1006-1007 (8th Cir.2010); United States v. Werra, 638 F.3d 326, 350-351 (1st Cir.2011); United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 584 (5th Cir.2004); Leaf v. Shelnutt, 400 F.3d 1070, 1086-1087 (7th Cir.2005). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Alfred G. Millergreen1 sentence2018See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 248 F.3d 506, 513-514 (6th Cir.2001); United States v. Miller, 430 F.3d 93, 98-99 (2d Cir.2005); United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 598 F.3d 997, 1006-1007 (8th Cir.2010); United States v. Werra, 638 F.3d 326, 350-351 (1st Cir.2011); United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 584 (5th Cir.2004); Leaf v. Shelnutt, 400 F.3d 1070, 1086-1087 (7th Cir.2005). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Werragreen1 sentence2018See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 248 F.3d 506, 513-514 (6th Cir.2001); United States v. Miller, 430 F.3d 93, 98-99 (2d Cir.2005); United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 598 F.3d 997, 1006-1007 (8th Cir.2010); United States v. Werra, 638 F.3d 326, 350-351 (1st Cir.2011); United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 584 (5th Cir.2004); Leaf v. Shelnutt, 400 F.3d 1070, 1086-1087 (7th Cir.2005). | 1 | 1 |
Thornton v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2015In Gant, the Supreme Court "clarified that an automobile search may fall within the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine only in two very specific situations: 'when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search' (the officer-safety justification), or 'when it is "reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle" ' (the evidence- preservation justification)." Polanco at 42 , quoting Gant at 343, 333 , quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004). | 1 | 1 |
Arizona v. Gantgreen1 sentence2015In Gant, the Supreme Court "clarified that an automobile search may fall within the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine only in two very specific situations: 'when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search' (the officer-safety justification), or 'when it is "reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle" ' (the evidence- preservation justification)." Polanco at 42 , quoting Gant at 343, 333 , quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Polancogreen1 sentence2015As noted, the state contends the trial court applied the wrong doctrine in this case, i.e., that it analyzed the case under the search incident to arrest exception, as recently clarified in the Supreme Court's holding in Gant, instead of utilizing the protective-sweep exception as set forth in Long. {¶ 29} By way of background, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Gant, "officers could conduct a warrantless search of 'the passenger compartment of [the No. 14AP-709 9 arrestee's] automobile' under [the search incident to arrest] doctrine." United States v. Polanco, 634 F.3d 39, 42 (1st Cir.2 | 1 | 1 |
New York v. Beltonred1 sentence2015As noted, the state contends the trial court applied the wrong doctrine in this case, i.e., that it analyzed the case under the search incident to arrest exception, as recently clarified in the Supreme Court's holding in Gant, instead of utilizing the protective-sweep exception as set forth in Long. {¶ 29} By way of background, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Gant, "officers could conduct a warrantless search of 'the passenger compartment of [the No. 14AP-709 9 arrestee's] automobile' under [the search incident to arrest] doctrine." United States v. Polanco, 634 F.3d 39, 42 (1st Cir.2 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Lyons
green
2 sentences2018“The scope of the protective sweep must not exceed that reasonably necessary to protect the safety of the officers.” State v. Lyons, 83 Ohio App.3d 525, 534 , 615 N.E.2d 310 (2d Dist.1992). {¶ 32} A majority of federal circuit courts have extended the protective sweep doctrine to cases where officers possess a reasonable suspicion that their safety is at risk, even in the absence of an arrest. 2018“The scope of the protective sweep must not exceed that reasonably necessary to protect the safety of the officers.” State v. Lyons, 83 Ohio App.3d 525, 534 , 615 N.E.2d 310 (2d Dist.1992). {¶ 32} A majority of federal circuit courts have extended the protective sweep doctrine to cases where officers possess a reasonable suspicion that their safety is at risk, even in the absence of an arrest. | 2 | 2017–2018 |
Maryland v. Buie
green
2 sentences2012Buie, 494 U.S. at 327 , 110 S.Ct. 1093 , 108 L.Ed.2d 276 . {¶ 10} We further stated in Sharpe at ¶ 44 , 46: The protective-sweep exception established in Buie is grounded on the “interest of the officers in taking steps to assure themselves that the house in which a suspect is being, or has just been, arrested is not harboring other persons who are dangerous and who could unexpectedly launch an attack.” 494 U.S. at 333 , 110 S.Ct. 1093 , 108 L.Ed.2d 276 . 2012Buie, 494 U.S. at 327 , 110 S.Ct. 1093 , 108 L.Ed.2d 276 . {¶ 10} We further stated in Sharpe at ¶ 44 , 46: The protective-sweep exception established in Buie is grounded on the “interest of the officers in taking steps to assure themselves that the house in which a suspect is being, or has just been, arrested is not harboring other persons who are dangerous and who could unexpectedly launch an attack.” 494 U.S. at 333 , 110 S.Ct. 1093 , 108 L.Ed.2d 276 . | 2 | 2008–2012 |
Kimmelman v. Morrison
green
2 sentences2023That is so because “it is through counsel that the accused secures his other rights.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377 , 106 S.Ct. 2574 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). 2023That is so because “it is through counsel that the accused secures his other rights.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377 , 106 S.Ct. 2574 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2023Jones argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the evidence from the safe as a product of coercion and a protective sweep in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 3 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS Defendants Have a Constitutional Right to the Effective Assistance of Counsel {¶8} The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused person the right to counsel, requiring the effective assistance of an attorney “who plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 2023Jones argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the evidence from the safe as a product of coercion and a protective sweep in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 3 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS Defendants Have a Constitutional Right to the Effective Assistance of Counsel {¶8} The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused person the right to counsel, requiring the effective assistance of an attorney “who plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Dunn
green
2 sentences2023In other words, for the protective sweep exception to apply, “there must be some positive indication that another person or persons remain in the residential premises where a subject is arrested and that they pose a threat to the safety of officers or others.” State v. Sharpe, 174 Ohio App.3d 498 , 2008-Ohio-267 , 882 N.E.2d 960, ¶ 46 (2d Dist.). {¶ 60} Unlike a protective sweep, where there is a concern that someone inside the home poses a danger to police or others on scene, the emergency aid/community caretaking exception applies in situations where police have reason to believe that someon 2023In other words, for the protective sweep exception to apply, “there must be some positive indication that another person or persons remain in the residential premises where a subject is arrested and that they pose a threat to the safety of officers or others.” State v. Sharpe, 174 Ohio App.3d 498 , 2008-Ohio-267 , 882 N.E.2d 960, ¶ 46 (2d Dist.). {¶ 60} Unlike a protective sweep, where there is a concern that someone inside the home poses a danger to police or others on scene, the emergency aid/community caretaking exception applies in situations where police have reason to believe that someon | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Mincey v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2023In other words, for the protective sweep exception to apply, “there must be some positive indication that another person or persons remain in the residential premises where a subject is arrested and that they pose a threat to the safety of officers or others.” State v. Sharpe, 174 Ohio App.3d 498 , 2008-Ohio-267 , 882 N.E.2d 960, ¶ 46 (2d Dist.). {¶ 60} Unlike a protective sweep, where there is a concern that someone inside the home poses a danger to police or others on scene, the emergency aid/community caretaking exception applies in situations where police have reason to believe that someon 2023In other words, for the protective sweep exception to apply, “there must be some positive indication that another person or persons remain in the residential premises where a subject is arrested and that they pose a threat to the safety of officers or others.” State v. Sharpe, 174 Ohio App.3d 498 , 2008-Ohio-267 , 882 N.E.2d 960, ¶ 46 (2d Dist.). {¶ 60} Unlike a protective sweep, where there is a concern that someone inside the home poses a danger to police or others on scene, the emergency aid/community caretaking exception applies in situations where police have reason to believe that someon | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Jackson v. United States
green
2 sentences2020Jackson v. United States, 479 U.S. 910 , 107 S.Ct. 308 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the conflict between courts “allowing a protective sweep when the police only suspect that another person on the premises may destroy evidence” and courts permitting only “the more stringent safety-based approach”). 2020Jackson v. United States, 479 U.S. 910 , 107 S.Ct. 308 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the conflict between courts “allowing a protective sweep when the police only suspect that another person on the premises may destroy evidence” and courts permitting only “the more stringent safety-based approach”). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
United States v. Raymond Johnson
green
1 sentence2020Beyond that, “protective sweeps are permitted when officers possess ‘a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.’” Chavez at ¶ 31, quoting Buie at 337. -13- Benvenuto, 2018-Ohio-2242, at ¶ 25 ; Johnson, 457 Fed.Appx. at 515 ; United States v. Waide, E.D.Ky CR No. 5:18-116-KKC, 2019 WL 1521973 , *7 (Apr. 8, 2019). {¶22} Moreover, law enforcement’s warrantless entry was justified because it had a reasonable belief that third parties were inside the residence and a reasonable belief that | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Benvenuto
green
1 sentence2020Beyond that, “protective sweeps are permitted when officers possess ‘a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.’” Chavez at ¶ 31, quoting Buie at 337. -13- Benvenuto, 2018-Ohio-2242, at ¶ 25 ; Johnson, 457 Fed.Appx. at 515 ; United States v. Waide, E.D.Ky CR No. 5:18-116-KKC, 2019 WL 1521973 , *7 (Apr. 8, 2019). {¶22} Moreover, law enforcement’s warrantless entry was justified because it had a reasonable belief that third parties were inside the residence and a reasonable belief that | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.