defendant contends instruction in Oklahoma

1979Mr. Bailiff, you have already been sworn, would you now take this instruction and the jury room for further deliberation." Relying on United States v. Cheramie, 520 F.2d 325 (5th Cir.1975), counsel for the defendant contends that the instruction was coercive and overreaching in that it exhorted the minority to re-examine its views in light of the majority's view, induced the erroneous perception that the jurors have an absolute "duty to decide," and strongly suggested the failure to decide would reflect unfavorably on the jury members.

1979Mr. Bailiff, you have already been sworn, would you now take this instruction and the jury room for further deliberation.” Relying on United States v. Cheramie, 520 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1975), counsel for the defendant contends that the instruction was coercive and overreaching in that it exhorted the minority to re-examine its views in light of the majority’s view, induced the erroneous perception that the jurors have an absolute “duty to decide,” and strongly suggested the failure to decide would reflect unfavorably on the jury members.

1974In Bryant v. State, Okl.Cr., 471 P.2d 948 (1970), the preliminary hearing was held on January 24th and the trial was set for February 15th and 16th.

1949In State v. Cephus, 6 Pennewill, Del. 160, 67 A. 150 , it was said: “In resisting an assault no more force may be used than is necessary, and if the person assaulted uses in his defense greater force he becomes the aggressor.” To the same effect is State v. De Paolo, 26 Del. 176 , 84 A. 213 .

1949In State v. Cephus, 6 Pennewill, Del. 160, 67 A. 150 , it was said: “In resisting an assault no more force may be used than is necessary, and if the person assaulted uses in his defense greater force he becomes the aggressor.” To the same effect is State v. De Paolo, 26 Del. 176 , 84 A. 213 .

1949In State v. Cephus, 6 Pennewill, Del. 160, 67 A. 150 , it was said: “In resisting an assault no more force may be used than is necessary, and if the person assaulted uses in his defense greater force he becomes the aggressor.” To the same effect is State v. De Paolo, 26 Del. 176 , 84 A. 213 .

1949In support of this proposition she cites Crenshaw v. State, 48 Tex. Cr.

1938Co. of N. Y. v. Morgan, 39 Okla. 205 , 135 P. 279 , N. Y.

1938Co. of N. Y. v. Morgan, 39 Okla. 205 , 135 P. 279 , N. Y.

1933The defendant contends that the rule laid down by *207 us in City of Yale v. Noble, 113 Okla. 106 , 239 P. 463 : “In order to be entitled to recover tbe plaintiff bad tbe burden of establishing by competent evidence tbe following facts; First, that tbe city of Yale, prior to tbe establishment of tbe grade complainid of herein, bad established a grade on said street adjacent to tbe property of tbe defendant in error.

1933The defendant contends that the rule laid down by *207 us in City of Yale v. Noble, 113 Okla. 106 , 239 P. 463 : “In order to be entitled to recover tbe plaintiff bad tbe burden of establishing by competent evidence tbe following facts; First, that tbe city of Yale, prior to tbe establishment of tbe grade complainid of herein, bad established a grade on said street adjacent to tbe property of tbe defendant in error.

1925The information charges that the defendant maintained “a place where intoxicating liquors, to wit, whisky, * * * were received and kept for the purpose of bartering, selling, and giving away.” The defendant contends that the information is insufficient under the holding of this court in the case of Proctor v. State, 15 Okla.

1924In the third place the defendant complains of the fifth paragraph of the instruction which was £S follows : “You are instructed that the deceased, by entering the employment of the defendant and engaging in the work of handling the powder in the jack house which was a dan-erous occupation, assumed the ordinary risks and dangers incident thereto, not only so far as they were known to him, but so far as they oould have been known by the use of ordinary care on his part, and if the explosion which resulted in the death of deceased was the result of the ordinary risk and dangers incident to this p

1924In the third place the defendant complains of the fifth paragraph of the instruction which was £S follows : “You are instructed that the deceased, by entering the employment of the defendant and engaging in the work of handling the powder in the jack house which was a dan-erous occupation, assumed the ordinary risks and dangers incident thereto, not only so far as they were known to him, but so far as they oould have been known by the use of ordinary care on his part, and if the explosion which resulted in the death of deceased was the result of the ordinary risk and dangers incident to this p