defendant contends instruction in Connecticut

2020Instead, it can defeat the defense of self-defense by disproving any one of the four elements of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt to your unanimous satisfaction.’’ 6 The defendant contends that his claim is of constitutional magnitude because it implicates the constitutional right to a unanimous verdict and otherwise satisfies the requirements of State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 , 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).

2020Instead, it can defeat the defense of self-defense by disproving any one of the four elements of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt to your unanimous satisfaction.’’ 6 The defendant contends that his claim is of constitutional magnitude because it implicates the constitutional right to a unanimous verdict and otherwise satisfies the requirements of State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 , 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).

2022We emphasize that the Superior Court is provided, by our statutes, with ‘‘plenary and general subject matter jurisdic- tion over legal disputes in family relations matters, including custody and support.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) O’Bryan v. O’Bryan, 67 Conn. App. 51, 54 , 787 A.2d 15 (2001), aff’d, 262 Conn. 355 , 813 A.2d 1001 (2003).

2022We emphasize that the Superior Court is provided, by our statutes, with ‘‘plenary and general subject matter jurisdic- tion over legal disputes in family relations matters, including custody and support.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) O’Bryan v. O’Bryan, 67 Conn. App. 51, 54 , 787 A.2d 15 (2001), aff’d, 262 Conn. 355 , 813 A.2d 1001 (2003).

2022We emphasize that the Superior Court is provided, by our statutes, with ‘‘plenary and general subject matter jurisdic- tion over legal disputes in family relations matters, including custody and support.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) O’Bryan v. O’Bryan, 67 Conn. App. 51, 54 , 787 A.2d 15 (2001), aff’d, 262 Conn. 355 , 813 A.2d 1001 (2003).

2022We emphasize that the Superior Court is provided, by our statutes, with ‘‘plenary and general subject matter jurisdic- tion over legal disputes in family relations matters, including custody and support.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) O’Bryan v. O’Bryan, 67 Conn. App. 51, 54 , 787 A.2d 15 (2001), aff’d, 262 Conn. 355 , 813 A.2d 1001 (2003).

2018In response, the state argues that the defendant is not entitled to review of this claim because (1) it was not preserved by the defendant's request to charge, and (2) the defendant has either induced these errors or waived them pursuant to State v. Kitchens , 299 Conn. 447 , 10 A.3d 942 (2011). 9 We conclude that the defendant's claim was not preserved by his request to charge or exceptions taken at trial and, accordingly, we do not reach its merits.

2018In response, the state argues that the defendant is not entitled to review of this claim because (1) it was not preserved by the defendant's request to charge, and (2) the defendant has either induced these errors or waived them pursuant to State v. Kitchens , 299 Conn. 447 , 10 A.3d 942 (2011). 9 We conclude that the defendant's claim was not preserved by his request to charge or exceptions taken at trial and, accordingly, we do not reach its merits.

2018Our Supreme Court adopted the jailhouse informant exception in State v. Patterson , 276 Conn. 452 , 886 A.2d 777 (2005), holding that a special credibility instruction is required in situations where a prison inmate "has been promised a benefit by the state in return for his or her testimony" regarding incriminating statements made by a fellow inmate.

2018Our Supreme Court adopted the jailhouse informant exception in State v. Patterson , 276 Conn. 452 , 886 A.2d 777 (2005), holding that a special credibility instruction is required in situations where a prison inmate "has been promised a benefit by the state in return for his or her testimony" regarding incriminating statements made by a fellow inmate.

2012Because the defendant must plainly put the trial court on notice as to the specific basis for his objection; see Practice Book § 60-5; State v. Jose G., 290 Conn. 331, 342-43 , 963 A.2d 42 (2009); he did not preserve the objection that he now raises on appeal.

2012Because the defendant must plainly put the trial court on notice as to the specific basis for his objection; see Practice Book § 60-5; State v. Jose G., 290 Conn. 331, 342-43 , 963 A.2d 42 (2009); he did not preserve the objection that he now raises on appeal.

2009The defendant acknowledges that he did not raise an objection before the trial court, and, accordingly, seeks to prevail on this unpreserved claim under either State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989), 5 or the plain error doctrine. 6 *35 The state responds that the defendant’s claim fails to satisfy the second prong of Golding because, as this court has stated, “an instructional omission with respect to an affirmative defense such as legal insanity does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” 7 Slate v. Wilson, 242 Conn. 605, 632 , 700 A.2d 633 (1997); *36 a

2009The defendant acknowledges that he did not raise an objection before the trial court, and, accordingly, seeks to prevail on this unpreserved claim under either State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989), 5 or the plain error doctrine. 6 *35 The state responds that the defendant’s claim fails to satisfy the second prong of Golding because, as this court has stated, “an instructional omission with respect to an affirmative defense such as legal insanity does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” 7 Slate v. Wilson, 242 Conn. 605, 632 , 700 A.2d 633 (1997); *36 a

2009The defendant acknowledges that he did not raise an objection before the trial court, and, accordingly, seeks to prevail on this unpreserved claim under either State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989), 5 or the plain error doctrine. 6 *35 The state responds that the defendant’s claim fails to satisfy the second prong of Golding because, as this court has stated, “an instructional omission with respect to an affirmative defense such as legal insanity does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” 7 Slate v. Wilson, 242 Conn. 605, 632 , 700 A.2d 633 (1997); *36 a

2009The defendant acknowledges that he did not raise an objection before the trial court, and, accordingly, seeks to prevail on this unpreserved claim under either State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989), 5 or the plain error doctrine. 6 *35 The state responds that the defendant’s claim fails to satisfy the second prong of Golding because, as this court has stated, “an instructional omission with respect to an affirmative defense such as legal insanity does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” 7 Slate v. Wilson, 242 Conn. 605, 632 , 700 A.2d 633 (1997); *36 a

2009The defendant acknowledges that he did not raise an objection before the trial court, and, accordingly, seeks to prevail on this unpreserved claim under either State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989), 5 or the plain error doctrine. 6 *35 The state responds that the defendant’s claim fails to satisfy the second prong of Golding because, as this court has stated, “an instructional omission with respect to an affirmative defense such as legal insanity does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” 7 Slate v. Wilson, 242 Conn. 605, 632 , 700 A.2d 633 (1997); *36 a

2009The defendant acknowledges that he did not raise an objection before the trial court, and, accordingly, seeks to prevail on this unpreserved claim under either State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989), 5 or the plain error doctrine. 6 *35 The state responds that the defendant’s claim fails to satisfy the second prong of Golding because, as this court has stated, “an instructional omission with respect to an affirmative defense such as legal insanity does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” 7 Slate v. Wilson, 242 Conn. 605, 632 , 700 A.2d 633 (1997); *36 a

2009The defendant acknowledges that he did not raise an objection before the trial court, and, accordingly, seeks to prevail on this unpreserved claim under either State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989), 5 or the plain error doctrine. 6 *35 The state responds that the defendant’s claim fails to satisfy the second prong of Golding because, as this court has stated, “an instructional omission with respect to an affirmative defense such as legal insanity does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” 7 Slate v. Wilson, 242 Conn. 605, 632 , 700 A.2d 633 (1997); *36 a

2009The defendant acknowledges that he did not raise an objection before the trial court, and, accordingly, seeks to prevail on this unpreserved claim under either State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989), 5 or the plain error doctrine. 6 *35 The state responds that the defendant’s claim fails to satisfy the second prong of Golding because, as this court has stated, “an instructional omission with respect to an affirmative defense such as legal insanity does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” 7 Slate v. Wilson, 242 Conn. 605, 632 , 700 A.2d 633 (1997); *36 a

2009Arguing that criminal attempt requires the defendant to have acted intentionally, the defendant contends that the instruction was misleading, citing State v. Flowers, 278 Conn. 533 , 898 A.2d 789 (2006), for the proposition that the court cannot instruct a *555 jury to find that a defendant “intended an unintentional result . . . .” Id., 544 .

2009Arguing that criminal attempt requires the defendant to have acted intentionally, the defendant contends that the instruction was misleading, citing State v. Flowers, 278 Conn. 533 , 898 A.2d 789 (2006), for the proposition that the court cannot instruct a *555 jury to find that a defendant “intended an unintentional result . . . .” Id., 544 .

2006The defendant contends that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance and that "a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel ... is a factor to be taken into consideration in determining whether a guilty plea was voluntary and intelligent." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Childree, supra, 189 Conn. at 124 , 454 A.2d 1274 .

2006The defendant contends that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance and that "a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel ... is a factor to be taken into consideration in determining whether a guilty plea was voluntary and intelligent." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Childree, supra, 189 Conn. at 124 , 454 A.2d 1274 .

2000Ill The defendant also claims that he is entitled to a new trial in light of the trial court’s jury instruction that “[t]he law is made to protect society and innocent persons and not to protect guilty ones.” Specifically, the defendant contends that this instruction undermined the presumption of innocence, thereby diluting the state’s burden of proof in violation of his fifth amendment right to due process and his sixth amendment right to a jury trial. 33 The defendant concedes that this claim is foreclosed by our recent decision in State v. Schiappa, 248 Conn. 132, 168-73 , 728 A.2d 466 , ce

2000Ill The defendant also claims that he is entitled to a new trial in light of the trial court’s jury instruction that “[t]he law is made to protect society and innocent persons and not to protect guilty ones.” Specifically, the defendant contends that this instruction undermined the presumption of innocence, thereby diluting the state’s burden of proof in violation of his fifth amendment right to due process and his sixth amendment right to a jury trial. 33 The defendant concedes that this claim is foreclosed by our recent decision in State v. Schiappa, 248 Conn. 132, 168-73 , 728 A.2d 466 , ce

2000Ill The defendant also claims that he is entitled to a new trial in light of the trial court’s jury instruction that “[t]he law is made to protect society and innocent persons and not to protect guilty ones.” Specifically, the defendant contends that this instruction undermined the presumption of innocence, thereby diluting the state’s burden of proof in violation of his fifth amendment right to due process and his sixth amendment right to a jury trial. 33 The defendant concedes that this claim is foreclosed by our recent decision in State v. Schiappa, 248 Conn. 132, 168-73 , 728 A.2d 466 , ce

1998The defendant contends that if defense counsel questioned Cabral concerning his advice to her with respect to the alibi, he would have been, in effect, testifying as an unsworn witness while at the same time acting as an advocate. 1 “Practice Book § 4061 provides that ‘[t]he court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial. . . .’ This court follows the ‘[long-standing] rule that absent certain exceptional circumstances . . . claims not distinctly raised at trial will not be reviewed on appeal.’ Biggs v. Warden, 26 Conn.

1998The defendant contends that if defense counsel questioned Cabral concerning his advice to her with respect to the alibi, he would have been, in effect, testifying as an unsworn witness while at the same time acting as an advocate. 1 “Practice Book § 4061 provides that ‘[t]he court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial. . . .’ This court follows the ‘[long-standing] rule that absent certain exceptional circumstances . . . claims not distinctly raised at trial will not be reviewed on appeal.’ Biggs v. Warden, 26 Conn.

1998The defendant contends that if defense counsel questioned Cabral concerning his advice to her with respect to the alibi, he would have been, in effect, testifying as an unsworn witness while at the same time acting as an advocate. 1 “Practice Book § 4061 provides that ‘[t]he court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial. . . .’ This court follows the ‘[long-standing] rule that absent certain exceptional circumstances . . . claims not distinctly raised at trial will not be reviewed on appeal.’ Biggs v. Warden, 26 Conn.

1998The defendant contends that if defense counsel questioned Cabral concerning his advice to her with respect to the alibi, he would have been, in effect, testifying as an unsworn witness while at the same time acting as an advocate. 1 “Practice Book § 4061 provides that ‘[t]he court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial. . . .’ This court follows the ‘[long-standing] rule that absent certain exceptional circumstances . . . claims not distinctly raised at trial will not be reviewed on appeal.’ Biggs v. Warden, 26 Conn.

1992He relies on State v. Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683, 705 , 529 A.2d 1245 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061 , 108 S. Ct. 1017 , 98 L.

1992He relies on State v. Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683, 705 , 529 A.2d 1245 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061 , 108 S. Ct. 1017 , 98 L.

1992He relies on State v. Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683, 705 , 529 A.2d 1245 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061 , 108 S. Ct. 1017 , 98 L.

1992He relies on State v. Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683, 705 , 529 A.2d 1245 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061 , 108 S. Ct. 1017 , 98 L.

1992He relies on State v. Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683, 705 , 529 A.2d 1245 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061 , 108 S. Ct. 1017 , 98 L.

1989State v. Townsend, 206 Conn. 621, 627 , 539 A.2d 114 (1989).

1989State v. Townsend, 206 Conn. 621, 627 , 539 A.2d 114 (1989).

1979The defendant contends that his privilege against self-incrimination and right to due process were violated by the trial court’s indirect comment upon his failure to testify when, in the course of the portion of the charge relating to intent, the court stated that intent ordinarily must be determined from circumstantial evidence “aside from that person’s own testimony.” For the same reasons that we rejected this precise claim in State v. Castagna, 170 Conn. 80, 91-92 , 364 A.2d 200 , we find no merit to the defendant’s argument in the present ease.

1979The defendant contends that his privilege against self-incrimination and right to due process were violated by the trial court’s indirect comment upon his failure to testify when, in the course of the portion of the charge relating to intent, the court stated that intent ordinarily must be determined from circumstantial evidence “aside from that person’s own testimony.” For the same reasons that we rejected this precise claim in State v. Castagna, 170 Conn. 80, 91-92 , 364 A.2d 200 , we find no merit to the defendant’s argument in the present ease.

1965Judd Co., 106 Conn. 551, 600 , and Saporiti v. Austin A. Chambers Co., 134 Conn. 476, 479 , required the plaintiffs to produce some evidence other than their own opinions in establishing values.

1965Judd Co., 106 Conn. 551, 600 , and Saporiti v. Austin A. Chambers Co., 134 Conn. 476, 479 , required the plaintiffs to produce some evidence other than their own opinions in establishing values.

1950“Such a statement . . ., while it cannot be regarded as the equivalent of direct testimony, is some evidence, circumstantial in its nature, of the truth of the fact contained in it and under the circumstances of a particular case may be sufficient evidence of that fact.” Perrelli v. Savas, 115 Conn. 42, 44 , 160 A. 311 ; State v. LaLouche, 116 Conn. 691, 696 , 166 A. 252 ; State v. Willis, 71 Conn. 293, 306, 308 , 41 A. 820 .

1950“Such a statement . . ., while it cannot be regarded as the equivalent of direct testimony, is some evidence, circumstantial in its nature, of the truth of the fact contained in it and under the circumstances of a particular case may be sufficient evidence of that fact.” Perrelli v. Savas, 115 Conn. 42, 44 , 160 A. 311 ; State v. LaLouche, 116 Conn. 691, 696 , 166 A. 252 ; State v. Willis, 71 Conn. 293, 306, 308 , 41 A. 820 .

1950“Such a statement . . ., while it cannot be regarded as the equivalent of direct testimony, is some evidence, circumstantial in its nature, of the truth of the fact contained in it and under the circumstances of a particular case may be sufficient evidence of that fact.” Perrelli v. Savas, 115 Conn. 42, 44 , 160 A. 311 ; State v. LaLouche, 116 Conn. 691, 696 , 166 A. 252 ; State v. Willis, 71 Conn. 293, 306, 308 , 41 A. 820 .

1950“Such a statement . . ., while it cannot be regarded as the equivalent of direct testimony, is some evidence, circumstantial in its nature, of the truth of the fact contained in it and under the circumstances of a particular case may be sufficient evidence of that fact.” Perrelli v. Savas, 115 Conn. 42, 44 , 160 A. 311 ; State v. LaLouche, 116 Conn. 691, 696 , 166 A. 252 ; State v. Willis, 71 Conn. 293, 306, 308 , 41 A. 820 .