valid arbitration clause in Texas

2026A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review “A party seeking to compel arbitration under the FAA must establish that (1) there is a valid arbitration clause, and (2) the claims in dispute fall within that agreement’s scope.” In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d 220, 223 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding).

2025“A party seeking to compel arbitration under the FAA must establish that (1) there is a valid arbitration clause, and (2) the claims in dispute fall within that agreement’s scope.” In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d 220, 223 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding); see also State Stores, Inc. v. Eufracio, 2019 WL 3484430 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 1, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).

2022Further, “[w]hether a non-signatory can compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause questions the existence of a valid arbitration clause between specific parties and is therefore a gateway matter for the court to decide.” In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d at 224 (citing In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 130 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding); Sherer v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 548 F.3d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)). 4 The Release recites, in relevant part, “This Release and Indemnification Agreement (Agreement) is entered into by the Adult Participant (Lakhani) . . . in favor

2021“Whether a non-signatory can compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause questions the existence of a valid arbitration clause between specific parties and is therefore a gateway matter for the court to decide.” In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d 220, 224 (Tex. 2011) (citing In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 130 (Tex. 2005)).

2016See In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d 220, 223 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding) (party seeking to compel arbitration under FAA must establish there is a valid arbitration clause and claims in dispute fall within that agreement’s scope) (citing In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005)). 9 In eases in which a party resists arbitration, “it matters whether the party resisting arbitration is a signatory or not.” Merrill Lynch Investment Mgrs. v. Optibase, Ltd., 337 F.3d 125, 131 (2nd Cir. 2003); see Roe v. Ladymon, 318 S.W.3d 502, 515 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.); see also DK Jo

2013Because we have found direct benefits estoppel inapplicable in this case, however, requiring arbitration of DCP‟s claims against Karlin solely on a concerted misconduct theory would run afoul of the holding in In re Merrill Lynch Trust Co. FSB, 235 S.W.3d 185, 191 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (noting court has never compelled arbitration “based solely” on concerted misconduct, and declining to do so).11 Because we find Karlin has not met his burden to establish the existence of a valid arbitration clause enforceable by him, In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d at 737 , we need not ad

2016“When the principal is bound under the terms of a valid arbitration clause, its agents, employees, and representatives are covered by that agreement.” In re Merrill Lynch Trust Co. FSB, 123 S.W.3d 549, 556 (Tex. *105 App.—San Antonio 2003, orig. proceeding) (quoting McMillan v. Computer Translation Sys. & Support, Inc., 66 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2001, orig. proceeding)).

2011“When the principal is bound under the terms of a valid arbitration clause, its agents, employees, and representatives are covered by that agreement.” Id. “[E]x-tending the scope of an arbitration provision to an agent of the party who signed the agreement furthers the federal policy of favoring arbitration and the parties’ intent to provide a single forum to resolve disputes arising under an agreement.” Id.

2016“When the principal is bound under the terms of a valid arbitration clause, its agents, employees, and representatives are covered by that agreement.” In re Merrill Lynch Trust Co. FSB, 123 S.W.3d 549, 556 (Tex. *105 App.—San Antonio 2003, orig. proceeding) (quoting McMillan v. Computer Translation Sys. & Support, Inc., 66 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2001, orig. proceeding)).

2007"When the principal is bound under the terms of a valid arbitration clause, its agents, employees, and representatives are covered by that agreement." Id. ; Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch , Pierce , Fenner & Smith , Inc ., 7 F.3d 1110, 1121-22 (3rd Cir. 1993) ("Agency logic has been applied to bind non-signatory business entities to arbitration agreements."); Letizia v. Prudential Bach Sec. , 802 F.2d 1185 , 1187-88 (9th Cir. 1986) (when broker and employees were integral to alleged statutory violations of principal corporation, claims against non-signatory employees were subject to arbitration); s

2015See Nazareth Hall Nursing Ctr. v. Melendez, 372 S.W.3d 301, 305 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2012, no pet.); see also In re Morgan Stanley & Co., 293 S.W.3d 182, 190 (Tex.2009) (orig. proceeding) (any claim that questions the existence of an arbitration agreement is a question for the court); In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 130 (Tex.2005) (orig. proceeding) (generally, courts not arbitrators consider gateway issues such as whether a valid arbitration clause exists); • In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d 220, 224-25 (Tex.2011) . (orig. proceeding) (whether a non-signatory can compel arbitration depends ■

2015See Nazareth Hall Nursing Ctr. v. Melendez, 372 S.W.3d 301, 305 (Tex.App. – El Paso 2012, no pet.); see also In re Morgan Stanley & Co., 293 S.W.3d 182, 190 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding) (any claim that questions the existence of an arbitration agreement is a question for the court); In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 130 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (generally, courts not arbitrators consider gateway issues such as whether a valid arbitration clause exists); In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d 220 , 224–25 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding) (whether a non-signatory can compel arbitration depends

2013Because we have found direct benefits estoppel inapplicable in this case, however, requiring arbitration of DCP‟s claims against Karlin solely on a concerted misconduct theory would run afoul of the holding in In re Merrill Lynch Trust Co. FSB, 235 S.W.3d 185, 191 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (noting court has never compelled arbitration “based solely” on concerted misconduct, and declining to do so).11 Because we find Karlin has not met his burden to establish the existence of a valid arbitration clause enforceable by him, In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d at 737 , we need not ad

2008See In re Merrill Lynch Trust Co. FSB, 235 S.W.3d 185 , 188 n.5 (Tex. 2007).

2007Braun of Am., Inc., 286 F.3d 1309, 1318 (11th Cir.2002) (internal quotations omitted); accord, Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1121 (3d Cir.1993) (“Because a principal is bound under the terms of a valid arbitration clause, its agents, employees, and representatives are also covered under the terms of such agreements.”); In re Vesta Ins.

2007Braun of Am., Inc., 286 F.3d 1309, 1318 (11th Cir.2002) (internal quotations omitted); accord, Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110 , 1121 (3d Cir.1993) ("Because a principal is bound under the terms of a valid arbitration clause, its agents, employees, and representatives are also covered under the terms of such agreements."); In re Vesta Ins.

2006"Arbitration is heavily favored under federal and state law and should not be denied unless it can be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause cannot be interpreted so as to encompass the dispute in question." In re Sun Communications, Inc. , 86 S.W.3d 313, 317 (Tex. App.--Austin 2002, no pet.) (citing Prudential Sec.

2006“Arbitration is heavily favored under federal and state law and should not be denied unless it can be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause cannot be interpreted so as to encompass the dispute in question.” In re Sun Communications, Inc., 86 S.W.3d 313, 317 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.) (citing Prudential Sec.

2006In re FirstMerit Bank , 52 S.W.3d at 753 (Tex. 2001); In re Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc. , 987 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1999).

2006In re FirstMerit Bank, 52 S.W.3d at 753 (Tex. 2001); In re Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1999).

2008In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Tex.2001) (orig.proceeding).

2008In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding).

2024Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 843 (Tex. 2013) (TGAA); In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d 220, 223 (Tex. 2011) (FAA); see 9 U.S.C. §§ 2 , 4; CIV.

2013Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 843 (Tex. 2013); In re AdvancePCS Health L.P., 172 S.W.3d 603, 605 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam).

2023Corp., 235 S.W.3d at 210; Ascendant Anesthesia PLLC v. Abazi, 348 S.W.3d 454, 462 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (“When the principal is bound under the terms of a valid arbitration clause, its agents, employees, and representatives are covered by that agreement.”); In re Merrill Lynch Tr.

2019See Ascendant Anesthesia PLLC v. Abazi, 348 S.W.3d 454, 462 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (“When the principal is bound under the terms of a valid arbitration clause, its agents, employees, and representatives are covered by that agreement.”).

2022Further, “[w]hether a non-signatory can compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause questions the existence of a valid arbitration clause between specific parties and is therefore a gateway matter for the court to decide.” In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d at 224 (citing In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 130 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding); Sherer v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 548 F.3d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)). 4 The Release recites, in relevant part, “This Release and Indemnification Agreement (Agreement) is entered into by the Adult Participant (Lakhani) . . . in favor

2011In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 130 (Tex.2005); Sherer v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 548 F.3d 379, 381 (5th Cir.2008).

2015Ultimately, HN34 the question requires us to determine ″the intent of the parties, as expressed in the terms of the agreement,″ so we apply ″ordinary principles of state contract law [to] determine whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate.″ Id. (quoting Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkm., 345 F.3d 347, 355, 358 (5th Cir.2003)); see also Kellogg Brown & Root, 166 S.W.3d at 738 (holding that, ″[u]nder the FAA, ordinary principles of state contract law determine whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate″).

2015Ultimately, the question requires us to determine “the intent of the parties, as expressed in the terms of the agreement,” so we apply “ordinary principles of state contract law [to] determine whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate.” Id. (quoting Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkm., 345 F.3d 347, 355, 358 (5th Cir.2003)); see also Kellogg Brown & Root, 166 S.W.3d at 738 (holding that, “[u]nder the FAA, ordinary principles of state contract law determine whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate”).

2015See Nazareth Hall Nursing Ctr. v. Melendez, 372 S.W.3d 301, 305 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2012, no pet.); see also In re Morgan Stanley & Co., 293 S.W.3d 182, 190 (Tex.2009) (orig. proceeding) (any claim that questions the existence of an arbitration agreement is a question for the court); In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 130 (Tex.2005) (orig. proceeding) (generally, courts not arbitrators consider gateway issues such as whether a valid arbitration clause exists); • In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d 220, 224-25 (Tex.2011) . (orig. proceeding) (whether a non-signatory can compel arbitration depends ■

2015See Nazareth Hall Nursing Ctr. v. Melendez, 372 S.W.3d 301, 305 (Tex.App. – El Paso 2012, no pet.); see also In re Morgan Stanley & Co., 293 S.W.3d 182, 190 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding) (any claim that questions the existence of an arbitration agreement is a question for the court); In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 130 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (generally, courts not arbitrators consider gateway issues such as whether a valid arbitration clause exists); In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d 220 , 224–25 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding) (whether a non-signatory can compel arbitration depends

2025Leach Builders, 458 S.W.3d at 524 (“[Non-signatory] contention raises questions about ‘the existence of a valid arbitration clause between specific parties and is therefore a gateway matter for the court to decide.’” (quoting In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d 220, 224 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding))).

2023Corp., 235 S.W.3d at 210; Ascendant Anesthesia PLLC v. Abazi, 348 S.W.3d 454, 462 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (“When the principal is bound under the terms of a valid arbitration clause, its agents, employees, and representatives are covered by that agreement.”); In re Merrill Lynch Tr.

2018“A party seeking to compel arbitration under the FAA must establish that (1) there is a valid arbitration clause; and (2) the claims in dispute fall within that agreement’s scope.” In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d 220, 223 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding); see also Branch Law Firm L.L.P., 532 S.W.3d at 12 .

2018Amateur Athletic Union of the U.S., Inc. v. Bray, 499 S.W.3d 96, 104 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.).

2017See Venture Cotton Co-op. v. Freeman, 435 S.W.3d 222, 227 (Tex. 2014).

2016See In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d 220, 223 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding) (party seeking to compel arbitration under FAA must establish there is a valid arbitration clause and claims in dispute fall within that agreement’s scope) (citing In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005)). 9 In eases in which a party resists arbitration, “it matters whether the party resisting arbitration is a signatory or not.” Merrill Lynch Investment Mgrs. v. Optibase, Ltd., 337 F.3d 125, 131 (2nd Cir. 2003); see Roe v. Ladymon, 318 S.W.3d 502, 515 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.); see also DK Jo

2016See In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d 220, 223 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding) (party seeking to compel arbitration under FAA must establish there is a valid arbitration clause and claims in dispute fall within that agreement’s scope) (citing In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005)). 9 In eases in which a party resists arbitration, “it matters whether the party resisting arbitration is a signatory or not.” Merrill Lynch Investment Mgrs. v. Optibase, Ltd., 337 F.3d 125, 131 (2nd Cir. 2003); see Roe v. Ladymon, 318 S.W.3d 502, 515 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.); see also DK Jo

2016See In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d 220, 223 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding) (party seeking to compel arbitration under FAA must establish there is a valid arbitration clause and claims in dispute fall within that agreement’s scope) (citing In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005)). 9 In eases in which a party resists arbitration, “it matters whether the party resisting arbitration is a signatory or not.” Merrill Lynch Investment Mgrs. v. Optibase, Ltd., 337 F.3d 125, 131 (2nd Cir. 2003); see Roe v. Ladymon, 318 S.W.3d 502, 515 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.); see also DK Jo

2016See In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d 220, 223 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding) (party seeking to compel arbitration under FAA must establish there is a valid arbitration clause and claims in dispute fall within that agreement’s scope) (citing In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005)). 9 In eases in which a party resists arbitration, “it matters whether the party resisting arbitration is a signatory or not.” Merrill Lynch Investment Mgrs. v. Optibase, Ltd., 337 F.3d 125, 131 (2nd Cir. 2003); see Roe v. Ladymon, 318 S.W.3d 502, 515 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.); see also DK Jo

2015See id. at 862; J.M.