Parker rule in Pennsylvania

1963In our opinion in 372 Pa. this Court carefully reviewed and rejected all of Johnson's contentions, including his objections to the admissibility of prior convictions under the so-called Parker rule — Commonwealth v. Parker, 294 Pa. 144 , 143 A. 904 .

1963In our opinion in 372 Pa. this Court carefully reviewed and rejected all of Johnson's contentions, including his objections to the admissibility of prior convictions under the so-called Parker rule — Commonwealth v. Parker, 294 Pa. 144 , 143 A. 904 .

1975Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 , 93 S.Ct. 1602 , 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973), reaffirms the McMann and Parker test.

1975Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 , 93 S.Ct. 1602 , 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973), reaffirms the McMann and Parker test.

1975Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970), decided along with McMann and Parker , stands for the proposition that adequate assistance of counsel is a factor which will be examined in determining whether the defendant intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment rights by entering a plea of guilty.

1975Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970), decided along with McMann and Parker , stands for the proposition that adequate assistance of counsel is a factor which will be examined in determining whether the defendant intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment rights by entering a plea of guilty.

1970This issue was raised in both of appellant’s habeas corpus petitions, and both the state and the federal courts decided the point adversely to petitioner on the authority of Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1965), reh. denied, 386 U.S. 969 (1967).

1969Gist v. Rundle, 419 Pa. 458, 460 , 214 A. 2d 496 (1965), this Court reformulated this test, finding that a new trial was mandated wherever the admission into evidence of a defendant’s prior criminal record under the Parker rule procedure created “a realistic probability of prejudice”, while in Commonwealth ex rel.

1969Gist v. Rundle, 419 Pa. 458, 460 , 214 A. 2d 496 (1965), this Court reformulated this test, finding that a new trial was mandated wherever the admission into evidence of a defendant’s prior criminal record under the Parker rule procedure created “a realistic probability of prejudice”, while in Commonwealth ex rel.

1969Cannon v. Maroney, 419 Pa. 461 , 214 A. 2d 498 (1965), it was implied that the test was whether a “realistic probability of serious prejudice” resulted from the introduction of such evidence.

1969Cannon v. Maroney, 419 Pa. 461 , 214 A. 2d 498 (1965), it was implied that the test was whether a “realistic probability of serious prejudice” resulted from the introduction of such evidence.

1969The scope of this holding, however, is cast into question by Rundle v. Johnson, 386 U.S. 14 (1967), a per curiam decision of the Court handed down only a month after Spencer was decided.

1969The scope of this holding, however, is cast into question by Rundle v. Johnson, 386 U.S. 14 (1967), a per curiam decision of the Court handed down only a month after Spencer was decided.

1969In Scoleri, supra, Lowry, supra, and Johnson, supra, federal courts accepted defendants’ contentions that they were indeed denied due process by introduction of evidence of their prior unrelated offenses. 5 In Rucker, supra, Commonwealth *154 ex rel.

1969Pa. 1964), aff'd. per curiam, 349 F. 2d 416 (3d Cir. 1965). 3 In his petition, Johnson claimed that under the facts of his case the admission of evidence of his prior record during his trial and pursuant to the Parker rule procedure constituted a denial of due *151 process. 4 In Johnson , the defendant was tried for murder in connection with the death of two individuals who were killed in the derailment of a train.

1969Pa. 1964), aff'd. per curiam, 349 F. 2d 416 (3d Cir. 1965). 3 In his petition, Johnson claimed that under the facts of his case the admission of evidence of his prior record during his trial and pursuant to the Parker rule procedure constituted a denial of due *151 process. 4 In Johnson , the defendant was tried for murder in connection with the death of two individuals who were killed in the derailment of a train.

1969In Scoleri, supra, Lowry, supra, and Johnson, supra, federal courts accepted defendants’ contentions that they were indeed denied due process by introduction of evidence of their prior unrelated offenses. 5 In Rucker, supra, Commonwealth *154 ex rel.

1969Rucker v. Myers, 311 F. 2d 311, at 315 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U. S. 844 (1963), enunciated the rule that the Commonwealth’s reliance on the Parker rule procedure was tantamount to a denial of due process “only in the clearest cases of gross and easily avoided prejudice.” In Commonwealth ex rel.

1969Rucker v. Myers, 311 F. 2d 311, at 315 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U. S. 844 (1963), enunciated the rule that the Commonwealth’s reliance on the Parker rule procedure was tantamount to a denial of due process “only in the clearest cases of gross and easily avoided prejudice.” In Commonwealth ex rel.

1957This being so, in a case like the present, where the trial judge was convinced from the confessions of the defendants, as the Court below evidently was, that they were habitual offenders against society, — robbers, burglars, and, as occasion arose, murderers, — where the evidence indicated such to be their general manner of life, and where the defendants asked that, if convicted, the jury, in assessing punishment, extend mercy to them, we cannot say it was reversible error to receive their full confessions in evidence, even though it is possible that the admissions therein of other offenses ma

1957This being so, in a case like the present, where the trial judge was convinced from the confessions of the defendants, as the Court below evidently was, that they were habitual offenders against society, — robbers, burglars, and, as occasion arose, murderers, — where the evidence indicated such to be their general manner of life, and where the defendants asked that, if convicted, the jury, in assessing punishment, extend mercy to them, we cannot say it was reversible error to receive their full confessions in evidence, even though it is possible that the admissions therein of other offenses ma

1957This being so, in a case like the present, where the trial judge was convinced from the confessions of the defendants, as the Court below evidently was, that they were habitual offenders against society, — robbers, burglars, and, as occasion arose, murderers, — where the evidence indicated such to be their general manner of life, and where the defendants asked that, if convicted, the jury, in assessing punishment, extend mercy to them, we cannot say it was reversible error to receive their full confessions in evidence, even though it is possible that the admissions therein of other offenses ma

1957This being so, in a case like the present, where the trial judge was convinced from the confessions of the defendants, as the Court below evidently was, that they were habitual offenders against society, — robbers, burglars, and, as occasion arose, murderers, — where the evidence indicated such to be their general manner of life, and where the defendants asked that, if convicted, the jury, in assessing punishment, extend mercy to them, we cannot say it was reversible error to receive their full confessions in evidence, even though it is possible that the admissions therein of other offenses ma

1957This being so, in a case like the present, where the trial judge was convinced from the confessions of the defendants, as the Court below evidently was, that they were habitual offenders against society, — robbers, burglars, and, as occasion arose, murderers, — where the evidence indicated such to be their general manner of life, and where the defendants asked that, if convicted, the jury, in assessing punishment, extend mercy to them, we cannot say it was reversible error to receive their full confessions in evidence, even though it is possible that the admissions therein of other offenses ma

1957This being so, in a case like the present, where the trial judge was convinced from the confessions of the defendants, as the Court below evidently was, that they were habitual offenders against society, — robbers, burglars, and, as occasion arose, murderers, — where the evidence indicated such to be their general manner of life, and where the defendants asked that, if convicted, the jury, in assessing punishment, extend mercy to them, we cannot say it was reversible error to receive their full confessions in evidence, even though it is possible that the admissions therein of other offenses ma

1957This being so, in a case like the present, where the trial judge was convinced from the confessions of the defendants, as the Court below evidently was, that they were habitual offenders against society, — robbers, burglars, and, as occasion arose, murderers, — where the evidence indicated such to be their general manner of life, and where the defendants asked that, if convicted, the jury, in assessing punishment, extend mercy to them, we cannot say it was reversible error to receive their full confessions in evidence, even though it is possible that the admissions therein of other offenses ma

1957This being so, in a case like the present, where the trial judge was convinced from the confessions of the defendants, as the Court below evidently was, that they were habitual offenders against society, — robbers, burglars, and, as occasion arose, murderers, — where the evidence indicated such to be their general manner of life, and where the defendants asked that, if convicted, the jury, in assessing punishment, extend mercy to them, we cannot say it was reversible error to receive their full confessions in evidence, even though it is possible that the admissions therein of other offenses ma

1957This being so, in a case like the present, where the trial judge was convinced from the confessions of the defendants, as the Court below evidently was, that they were habitual offenders against society, — robbers, burglars, and, as occasion arose, murderers, — where the evidence indicated such to be their general manner of life, and where the defendants asked that, if convicted, the jury, in assessing punishment, extend mercy to them, we cannot say it was reversible error to receive their full confessions in evidence, even though it is possible that the admissions therein of other offenses ma

1957This being so, in a case like the present, where the trial judge was convinced from the confessions of the defendants, as the Court below evidently was, that they were habitual offenders against society, — robbers, burglars, and, as occasion arose, murderers, — where the evidence indicated such to be their general manner of life, and where the defendants asked that, if convicted, the jury, in assessing punishment, extend mercy to them, we cannot say it was reversible error to receive their full confessions in evidence, even though it is possible that the admissions therein of other offenses ma

1957In Com. v. Williams, 307 Pa. 134, 152 , 160 A. 602 , this Court, following the Parker rule, stated ". . . evidence as to prior convictions to aggravate the penalty must be strictly limited . . .

1957In Com. v. Williams, 307 Pa. 134, 152 , 160 A. 602 , this Court, following the Parker rule, stated ". . . evidence as to prior convictions to aggravate the penalty must be strictly limited . . .