Hale claim in Florida

2012Although this finding may ultimately prove accurate, the court is not permitted to rely on such documents to make this determination: [I]n Burgess v. State, 831 So.2d 137, 141 (Fla.2002), the supreme court held that a trial court cannot rely on hearsay documentation that is contained in the trial court record, such as a police report, to determine a 3.800(a) Hale claim.

2007See Burgess v. State, 831 So.2d 137, 142 (Fla.2002) (affirming that a Hale claim is not cognizable under rule 3.800 when based on hearsay information contained in a police report); Harris v. State, 875 So.2d 735, 736 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding that a facially sufficient claim of Hale violation cannot be established by charging document or "extra-record" facts).

2007We recognize that in Valdes v. State, this court held that it can consider a claimed Hale violation under rule 3.800 based on facts established in a prior direct appeal opinion. 765 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).

2005See Valdes v. State, 765 So.2d 774, 776 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (holding that a Hale claim is cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) motion so long as it is apparent on the face of the record).

2007See Harris v. State, 875 So.2d 735 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding that in the context of a Hale claim, the appellant must identify with particularity the non-hearsay record documents demonstrating that his crimes arose from a single criminal episode); Jackson, 803 So.2d at 845 (holding that a Hale claim alleging that the "trial transcripts" demonstrated the crimes occurred in a single criminal episode was facially insufficient where the motion did not allege "how" the transcripts showed this).

2007See Harris v. State, 875 So.2d 735 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding that in the context of a Hale claim, the appellant must identify with particularity the non-hearsay record documents demonstrating that his crimes arose from a single criminal episode); Jackson, 803 So.2d at 845 (holding that a Hale claim alleging that the "trial transcripts" demonstrated the crimes occurred in a single criminal episode was facially insufficient where the motion did not allege "how" the transcripts showed this).

2010The postconviction court treated it as a rule 3.850 motion and denied it as untimely in July 1997, citing State v. Callaway, 658 So.2d 983 (Fla.1995), and Lock v. State, 668 So.2d 1081 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), and explaining that the window for filing a Hale claim closed on February 9, 1996.

2010The postconviction court treated it as a rule 3.850 motion and denied it as untimely in July 1997, citing State v. Callaway, 658 So.2d 983 (Fla.1995), and Lock v. State, 668 So.2d 1081 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), and explaining that the window for filing a Hale claim closed on February 9, 1996.

2007See Harris v. State, 875 So.2d 735 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding that in the context of a Hale claim, the appellant must identify with particularity the non-hearsay record documents demonstrating that his crimes arose from a single criminal episode); Jackson, 803 So.2d at 845 (holding that a Hale claim alleging that the "trial transcripts" demonstrated the crimes occurred in a single criminal episode was facially insufficient where the motion did not allege "how" the transcripts showed this).

2007See Harris v. State, 875 So.2d 735 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding that in the context of a Hale claim, the appellant must identify with particularity the non-hearsay record documents demonstrating that his crimes arose from a single criminal episode); Jackson, 803 So.2d at 845 (holding that a Hale claim alleging that the "trial transcripts" demonstrated the crimes occurred in a single criminal episode was facially insufficient where the motion did not allege "how" the transcripts showed this).

2003We accordingly remand this cause to the trial court to reconsider Downs' motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) on its merits in light of Burgess, 831 So.2d 137 . [1] See generally Adams v. State, 755 So.2d 678, 680 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (holding that movant may assert a Hale [2] claim in a rule 3.800(a) motion if the facts supporting the claim are apparent from the face of the record); Valdes v. State, 765 So.2d 774, 777 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (concluding that the appellant was entitled to relief because his Hale claim was apparent from the

2001See Adams v. State, 755 So.2d 678, 680 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (finding that a Hale claim which alleges that it may be determined without resort to extra-record facts is cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) motion).

2001Compare, e.g., Hale v. State, 630 So.2d 521 (Fla.1993)(holding that the decision to prevent the practice of consecutively stacking habitual offender sentences for violations arising from a single criminal episode should apply retroactively because the concern for fairness and uniformity in individual cases outweighed any adverse impact that retroactive application of the Hale rule might have on decisional finality).

2001Compare, e.g., Hale v. State, 630 So.2d 521 (Fla.1993)(holding that the decision to prevent the practice of consecutively stacking habitual offender sentences for violations arising from a single criminal episode should apply retroactively because the concern for fairness and uniformity in individual cases outweighed any adverse impact that retroactive application of the Hale rule might have on decisional finality).

2023See, e.g., Kiedrowski v. State, 876 So. 2d 692, 694 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (defendant sentenced on two third-degree felonies; each offense was subject to enhancement as an HFO; however, the trial court ultimately designated defendant an HFO on only one of the two qualifying offenses, imposed an enhanced sentence of ten years on that offense, to be followed by a consecutive unenhanced sentence of two years on the remaining offense; First District vacated the twelve-year sentence, holding it violated “the reasoning and the spirit of Hale” where the total sentence imposed exceeded the ten-year total

2008Six years later, however, in considering whether a trial court had cured a Hale violation by removing the habitual felony offender designation on one of two felony counts while leaving the sentence lengths on both counts the same, we held that, Davis notwithstanding, the amended sentences, in the aggregate, ran afoul of Hale because they "exceed[ed] the statutory maximum if both sentences had been enhanced under section 775.084 [the habitual offender statute] and run concurrently, or if neither had been enhanced and run consecutively." Kiedrowski v. State, 876 So.2d 692, 694 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004

2016See Harris v. State, 845 So.2d 250, 250 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (affirming without prejudice to any right Harris might have to file a facially sufficient motion under rule 3.800(a) alleging that his consecutive habitual violent felony offender sentences were illegal because the offenses were part of a single criminal episode and identifying with particularity the nonhearsay record documents, such as a trial transcript, that support his claim).

2016See Harris v. State, 845 So.2d 250, 250 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (affirming without prejudice to any right Harris might have to file a facially sufficient motion under rule 3.800(a) alleging that his consecutive habitual violent felony offender sentences were illegal because the offenses were part of a single criminal episode and identifying with particularity the nonhearsay record documents, such as a trial transcript, that support his claim).

2001See State v. Mancino, 714 So.2d 429, 433 (Fla.1998); West v. State, 790 So.2d 513 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); Pullins v. State, 111 So.2d 451 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Valdes v. State, 765 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).

2001See State v. Mancino, 714 So.2d 429, 433 (Fla.1998); West v. State, 790 So.2d 513 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); Pullins v. State, 111 So.2d 451 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Valdes v. State, 765 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).

2001See Wilson v. State, 800 So.2d 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) ("A rule 3.800 motion can be the proper vehicle in which to raise a Hale claim ... if the issue can be resolved from the face of the entire written record."); Valdes v. State, 765 So.2d 774, 776-77 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (holding that a "defendant is entitled to relief under rule 3.800(a) [if] his Hale claim is apparent from the face of the record."); see generally Carter v. State, 786 So.2d 1173 (Fla.2001).

2001See Wilson v. State, 800 So.2d 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) ("A rule 3.800 motion can be the proper vehicle in which to raise a Hale claim ... if the issue can be resolved from the face of the entire written record."); Valdes v. State, 765 So.2d 774, 776-77 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (holding that a "defendant is entitled to relief under rule 3.800(a) [if] his Hale claim is apparent from the face of the record."); see generally Carter v. State, 786 So.2d 1173 (Fla.2001).

2012See also Speas v. State, 887 So.2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (noting that a Hale claim may be raised in a motion pursuant to rule 3.800(a)); but see Calla-way v. State, 642 So.2d 636 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (holding that “a sworn motion pursuant to rule 3.850 is the appropriate method for resolution” of Hale issue).

2012See also Speas v. State, 887 So.2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (noting that a Hale claim may be raised in a motion pursuant to rule 3.800(a)); but see Calla-way v. State, 642 So.2d 636 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (holding that “a sworn motion pursuant to rule 3.850 is the appropriate method for resolution” of Hale issue).

2010See West v. State, 790 So.2d 513, 515 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (finding a Hale violation on the face of the record and vacating probationary sentence that had been imposed consecutively to prison term).

2010See West v. State, 790 So.2d 513, 515 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (finding a Hale violation on the face of the record and vacating probationary sentence that had been imposed consecutively to prison term).

1996See Rosier v. State, 655 So.2d 160 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 663 So.2d 632 (Fla.1995).

1995Although Appellant’s case became final before Hale was decided, we conclude that the question of the timeliness of his Rule 3.850 motion was effectively resolved in Appellant’s favor in Rosier, 655 So.2d at 160 , in which we held that a Hale issue (like Appellant’s) may be raised under oath pursuant to Rule 3.850 during the two-year period following Hale because the rule in Hale applies retroactively under the analysis set forth in Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922 (Fla.), cert. den., 449 U.S. 1067 , 101 S.Ct. 796 , 66 L.Ed.2d 612 (1980).

2012See also Speas v. State, 887 So.2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (noting that a Hale claim may be raised in a motion pursuant to rule 3.800(a)); but see Calla-way v. State, 642 So.2d 636 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (holding that “a sworn motion pursuant to rule 3.850 is the appropriate method for resolution” of Hale issue).

2012See also Speas v. State, 887 So.2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (noting that a Hale claim may be raised in a motion pursuant to rule 3.800(a)); but see Calla-way v. State, 642 So.2d 636 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (holding that “a sworn motion pursuant to rule 3.850 is the appropriate method for resolution” of Hale issue).

2003See Johnson v. Moore, 801 So.2d at 289 .

2003See Johnson v. Moore, 801 So.2d at 289 .

2023See, e.g., Kiedrowski v. State, 876 So. 2d 692, 694 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (defendant sentenced on two third-degree felonies; each offense was subject to enhancement as an HFO; however, the trial court ultimately designated defendant an HFO on only one of the two qualifying offenses, imposed an enhanced sentence of ten years on that offense, to be followed by a consecutive unenhanced sentence of two years on the remaining offense; First District vacated the twelve-year sentence, holding it violated “the reasoning and the spirit of Hale” where the total sentence imposed exceeded the ten-year total

2023Pursuant to the reasoning of Kiedrowski and Hamilton, consecutive HFO and non-HFO sentences imposed for crimes committed during a single criminal episode are legal if the aggregate sentence is less than that which could have been imposed if all HFO eligible convictions had been enhanced and ordered to run concurrently”) (emphasis added); Hamilton v. State, 996 So. 2d 964, 966 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“Because appellant's sentences do not, in the aggregate, exceed the maximum he could have received if all sentences subject to enhancement under the habitual felony offender statute had been enhanced

2014See Williams, 124 So.3d at 289 (holding that the postconviction court should reconsider the Hale claim and, if granted, adjust the HFO and non-HFO sentences to run concurrently); see also Swanson, 98 So.3d at 195 (reversing the denial of postconviction relief and remanding with directions for the postconviction court to adjust the defendant’s HFO sentences to run concurrently); Wicker v. State, 655 So.2d 1240, 1242 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (reversing consecutive HFO sentences on direct appeal pursuant to Hale and ordering the trial court to impose concurrent HFO sentences on remand).

2014See Williams, 124 So.3d at 289 (holding that the postconviction court should reconsider the Hale claim and, if granted, adjust the HFO and non-HFO sentences to run concurrently); see also Swanson, 98 So.3d at 195 (reversing the denial of postconviction relief and remanding with directions for the postconviction court to adjust the defendant’s HFO sentences to run concurrently); Wicker v. State, 655 So.2d 1240, 1242 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (reversing consecutive HFO sentences on direct appeal pursuant to Hale and ordering the trial court to impose concurrent HFO sentences on remand).

2014See Williams, 124 So.3d at 289 (holding that the postconviction court should reconsider the Hale claim and, if granted, adjust the HFO and non-HFO sentences to run concurrently); see also Swanson, 98 So.3d at 195 (reversing the denial of postconviction relief and remanding with directions for the postconviction court to adjust the defendant’s HFO sentences to run concurrently); Wicker v. State, 655 So.2d 1240, 1242 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (reversing consecutive HFO sentences on direct appeal pursuant to Hale and ordering the trial court to impose concurrent HFO sentences on remand).

2014See Williams, 124 So.3d at 289 (holding that the postconviction court should reconsider the Hale claim and, if granted, adjust the HFO and non-HFO sentences to run concurrently); see also Swanson, 98 So.3d at 195 (reversing the denial of postconviction relief and remanding with directions for the postconviction court to adjust the defendant’s HFO sentences to run concurrently); Wicker v. State, 655 So.2d 1240, 1242 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (reversing consecutive HFO sentences on direct appeal pursuant to Hale and ordering the trial court to impose concurrent HFO sentences on remand).