8 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgangreen2 sentences2012Sovereign immunity would not preclude a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of an execution protocol statute, see Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827, 852-53 (Tenn.2008) (holding that sovereign immunity does not bar a declaratory judgment claim against state officers to prevent the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute); however, the Petitioner would likely have to argue that his execution is unlawful because of his intellectual disability, not because any statute is unconstitutional. 2012Sovereign immunity would not preclude a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of an execution protocol statute, see Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827, 852-53 (Tenn. 2008) (holding that sovereign immunity does not bar a declaratory judgment claim against (continued...) -7- U.S. 637, 644-45 (1998) (interpreting a habeas corpus statute so as to avoid the “far reaching and seemingly perverse” consequence of “bar[ring] the prisoner from ever obtaining . . . review” of a claim); Henderson v. Thaler, 626 F.3d 773, 788 (5th Cir. 2010) (Weiner, J., dissenting) (“If | 2 | 2 |
Price v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.green1 sentence2017In Price v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 486 S.W.2d 721, 724-25 (Tenn. 1972), the supreme court cited Schlief when concluding that the six-year statute of limitations applied to an insured’s declaratory judgment claim against an uninsured motorist carrier, and not the one-year statute of limitations that would apply to a suit on the tort.1 And, in Cavalier Insurance Corp. v. Osment, 538 S.W.2d 399, 404 (Tenn. 1976), the supreme court explained that an insured’s claim against an uninsured motorist carrier was “not a tort action against the uninsured motorist, but [] a claim under | 1 | 1 |
Cavalier Insurance Corp. v. Osmentgreen2 sentences2017In Price v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 486 S.W.2d 721, 724-25 (Tenn. 1972), the supreme court cited Schlief when concluding that the six-year statute of limitations applied to an insured’s declaratory judgment claim against an uninsured motorist carrier, and not the one-year statute of limitations that would apply to a suit on the tort.1 And, in Cavalier Insurance Corp. v. Osment, 538 S.W.2d 399, 404 (Tenn. 1976), the supreme court explained that an insured’s claim against an uninsured motorist carrier was “not a tort action against the uninsured motorist, but [] a claim under 2017In Price v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 486 S.W.2d 721, 724-25 (Tenn. 1972), the supreme court cited Schlief when concluding that the six-year statute of limitations applied to an insured’s declaratory judgment claim against an uninsured motorist carrier, and not the one-year statute of limitations that would apply to a suit on the tort.1 And, in Cavalier Insurance Corp. v. Osment, 538 S.W.2d 399, 404 (Tenn. 1976), the supreme court explained that an insured’s claim against an uninsured motorist carrier was “not a tort action against the uninsured motorist, but [] a claim under | 1 | 1 |
Henderson v. Thalergreen1 sentence2012Sovereign immunity would not preclude a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of an execution protocol statute, see Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827, 852-53 (Tenn. 2008) (holding that sovereign immunity does not bar a declaratory judgment claim against (continued...) -7- U.S. 637, 644-45 (1998) (interpreting a habeas corpus statute so as to avoid the “far reaching and seemingly perverse” consequence of “bar[ring] the prisoner from ever obtaining . . . review” of a claim); Henderson v. Thaler, 626 F.3d 773, 788 (5th Cir. 2010) (Weiner, J., dissenting) (“If | 1 | 1 |
Byrd v. Hallgreen1 sentence2010Quality Food Serv., 3 We note that Plaintiff does not raise an issue on appeal regarding the unjust enrichment claim or the declaratory judgment claim. -6- 960 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Tenn. 1998); Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 215 (Tenn. 1993)). | 1 | 1 |
McCarley v. West Quality Food Servicegreen1 sentence2010Quality Food Serv., 3 We note that Plaintiff does not raise an issue on appeal regarding the unjust enrichment claim or the declaratory judgment claim. -6- 960 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Tenn. 1998); Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 215 (Tenn. 1993)). | 1 | 1 |
Fuller v. Campbellgreen1 sentence2006Fuller v. Campbell, 109 S.W.3d 737, 739 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. Beelergreen2 sentences1996In ruling on the Declaratory Judgment issue the Supreme Court, quoting Hill v. Beeler, 199 Tenn. 325, 332-33 , 286 S.W.2d 868, 871 (1956), stated: The Declaratory Judgment Act [§ 29-14-101], et seq., does not permit the filing of a suit against the State to construe statutes so it seems to us that there is no authority for the suit but that Code Section [20-13-102] expressly forbids such an action. 1996In ruling on the Declaratory Judgment issue the Supreme Court, quoting Hill v. Beeler, 199 Tenn. 325, 332-33 , 286 S.W.2d 868, 871 (1956), stated: The Declaratory Judgment Act [§ 29-14-101], et seq., does not permit the filing of a suit against the State to construe statutes so it seems to us that there is no authority for the suit but that Code Section [20-13-102] expressly forbids such an action. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Blake v. Plus Mark, Inc.
green
2 sentences2022She insisted that “proceeding further on the employer’s prayer for a declaratory judgment was error.” Id. 2022Specifically, she argued that the “counterclaim” had “asserted - 19 - no grounds for relief other than the denial of liability” and that “dismissal of the complaint required the dismissal of the counterclaim.” Id. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Davis v. McClaran
green
1 sentence1997The Tennessee Supreme Court has held that a “§ 1983 is an adequate remedy, thus obviating the need for a writ of mandamus . . . .” Davis v. 5 McClaran, 909 S.W.2d 412 , 420 n.8 (Tenn. 1995). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Taylor
green
2 sentences1996Northern Telecom, 781 S.W.2d at 840 . 1996Northern Telecom, 781 S.W.2d at 840 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.