declaratory judgment claim in Texas

2025Dist. v. Marquez, 487 S.W.3d 538, 547 (Tex. 2016) (same); IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 856 (“private parties cannot circumvent the State’s sovereign immunity from suit by characterizing a suit for money damages, such as a contract dispute, as a declaratory-judgment claim”).

2024CODE ANN. § 251.007(a) (“The commissioners court of each county shall classify each public road in the county as a first-class, second-class, or third-class road.”)5; see also Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d at 620-22 (“But Sefzik is not challenging the validity of a statute; instead, he is challenging TxDOT’s actions under it, and he does not direct us to any provision of the UDJA that expressly waives immunity for his claim.”); Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 371 (“It is well settled that ‘private parties cannot circumvent the State’s sovereign immunity from suit by characterizing a suit for money damages . . .

2017Further, that the jury and Court find and decree that the City of Seguin be liable to Plaintiff for the cost of the removal of the subject drainage culvert and the cost of the restoration of the property and any consequential and necessary and/or reasonable reconstruction of improvements situated on the property. “‘[P]rivate parties cannot circumvent the State’s sovereign immunity from suit by characterizing a suit for money damages, such as a contract dispute, as a declaratory-judgment claim.’” City of Hous. v. Williams, 216 S.W.3d 827, 828-29 (Tex. 2007) (quoting Tex. Nat.

2016CODE ANN. § 37.006(b) (West 2015); Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex. 2011). “‘[P]rivate parties cannot circumvent the State’s sovereign immunity from suit by characterizing a suit for money damages, such as a contract dispute, as a declaratory-judgment claim.’” City of Houston v. Williams, 216 S.W.3d 827, 828-29 (Tex. 2007) (quoting Tex. Nat.

2026“It is well settled that ‘private parties cannot circumvent the State’s sovereign immunity from suit by characterizing a suit for money damages . . . as a declaratory-judgment claim.’” Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 371 (quoting Tex. Nat.

2024CODE ANN. § 251.007(a) (“The commissioners court of each county shall classify each public road in the county as a first-class, second-class, or third-class road.”)5; see also Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d at 620-22 (“But Sefzik is not challenging the validity of a statute; instead, he is challenging TxDOT’s actions under it, and he does not direct us to any provision of the UDJA that expressly waives immunity for his claim.”); Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 371 (“It is well settled that ‘private parties cannot circumvent the State’s sovereign immunity from suit by characterizing a suit for money damages . . .

2025A declaratory- judgment claim is ripe when there is a live controversy, harm will occur if it is not resolved, and the declaration sought will “actually resolve the controversy.” Lynch, 595 S.W.3d at 685; see also Etan Indus., Inc. v. Lehmann, 359 S.W.3d 620, 624 (Tex. Appellee Superior HealthPlan, Inc.’s Reply in Support of Motion for Temporary Relief — Page 9 2011) (“[The UDJA] is intended as a means of determining the parties’ rights when a controversy has arisen but before a wrong has been committed … .”).

2025A declaratory-judgment claim is ripe when there is a live controversy, harm will occur if it is not resolved, and the declaration sought will “actually resolve the controversy.” Lynch, 595 S.W.3d at 685; see also Etan Indus., Inc. v. Lehmann, 359 S.W.3d 620, 624 (Tex. 2011) (“[The UDJA] is intended as a means of determining the parties’ rights when a con- troversy has arisen but before a wrong has been committed.”).

2008See Winters v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 132 S.W.3d 568, 580 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (discrimination claim was brought against both employer and supervisor, where the term “defendants” was used in alleging that claim, whereas a fraud claim was specific to supervisor).

2008See Winters v. Chubb & Son, Inc. , 132 S.W.3d 568, 580 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (discrimination claim was brought against both employer and supervisor, where the term "defendants" was used in alleging that claim, whereas a fraud claim was specific to supervisor).

2008See Fowler v. Resolution Trust Corp., 855 S.W.2d 31, 37 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1993, no writ) (attorney’s fees not available for a declaratory judgment claim that seeks the resolution of disputes already before the court).

2008See Fowler v. Resolution Trust Corp. , 855 S.W.2d 31, 37 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1993, no writ) (attorney's fees not available for a declaratory judgment claim that seeks the resolution of disputes already before the court).

2025The declaratory judgment claim “must do more ‘than merely duplicate the issues litigated’ via the contract or tort claims.” Id. (quoting MBM Fin.

2025Corp., 292 S.W.3d at 670 ).

2008Comm'n v. Little-Tex Insulation Co. , 39 S.W.3d 591, 597 (Tex. 2001), and "private parties cannot circumvent the State's sovereign immunity from suit by characterizing . . . a contract dispute, as a declaratory-judgment claim," IT-Davy , 74 S.W.3d at 856 .

2008Comm'n v. Little-Tex Insulation Co., 39 S.W.3d 591, 597 (Tex.2001), and “private parties cannot circumvent the State’s sovereign immunity from suit by characterizing ... a contract dispute, as a declaratory-judgment claim,” IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 856 .

2019But, as the supreme court noted, “[t]here is no basis for declaratory relief when a party is seeking in the same action a different, enforceable remedy, and a judicial declaration would add nothing to what would be implicit or express in a final judgment for the enforceable remedy.” Kyle, 522 S.W.3d at 467 n.10 (citing Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 79 (Tex. 2015) (holding that “courts will not entertain an action [against a governmental unit] under the [UDJA] when the same claim could be pursued through different channels”); Etan Indus., Inc. v. Lehmann, 359 S.W

2018But, as the supreme court noted, “[t]here is no basis for declaratory relief when a party is seeking in the same action a different, enforceable remedy, and a judicial declaration would add nothing to what would be implicit or express in a final judgment for the enforceable remedy.” Kyle, 522 S.W.3d at 467 n.10 (citing Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 79 (Tex. 2015) (holding that “courts will not entertain an action [against a governmental unit] under the [UDJA] when the same claim could be pursued through different channels”); Etan Indus., Inc. v. Lehmann, 359 S.W

2019But, as the supreme court noted, “[t]here is no basis for declaratory relief when a party is seeking in the same action a different, enforceable remedy, and a judicial declaration would add nothing to what would be implicit or express in a final judgment for the enforceable remedy.” Kyle, 522 S.W.3d at 467 n.10 (citing Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 79 (Tex. 2015) (holding that “courts will not entertain an action [against a governmental unit] under the [UDJA] when the same claim could be pursued through different channels”); Etan Indus., Inc. v. Lehmann, 359 S.W

2019But, as the supreme court noted, “[t]here is no basis for declaratory relief when a party is seeking in the same action a different, enforceable remedy, and a judicial declaration would add nothing to what would be implicit or express in a final judgment for the enforceable remedy.” Kyle, 522 S.W.3d at 467 n.10 (citing Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 79 (Tex. 2015) (holding that “courts will not entertain an action [against a governmental unit] under the [UDJA] when the same claim could be pursued through different channels”); Etan Indus., Inc. v. Lehmann, 359 S.W

2009See First Nat'l Bank v. Anderson Ford-Lincoln-Mercury , 704 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, ref. n.r.e.) (op. on rehr'g) (determining that when it was unclear whether an award of attorney's fees was attributable to a declaratory judgment claim or to an unsuccessful breach of contract claim, remand is required).

2009See First Nat’l Bank v. Anderson Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, 704 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1985, ref. n.r.e.) (op. on reh’g) (determining that when it was unclear whether an award of attorney’s fees was attributable to a declaratory judgment claim or to an unsuccessful breach of contract claim, remand is required).

2007Cf. Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 227-28 (Tex. 2004) (regarding whether parks and wildlife department acted with gross negligence so as to waive sovereign immunity under the recreational use statute). 27 damages, such as a contract dispute, as a declaratory-judgment claim.”); see also Federal Sign v. Texas S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401, 404 (Tex. 1997) (“A state official’s illegal or unauthorized actions are not acts of the State.

2007See, e.g., IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 856 (“[Pjrivate parties cannot circumvent the State’s sovereign immunity from suit by characterizing a suit for money damages, such as a contract dispute, as a declaratory-judgment claim.”); see also Federal Sign v. Texas S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401, 404 (Tex.1997) (“A state official’s illegal or unauthorized actions are not acts of the State.

2024CODE ANN. § 251.007(a) (“The commissioners court of each county shall classify each public road in the county as a first-class, second-class, or third-class road.”)5; see also Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d at 620-22 (“But Sefzik is not challenging the validity of a statute; instead, he is challenging TxDOT’s actions under it, and he does not direct us to any provision of the UDJA that expressly waives immunity for his claim.”); Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 371 (“It is well settled that ‘private parties cannot circumvent the State’s sovereign immunity from suit by characterizing a suit for money damages . . .

2016See Patel v. Tex. Dept. of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 76 (Tex. 2015); see also CR201 (TABC Reply at 13) (admitting that Leeper has not been overruled). 5 “Sefzik is not challenging the validity of a statute; instead, he is chal- lenging TxDOT’s actions under it, and he does not direct us to any provision of the UDJA that expressly waives immunity for his claim.” Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d at 622 . 14 Pre-Sefzik, the Austin Court of Appeals had found that a declaratory- judgment claim seeking an interpretation of a statute waives sovereign im- munity, as in Leeper and DeQueen: · Star Housto

2025Haden Co. v. Dodgen, 158 Tex. 74 , 308 S.W.2d 838, 842 [A]lthough [Epperson] ar[ose] out of [ ] (1958)). contract transaction ... [it] appears to fall into the class of cases projected by United States v. Lee, Heinrich relies on State v. Epperson, 121 Tex. [ 106 U.S. 196 , 1 S.Ct. 240 , 27 L.Ed. 171 (1882)].4 80, 42 S.W.2d 228, 231 (1931), in which we held In that class of cases it is held that suits for that a suit against a tax collector for the recovery property alleged to be unlawfully or wrongfully of money (alleged to be due under a contract and withheld from the rightful owner by office

2025Haden Co. v. Dodgen, 158 Tex. 74 , 308 S.W.2d 838, 842 [A]lthough [Epperson] ar[ose] out of [ ] (1958)). contract transaction ... [it] appears to fall into the class of cases projected by United States v. Lee, Heinrich relies on State v. Epperson, 121 Tex. [ 106 U.S. 196 , 1 S.Ct. 240 , 27 L.Ed. 171 (1882)].4 80, 42 S.W.2d 228, 231 (1931), in which we held In that class of cases it is held that suits for that a suit against a tax collector for the recovery property alleged to be unlawfully or wrongfully of money (alleged to be due under a contract and withheld from the rightful owner by office

2010Co., 290 S.W.3d 345, 352, 361, 363 (Tex. App.–Austin 2009, pet. filed) (holding that sovereign immunity bars a declaratory judgment claim wherein the plaintiff sought a declaration establishing title to property also claimed by the State) (citing Tex. A&M Univ.

2010Co., 290 S.W.3d 345, 352, 361, 363 (Tex.App.-Austin 2009, pet. filed) (holding that sovereign immunity bars a declaratory judgment claim wherein the plaintiff sought a declaration establishing title to property also claimed by the State) (citing Tex. A & M Univ.

2015See, e.g., id., 74 S.W.3d at 856 (noting plaintiff could not confer jurisdiction on trial court by characterizing breach of contract claim as a declaratory judgment claim); City of Hamilton, 2012 WL 579554 , at *5 (holding when plaintiff alleged only that governmental officials acted contrary to contract, claim was simply á breach of contract suit to enforce plaintiffs interpretation of the contract); Tex. Logos, L.P. v. Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 241 S.W.3d 105, 121-22 .

2009See City of Houston v. Williams, 216 S.W.3d 827, 828-29 (Tex.2007) (“ ‘private parties cannot circumvent the State’s sovereign immunity from suit by characterizing a suit for money damages, such as a contract dispute, as a declaratory-judgment claim’ ” and “if the sole purpose of such a declaration [regarding a governmental body’s statutory authority] is to obtain a money judgment, immunity is not waived”) (quoting IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 856 ); Koch, 273 S.W.3d at 455 (citing, as examples, UDJA claims that would establish the State’s contractual or tort liability); Texas Logos, *361 L.P. v. Tex

2018See Magee, 347 S.W.3d at 297-98 .

2014See G & H Towing Co. v Magee, 347 S.W.3d 293, 297-98 (Tex. 2011).

2015A trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment claim requires “a justiciable controversy as to the rights and status of parties actually before the court for adjudication, and the declaration sought must actually resolve the controversy.” Brooks v. Northglen Ass’n, 141 S.W.3d 158, 163-64 (Tex. 2004).

2015II, § 1; Brooks v. Northglen Ass'n, 141 S.W.3d 158, 164 (Tex.2004))). 119 In urging that the hearing examiner's decision should not be deemed to foreclose his declaratory claims, Bracey refers us to a Dallas Court of Appeals decision involving a similar declaratory judgment claim alleging that the City of Dallas had violated Subchapter B and disciplined an employee in spite of it.

2011See IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 855-56 (stating that classifying a suit as a declaratory judgment action does not “change [the] suit’s underlying nature” and explaining that “private parties cannot circumvent the State’s sovereign immunity from suit by characterizing a suit for money damages ... as a declaratory-judgment claim”); City of Dallas v. Blanton, 200 S.W.3d 266, 280 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) (rendering a judgment of dismissal because the plaintiff’s declaratory judgment claim, which concerned the construction of a Dallas city code section, sought to impose liability for damages); Nue

2006See IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 856 (“[Pjrivate parties cannot circumvent the State’s sovereign immunity from suit by characterizing a suit for money damages, such as a contract dispute, as a declaratory-judgment claim.”); see also City of San Benito v. Ebarb, 88 S.W.3d 711, 721 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied) (citing IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 855-56 ).

2010Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 839-40 (Tex. 2007)). 2.

2010Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 839-40 (Tex.2007)). 2.

2019Lower Colo. River Auth. v. City of Boerne, 422 S.W.3d 60 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. dism’d) (“Based on the plain language of section 271.152, the legislature has not expressly and unambiguously waived immunity from suit for a declaratory judgment claim.”); McCandless v. Pasadena Indep.

2015Reply to Tobias’ argument that the award of money damages and attorneys fees under the declaratory judgment claim are also available under section 271.153.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -12- CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -12- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -13- CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -14- -ii- INDEX OF AUTHORITIES CASES Ben Bolt-Palito Blanco Consolidated Independent School Di

2009See City of Houston v. Williams, 216 S.W.3d 827, 828-29 (Tex.2007) (“ ‘private parties cannot circumvent the State’s sovereign immunity from suit by characterizing a suit for money damages, such as a contract dispute, as a declaratory-judgment claim’ ” and “if the sole purpose of such a declaration [regarding a governmental body’s statutory authority] is to obtain a money judgment, immunity is not waived”) (quoting IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 856 ); Koch, 273 S.W.3d at 455 (citing, as examples, UDJA claims that would establish the State’s contractual or tort liability); Texas Logos, *361 L.P. v. Tex

2009See City of Houston v. Williams, 216 S.W.3d 827, 828-29 (Tex. 2007) (“‘private parties cannot circumvent the State’s sovereign immunity from suit by characterizing a suit for money damages, such as a contract dispute, as a declaratory-judgment claim’” and “if the sole purpose of such a declaration [regarding a governmental body’s statutory authority] is to obtain a money judgment, immunity is not waived”) (quoting IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 856 ); Koch, 273 S.W.3d at 455 (citing, as examples, UDJA claims that would establish the State’s contractual or tort liability); Texas Logos, L.P. v. Texas Dep

2015Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 11 (Tex. 1991), citing Flint & Assoc. v. Intercontinental Pipe & Steel, Inc., 739 S.W.2d 622, 624-25 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, writ denied). 94 Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 313-14 (Tex. 2006). ! 21! inseparable from each other, the entire amount of attorney’s fees sought by Appellee is recoverable and not subject to segregation.95 Appellants for the first time on appeal attack Appellee’s attorney’s fee claim on the basis that the April 23, 2012, order resolved the declaratory judgment claim; which bars any fees thereafter. 96 Appellants’ failu

2012Second, CPS and Joubran cite Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299 (Tex.2006), and argue that Hughes’s attorney’s fees were not properly segregated because he was obligated to segregate the “discrete legal services” pertaining to his defense of the declaratory judgment claim.

2021Co. v. KCS Res., LLC, 450 S.W.3d 203 , 223–24 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (finding that the UDJA permits the award of attorney’s fees, as a party defending a claim for declaratory relief, even when the UDJA claimant nonsuits his UDJA claim); Barshop, 925 S.W.2d at 637–38 (holding that a failure to “substantially prevail[ ]” on a declaratory judgment claim does not preclude recovery of attorney’s fees under the UDJA); Bailey v. Smith, 581 S.W.3d 374 , 399 (Tex. App.— Austin 2019, pet. denied) (“That principle does not preclude an award of fees for defending against anoth

2015Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618 , 637–38 (Tex. 1996) (holding that failure to “substantially 1 The plaintiffs in the Dominguez suit sought damages prevail[ ]” on a declaratory judgment claim does not for injuries they sustained when they were thrown from preclude recovery of attorney's fees under the UDJA). their horses while riding along FM 906 in Lamar County, Texas.

2018Id. at 643 .

2013See Hallman, 159 S.W.3d at 641-43 ; Petroleum Analyzer Co., L.P., 2010 WL 2789016 , at *21; Bradt, 905 S.W.2d at 759-60 .

2018Martin, 133 S.W.3d at 265 ; Plumb, 617 S.W.2d at 669 .

2018Martin, 133 S.W.3d at 265 ; Plumb, 617 S.W.2d at 669 .

2013See Cytogenix, Inc., 213 S.W.3d at 489-90 ; Kenneth Leventhal & Co., 978 S.W.2d at 258 -59 The Bank successfully defended against the Murphys’ declaratory-judgment claim and successfully prosecuted its own declaratory-judgment claim; Accordingly, the trial court had discretion to award the Bank attorney’s fees under section 37.009.

2013See Cytogenix, Inc., 213 S.W.3d at 489–90; Kenneth Leventhal & Co., 978 S.W.2d at 258–59 The Bank successfully defended against the Murphys’ declaratory-judgment claim and successfully prosecuted its own declaratory-judgment claim.

2010We further held in Freedman that parties may not “recast their . . . claims . . . as equitable claims to avoid the requirement of legislative consent to suit.” Freedman , 110 S.W.3d at 508 .

2007IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 856 ; Freedman v. Univ. of Houston, 110 S.W.3d 504, 508 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).