declaratory judgment rule in Michigan

2022However, because our decision regarding retroactivity provides full relief to the injured plaintiffs, they no longer have any personal interest in whether prospective application of the amendments can survive constitutional scrutiny. -13- As stated in Fieger v Comm of Ins, 174 Mich App 467, 472 ; 437 NW2d 271 (1988): [R]egardless of the liberal policy underlying the declaratory judgment rule, a plaintiff must still allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself, even if it is an injury shared by a large class of other possible litigants.

2022However, because our decision regarding retroactivity provides full relief to the injured plaintiffs, they no longer have any personal interest in whether prospective application of the amendments can survive constitutional scrutiny. -13- As stated in Fieger v Comm of Ins, 174 Mich App 467, 472 ; 437 NW2d 271 (1988): [R]egardless of the liberal policy underlying the declaratory judgment rule, a plaintiff must still allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself, even if it is an injury shared by a large class of other possible litigants.

2023A litigant has standing to seek a declaratory judgment if the “litigant meets the requirements of MCR 2.605.” Lansing Sch Edu Ass’n, 487 Mich at 372 .

2023A litigant has standing to seek a declaratory judgment if the “litigant meets the requirements of MCR 2.605.” Lansing Sch Edu Ass’n, 487 Mich at 372 .

2020The majority’s approach is inconsistent with the principles underlying the declaratory judgment rule, which are: to enable the parties to obtain adjudication of rights before an actual injury occurs, to settle a matter before it ripens into a violation of the law or a breach of contract, or to avoid multiplicity of actions by affording a remedy for declaring in expedient action the rights and obligations of all litigants. [Rose v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 274 Mich App 291, 294 ; 732 NW2d 160 (2006) (emphasis added).] Plaintiff contends that defendant failed to properly interpret and apply tw

2020The majority’s approach is inconsistent with the principles underlying the declaratory judgment rule, which are: to enable the parties to obtain adjudication of rights before an actual injury occurs, to settle a matter before it ripens into a violation of the law or a breach of contract, or to avoid multiplicity of actions by affording a remedy for declaring in expedient action the rights and obligations of all litigants. [Rose v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 274 Mich App 291, 294 ; 732 NW2d 160 (2006) (emphasis added).] Plaintiff contends that defendant failed to properly interpret and apply tw

2020Generally, where the injury sought to be prevented is merely hypothetical, a case of actual controversy does not exist. [Citizens for Common Sense in Gov’t v Attorney General, 243 Mich App 43, 55 ; 620 NW2d 546 (2000) (citations and quotation marks omitted).] Accordingly, “[w]hen there is no actual controversy, the court lacks jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment.” Van Buren Charter Twp 319 Mich App at 545. -4- III.

2020Generally, where the injury sought to be prevented is merely hypothetical, a case of actual controversy does not exist. [Citizens for Common Sense in Gov’t v Attorney General, 243 Mich App 43, 55 ; 620 NW2d 546 (2000) (citations and quotation marks omitted).] Accordingly, “[w]hen there is no actual controversy, the court lacks jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment.” Van Buren Charter Twp 319 Mich App at 545. -4- III.

2003Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 588-589 ; 267 NW2d 72 (1978); Durant v Michigan (On Remand), 238 Mich App 185, 204-205 ; 605 NW2d 66 (1999). “[W]hat is essential to an ‘actual controversy’ under the declaratory judgment rule is that plaintiff plead and prove facts which indicate an adverse interest necessitating a sharpening of the issues raised.” Shavers, supra at 589 ; Fieger v Comm’r of Ins, 174 Mich App 467, 470-471 ; 437 NW2d 271 (1988).

2003Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 588-589 ; 267 NW2d 72 (1978); Durant v Michigan (On Remand), 238 Mich App 185, 204-205 ; 605 NW2d 66 (1999). “[W]hat is essential to an ‘actual controversy’ under the declaratory judgment rule is that plaintiff plead and prove facts which indicate an adverse interest necessitating a sharpening of the issues raised.” Shavers, supra at 589 ; Fieger v Comm’r of Ins, 174 Mich App 467, 470-471 ; 437 NW2d 271 (1988).

2000See MCR 2.605. 2 As the Supreme Court stated, in Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 588 ; 267 NW2d 72 (1978): The declaratory judgment rule was intended and has been liberally construed to provide a broad, flexible remedy with a view to making the courts more accessible to the people. 2 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed), Committee Comment, p 683, Comm’r of Revenue v Grand Trunk W R Co, 326 Mich 371, 375 ; 40 NW2d 188 (1949).

1978GCR 1963, 521.1 provides: "In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, any circuit court of this state may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking a declaratory judgment, whether or not relief is or could be sought or granted.” The declaratory judgment rule was intended and has been liberally construed to provide a broad, flexible remedy with a view to making the courts more accessible to the people. 2 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed), Committee Comment, p 683; Comm’r of Revenue v Grand Trunk WR Co, 326 Mich 371, 375 ;

2024Pontiac Police & Fire Prefunded Group Health and Ins Trust Bd of Trustees v Pontiac No 2, 309 Mich App 611, 624 ; 878 NW2d 783 (2015).

2021The purpose of the declaratory judgment rule is: to enable parties, in appropriate circumstances of actual controversy, to obtain an adjudication of their rights before actual injury occurs, to settle matters before they ripen into violations of law or a breach of contractual duty, to avoid multiplicity of actions by affording a remedy for declaring in one expedient action the rights and obligation of all litigants, or to avoid the strictures associated with obtaining coercive relief, when coercive relief is neither desired nor necessary to resolve the -14- matter. [Skiera v Nat’l Indemnity Co

2021The purpose of the declaratory judgment rule is: to enable parties, in appropriate circumstances of actual controversy, to obtain an adjudication of their rights before actual injury occurs, to settle matters before they ripen into violations of law or a breach of contractual duty, to avoid multiplicity of actions by affording a remedy for declaring in one expedient action the rights and obligation of all litigants, or to avoid the strictures associated with obtaining coercive relief, when coercive relief is neither desired nor necessary to resolve the -14- matter. [Skiera v Nat’l Indemnity Co

2016MCR 2.605(A) empowers a circuit court to issue a declaratory judgment in “a case of actual controversy[.]” PT Today, Inc v Comm’r of the Office of Fin and Ins Servs, 270 Mich App 110, 127 ; 715 NW2d 398 (2006).

2016MCR 2.605(A) empowers a circuit court to issue a declaratory judgment in “a case of actual controversy[.]” PT Today, Inc v Comm’r of the Office of Fin and Ins Servs, 270 Mich App 110, 127 ; 715 NW2d 398 (2006).

2016In any event, since no party raised the issue, we will assume without deciding that plaintiff was entitled to declaratory relief on its claim that defendants violated the act by not timely posting the Planning Commission’s modified meeting schedule, as required by MCL 15.265(3). [Emphasis added.] Later, in responding to the dissent, the Speicher Court noted that “[t]o the extent the dissent invokes the federal presumption that a declaratory judgment is the functional equivalent of an injunction, that presumption has not been adopted in this state, nor would it apply in this context given that

2016In any event, since no party raised the issue, we will assume without deciding that plaintiff was entitled to declaratory relief on its claim that defendants violated the act by not timely posting the Planning Commission's modified meeting schedule, as required by MCL 15.265(3). [Emphasis added.] Later, in responding to the dissent, the Speicher Court noted that “[t]o the extent the dissent invokes the federal presumption that a declaratory judgment is the functional equivalent of an injunction, that presumption has not been adopted in this state, nor would it apply in this context given that

2015A litigant may have standing in this context if the litigant has a special injury or right, or substantial interest, that will be detrimentally affected in a manner different from the citizenry at large or if the statutory scheme implies that the Legislature intended to confer standing on the litigant. [Id. at 372.] Shamel relies on Aichele v Hodge, 259 Mich App 146, 164-165 ; 673 NW2d 452 (2003), in which this Court stated: 1 Because this Court did not grant leave to appeal with respect to plaintiff Paula Schlossberg, she is not a party to this appeal. -2- In Bowie v Arder, 411 Mich 23, 42-43

2015A litigant may have standing in this context if the litigant has a special injury or right, or substantial interest, that will be detrimentally affected in a manner different from the citizenry at large or if the statutory scheme implies that the Legislature intended to confer standing on the litigant. [Id. at 372.] Shamel relies on Aichele v Hodge, 259 Mich App 146, 164-165 ; 673 NW2d 452 (2003), in which this Court stated: 1 Because this Court did not grant leave to appeal with respect to plaintiff Paula Schlossberg, she is not a party to this appeal. -2- In Bowie v Arder, 411 Mich 23, 42-43

2015MCR 2.605(A)(1) provides: “In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, a Michigan court of record may declare the rights and other legal relations of an interested party seeking a declaratory judgment, whether or not other relief is or could be sought or granted.” The declaratory judgment rule, however, “incorporates the doctrines of standing, ripeness, and mootness.” UAW v Central Mich Univ Trustees, 295 Mich App 486, 495 ; 815 NW2d 132 (2012).

2015A litigant may have standing in this context if the litigant has a special injury or right, or substantial interest, that will be detrimentally affected in a manner different from the citizenry at large or if the statutory scheme implies that the Legislature intended to confer standing on the litigant. [Id. at 372.] Shamel relies on Aichele v Hodge, 259 Mich App 146, 164-165 ; 673 NW2d 452 (2003), in which this Court stated: 1 Because this Court did not grant leave to appeal with respect to plaintiff Paula Schlossberg, she is not a party to this appeal. -2- In Bowie v Arder, 411 Mich 23, 42-43

2014Given our Supreme Court’s description of the predecessor rule to MCR 2.605 as “intended to provide for the broadest type of declaratory judgment procedure,” Allstate Ins Co v Hayes, 442 Mich 56 , 65 n 8; 499 NW2d 743 (1993) (quotation marks and citation omitted), I cannot accept the majority’s crabbed view of this powerful remedy.

2014Given our Supreme Court’s description of the predecessor rule to MCR 2.605 as “intended to provide for the broadest type of declaratory judgment procedure,” Allstate Ins Co v Hayes, 442 Mich 56 , 65 n 8; 499 NW2d 743 (1993) (quotation marks and citation omitted), I cannot accept the majority’s crabbed view of this powerful remedy.

2006The declaratory judgment rule, MCR 2.605, neither limits nor expands the subject-matter jurisdiction of the courts, but instead incorporates “traditional restrictions on justiciability such as standing, ripeness, and mootness.” Associated Builders & Contractors v Dep’t of Consumer & Industry Services Director, 472 Mich 117, 125 ; 693 NW2d 374 (2005).

2006The declaratory judgment rule, MCR 2.605, neither limits nor expands the subject-matter jurisdiction of the courts, but instead incorporates “traditional restrictions on justiciability such as standing, ripeness, and mootness.” Associated Builders & Contractors v Dep’t of Consumer & Industry Services Director, 472 Mich 117, 125 ; 693 NW2d 374 (2005).

2000Because declaratory relief is not "sufficient to compel obedience to the constitutional mandate" in the present case, the "electorate has authorized that additional relief be granted." Durant v. Michigan, supra at 208, 566 N.W.2d 272 .

1986Kuhn v East Detroit, 50 Mich App 502, 504 ; 213 NW2d 599 (1973), lv den 391 Mich 815 (1974).

1986Kuhn v East Detroit, 50 Mich App 502, 504 ; 213 NW2d 599 (1973), lv den 391 Mich 815 (1974).

1986See Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 588 ; 267 NW2d 72 (1978), cert den 442 US 934 ; 99 S Ct 2869 ; 61 L Ed 2d 303 (1979).

1986See Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 588 ; 267 NW2d 72 (1978), cert den 442 US 934 ; 99 S Ct 2869 ; 61 L Ed 2d 303 (1979).

1986See Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 588 ; 267 NW2d 72 (1978), cert den 442 US 934 ; 99 S Ct 2869 ; 61 L Ed 2d 303 (1979).

1985See Foote Memorial Hospital v Jackson Hospital Authority, 390 Mich 193, 228-233 ; 211 NW2d 649 (1973) (Levin, J., dissenting in part and concur *73 ring in part) (certified question); Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 588-589 ; 267 NW2d 72 (1978) (declaratory judgment). 51 See Circuit Court’s Findings of Relevant Facts, Nos. 306-309, 322-323, 348-353. 52 See Circuit Court’s Findings of Relevant Facts, Nos. 309-310, 344-347. 53 See Circuit Court’s Findings of Relevant Facts, Nos. 306-309, 322-323, 348-353. 54 See Circuit Court’s Findings of Relevant Facts, Nos. 352-353. 55 See Circuit C

1978The Court then found plaintiffs had standing under the declaratory judgment rule, supra, to challenge a limited number of issues. 3 The Court of Appeals held constitutional the act’s personal injury protection scheme (affirming the trial court), 65 Mich App 355, 365-367 , and the act’s exclusion of two-wheel vehicles from compulsory no-fault coverage (overruling the trial court), 65 Mich App 355, 367-368 .

1978The Court then found plaintiffs had standing under the declaratory judgment rule, supra, to challenge a limited number of issues. 3 The Court of Appeals held constitutional the act’s personal injury protection scheme (affirming the trial court), 65 Mich App 355, 365-367 , and the act’s exclusion of two-wheel vehicles from compulsory no-fault coverage (overruling the trial court), 65 Mich App 355, 367-368 .

1978That exercise of discretion, however, is a legislative, not a judicial, function." Village of Belle Terre v Boraas, 416 US 1, 8 ; 94 S Ct 1536 ; 39 L Ed 2d 797 (1974); and see New Orleans v Dukes, 427 US 297 ; 96 S Ct 2513 ; 49 L Ed 2d 511 (1976). [1] While the declaratory judgment rule, GCR 1963, 521, is to be liberally construed and administered, the granting of a declaratory judgment is still a matter of judicial discretion.

1978That exercise of discretion, however, is a legislative, not a judicial, function." Village of Belle Terre v Boraas, 416 US 1, 8 ; 94 S Ct 1536 ; 39 L Ed 2d 797 (1974); and see New Orleans v Dukes, 427 US 297 ; 96 S Ct 2513 ; 49 L Ed 2d 511 (1976). [1] While the declaratory judgment rule, GCR 1963, 521, is to be liberally construed and administered, the granting of a declaratory judgment is still a matter of judicial discretion.

1978That exercise of discretion, however, is a legislative, not a judicial, function." Village of Belle Terre v Boraas, 416 US 1, 8 ; 94 S Ct 1536 ; 39 L Ed 2d 797 (1974); and see New Orleans v Dukes, 427 US 297 ; 96 S Ct 2513 ; 49 L Ed 2d 511 (1976). [1] While the declaratory judgment rule, GCR 1963, 521, is to be liberally construed and administered, the granting of a declaratory judgment is still a matter of judicial discretion.

1978That exercise of discretion, however, is a legislative, not a judicial, function." Village of Belle Terre v Boraas, 416 US 1, 8 ; 94 S Ct 1536 ; 39 L Ed 2d 797 (1974); and see New Orleans v Dukes, 427 US 297 ; 96 S Ct 2513 ; 49 L Ed 2d 511 (1976). [1] While the declaratory judgment rule, GCR 1963, 521, is to be liberally construed and administered, the granting of a declaratory judgment is still a matter of judicial discretion.